

Various Domains of Integration of Refugees and their Interrelationships: A Study of Recent Refugee Inflows in Austria

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Abstract

This paper addresses the complexity of, and the interrelationships between, two important aspects of integration of refugees in Austria, namely labour market integration and social integration. While labour market integration is captured in terms of being employed as compared to being unemployed or inactive, social integration distinguishes between social networks and their ethnic composition and social capital. It identifies the key determinants of each of these domains of integration and investigates the direction as well as the size of interdependencies among them. The analysis uses a unique dataset built on the basis of a survey of about 1,600 refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran who had come to Austria since 2010. The analysis establishes an important causal link between social integration and labour market integration (i.e. employment). Both social network effects with Austrians as well as with co-ethnics are important in this context but the former is more powerful than the latter. It shows that both education and length of stay are key determinants of successful labour market integration. Furthermore, tests regarding the relevance of language command for both social and labour market integration show the strong importance of speaking and understanding German, and much less so, of writing German.

Keywords: social integration, labour market integration, refugees, migration

JEL classification: J60, J15, Z10

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1. Introduction

Austria experienced a large influx of refugees in the years 2014 to 2016 during the escalation of the war in Syria. It made it into one of the three economies that absorbed the largest numbers of asylum seekers per capita, together with Germany and Sweden.¹ In Germany about 1.2 million asylum seekers were registered in 2015 and 2016 compared to 131,000 in Austria and 199,000 in Sweden. On a per capita basis, Sweden encountered 17 asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015 (in 2016 this came down to 3), Austria 10 (reduced in 2016 to 5) and Germany 6 (increased in 2016 to 9).

Subsequent to the large inflow in 2015 and as a reaction to the lack of an effective European-level mechanism to “spread the burden” of hosting refugee populations, all three countries have been implementing procedures to reduce the (unauthorised) inflow of asylum seekers. Governments granted or shortened the period for a temporary residence permit instead of a permanent one, (temporarily) suspended family reunification for those under subsidiary protection, extended the list of safe origin countries and made permanent residence permits conditional on individual integration efforts.

At the same time, governments in all three countries allocated considerable resources to enhance integration. Given the importance of recent refugee inflows into Austria, it is obviously of great importance to study the integration experiences (not only economic, but also social, cultural and political) of refugees who came into Austria. Previous post WWII refugee flows into Austria were predominantly from other European countries (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia and Poland 1968 and 1981 and Yugoslavia during the Balkan crisis of the 1990s). The most recent refugee influx is the first significant refugee inflow from outside Europe (especially from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Iran) and hence of particular importance as one can expect ‘South-North’ migration and refugee flows into Europe to become more dominant.

The analysis in this paper focusses on two domains of integration: labour market integration (LMI) and social integration (SI). Labour market integration is captured in terms of being employed as compared to being unemployed or inactive, while social integration distinguishes between social networks (and their ethnic composition in terms of co-ethnic social networks and non-coethnic, i.e. predominantly Austrian, social networks) and social capital.²

The paper contributes to the existing literature on several accounts. First, it looks into the causal relationship between labour market and social integration of refugees. Traditionally, both domains of integration are either analysed separately or in an exogenous setting ignoring that labour market and social integration are interdependent with causality running both ways. Prevailing interdependencies between both domains of integration are important from a policy-perspective as, for instance, labour market integration can be accelerated by means of both labour market and social integration policies and measures. Second, it uses several different social integration measures to explicitly account for the complexity and multidimensionality of social integration. In this context, it not only distinguishes the

¹ Hungary also received a large number of asylum seekers, but very few of those remained in Hungary.

² The operationalisation of these two concepts in our study will be explained in Section 4.

concept of *social network* from that of *social capital* (for the concept, see Putnam, 1995, 2002, and Ager and Strang, 2004, 2008) but also takes the ethnic composition of social networks into account and differentiates between co-ethnic networks only with people from the same country of birth and non-coethnic networks, mainly with Austrians. *Social networks* refer to the interactions that take place with persons either from the host society, or from the place a migrant/refugee comes from (co-ethnics) or with migrants/refugees that come from other countries. In quantitative research, surveys attempt to find out how wide a network is and how intensive the interaction with a particular network is. Why are such interactions important? In the context of integration, social networks can assist (at times also hinder in certain respects) integration processes as they provide information and also other types of support to find one's way in a foreign, unfamiliar place. Many studies find that social networks are important for integration (for employment, entrepreneurship, housing, education, etc.; for a sample of studies see Bakker et al., 2013; 2016, Beaman, 2012; Drever and Hoffmeister, 2008; Franzen and Hangartner, 2006; Kanas et al., 2012; Lamba and Krahn, 2003). *Social capital* is a concept that has been developed by Putnam (1995, 2002). It refers to the direct mobilisation of resources that a social context can potentially provide to a person. It refers to whether a person has actual access – through the social capital he/she has built up – to support in particular circumstances (if a person is ill, needs to borrow money, in finding accommodation, getting support to deal with the institutions of the host society, get access to educational/training facilities, and – of course – employment). Social capital is closely linked to social networks but both the potential to provide support and the nature of this support depend very much on the type of social network in which an individual situates him/herself and the particular position which he/she occupies in it. The latter in turn also depends on personality characteristics and the particular personal circumstances that led to the build-up of a particular social set-up. The differentiation by ethnic composition allows a more nuanced and differentiated look at the role various networks play for integration. However, due to data limitations, a similar differentiation of social capital by ethnic composition in terms of *bonding capital* – i.e. ties with refugees from the same country of origin – and *bridging social capital* – i.e. ties between refugees and the host community – was impossible (for the distinction between these two concepts, see Kanas and Van Tubergen, 2009). Finally, it uses a novel and unique survey data set which captures the integration processes of recent refugees, particularly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq in Austria along various dimensions. In this respect, it allows us to identify the key determinants of, and obstacles to, the successful integration of refugees in Austria which is key to informed and targeted integration policies.

Our results show that labour market and social integration are strongly interrelated such that socially more integrated refugees are also more likely to be in paid employment or, to a lesser extent, also in inactivity³, and that refugees in paid employment or in inactivity are also socially more integrated. However, important differences are observable along the various dimensions of labour market and social integration. For instance, refugees in paid employment are socially better integrated than inactive refugees. Furthermore, refugees in paid employment are not only socially better integrated with Austrians but can also rely on more social capital while inactive refugees are only socially better integrated with their co-ethnic networks but can fall back on little additional social capital. Furthermore, education, length of stay in Austria, German language proficiency and religious affiliation are key determinants of a refugee's successful labour market integration while age and marital status are key determinants of a refugee's probability of being inactive. Likewise, German language proficiency as well as the intention to stay permanently in Austria matter the most for a refugee's integration into social

³ A closer inspection of the data shows that a large share of those in 'inactivity' are actually young people in training or education.

networks with Austrians as well as the social capital he can fall back on. In contrast, religious affiliation or country of birth are key determinants of a refugee's integration into co-ethnic social networks. Once endogeneity between both domains of integration is accounted for, the analysis provides some evidence that higher social integration causes better labour market integration, particularly in terms of better chances of refugees to find paid employment. However, this causal effect only emanates from stronger networks mainly with Austrians. The analysis was unable to establish the causal relationship running from labour market integration to social integration since the necessary methodological preconditions (i.e. a relevant instrument) were not met.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related literature and sheds light on the key determinants of, and the interrelationships between, both domains of integration under scrutiny. Section 3 briefly discusses the data source while Section 4 gives a detailed account of the methodological approach and the different integration measures used in the analysis. A brief overview of the degree of labour market and social integration among refugees in Austria is provided in Section 5. In Section 6, the key determinants of both domains of integration are discussed in detail while Section 7 addresses endogeneity between both domains of integration and discusses the causal interrelationships between them. Finally, Section 8 summarises and concludes.

2. Related literature

The literature on migrants' integration into host societies and their economies has become extensive and studies on refugees' integration have also developed quite strongly. Traditionally, research on refugees had concentrated on the classical large immigration countries, the United States, Canada and Australia, but the recent refugee waves (and the prospects of future waves) into Europe have generated increased work in Europe as well.

Overall one might want to distinguish between the literature that focusses more on economic issues, in particular labour market integration, and the literature that examines social, cultural and political integration. However, it is clear that the different dimensions of integration interact. The consequence is that integration in one domain cannot be understood without examining progress and blockages in the other domains.

The literature on *labour market integration* of migrants and refugees can build on a well-developed theoretical and empirical literature regarding the functioning of labour markets. Thus, it is clear that human capital (i.e. the skills which a person has built up) is essential for access to a set of potential jobs (Mincer, 1974). In the particular case of migrants and refugees, there are specific additional issues to be considered: one is the transferability of skills and educational qualifications (Kanas and van Tubergen, 2009; Duvander, 2001; Friedberg, 2000) and the other is the social/cultural element that indicates that additional capabilities are to be acquired (in particular language skills, but also cultural behavioural norms; Parasnis et al., 2008; Clark and Lindley, 2009; Lundborg, 2013; Korac, 2009; Mulvey and Council, 2013; Ortensi, 2015; Phillimore, 2011 and 2012; Refugee Council, 2006; Wauters and Lambrecht, 2008; Robila, 2018). In both these two areas, it is likely that a migrant (or refugee) will have difficulties for some time in exploiting the full potential of the educational and skill levels that he/she had acquired before arriving in the host country (Chiswick and Miller, 2008 and 2014; Green et al., 2007; Griesshaber and Seibel, 2015.). It will be very important in this phase to focus on the 'complementary skills' that are missing (see the literature that examines the relative value of skills acquired before and after migration: Friedberg, 2000; Hall and Farkas, 2008) and, further, not to impose unnecessary formal stumbling blocks that prevent a mutually beneficial transfer of skills and of educational qualifications.

Further, there is the literature on 'matching' in the labour market, i.e. of persons looking for a job and of the needs of potential employers (see, e.g., Pissarides, 2000). Here information is crucial: knowing about a particular job and its suitability for oneself, about the 'screening' devices used by employers of the potential pool of applicants for a particular job and the criteria applied in the selection processes of applicants. In all these areas, new arrivals will be at a disadvantage compared to the indigenous population (Clark and Lindley, 2009; Bevelander, 2016; Luik et al., 2016; Battisti et al., 2018; McDonald and Worswick, 1999; Mamgain and Collins, 2003; Sarvimaeki, 2017). Furthermore, refugees who have less anchorage (in pre-existing networks) and had less preparation before their arrival than other types of migrants are also at a disadvantage (Cortes, 2004).

There is a further issue which affects refugees much more than other migrant groups and that is the state of their health. Refugees have often experienced violent and traumatic events in their countries of origin or on the routes of escape. These experiences are potential sources of mental and physical health

problems (Alpak et al., 2015; de Vroome and van Tubergen, 2010; Hondius et al., 2000; Gerritsen et al., 2006; Porter and Haslam, 2005; Leitner et al., 2019) and these in turn can be a hindrance for both dimensions of integration which are the concern of this paper, i.e. social integration and labour market integration (Hauff and Vaglum, 1993; Takeda, 2000; Waxman, 2001).

Let us move to the vast *literature on social integration* and also its links to labour market integration. Regarding the overall issue of social and cultural integration, Berry (1997) in a well-known article provides a conceptual framework on ‘acculturation’ and ‘adaptation to host societies’. He draws on a definition of ‘acculturation’ presented by Redfield et al (1936, p. 149): “acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups”. This literature draws on cross-cultural psychology, but is also highly relevant for the choices that migrants/refugees make regarding the ‘social networks’ they enter into and how their relationships in these networks evolve in different phases of their ‘adaptation’ to life in a new country (see also Ager and Strang, 2004, 2008; Korac, 2009).

The literature generally recognises that social networks play a major role in the economic integration of immigrants and of refugees (Delaporte and Matloop, 2017; Kazemipur, 2006; Franzen and Hangarter, 2006; Kanas et al., 2012; Mangain and Collins, 2003; Beaman, 2012; Lamba and Krahn, 2003; Cheung and Phillimore, 2014; Kearns and Whitely, 2015; De Vroome and van Tubergen, 2010; Robila, 2018). It particularly emphasises the difference of the impact of social networks with co-ethnics and with persons of the host society: they provide different access to information, to contacts and have different implications for the direction and the provision of resources for integration (into the labour market and otherwise). Putnam (2002) refers to the associated build-up of ‘social capital’ as ‘bonding’ if it results from contacts with one’s own ethnic community and ‘as bridging’ if it emerges from contacts with natives.

Contacts with members of the host population in and outside the workplace have been shown in many studies as being important for gaining access to important information, affecting job placements and earnings once in employment (Drever and Hoffmeister, 2008; Kazemipur, 2006; Tammaru et al., 2010; Delaporte and Matloop, 2017; Cheung and Phillimore, 2014). However, the cultural contacts with one’s own community also provide social support and may improve labour market access (Ibrahim et al., 2010; Takeda, 2000). Immigrant ethnic enclaves may provide labour market information and access to jobs (Wang and Maani, 2014; Kanas et al., 2012; Levanon, 2014). However, there is also evidence of some negative sides of a strong anchorage in co-ethnic networks (Finney and Simpson, 2009). Thus Battisti et al. (2015) find that larger social co-ethnic networks are associated with lower human capital investments, and – importantly – there can be a negative impact on earnings prospects if there is a high linguistic concentration in the areas where immigrants or refugees live (Chiswick and Miller, 2002; Borjas, 1995; Damm, 2009; Cutler et al., 2008; Edin et al., 2003).

Which brings us to the importance of language acquisition and language use: command of the host country’s language is an important element of human capital and highly relevant for the types of jobs migrants will have access to and to their earnings prospects (Chiswick and Miller, 2002, 2014; Carliner, 1995, 1996; Dustmann, 1999; Dustmann and van-Soest, 2002; Rivera-Batiz, 1990; Shields and Price, 2001; White and Kaufman, 1997). It also serves as a ‘signalling device’ of social integration beyond the mere operational functionality of its use.

There is also research that compares the integration experiences of refugees longitudinally with those of other migrant types (principally economic migrants and migrants coming via family reunion) and here a number of interesting patterns emerge (Cortes, 2004; Connor, 2010; Bevelander and Pendakur, 2014; Bevelander, 2016; Bakker et al., 2016; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2017). An important distinguishing characteristic is the much lower likelihood (or perception of that likelihood) that refugees would return to their native country. This is natural given the experiences that led to their leaving their country. This has implications for the incentives to integrate (thus to invest in country-specific human and social capital⁴) and has an impact on mobility patterns over time as many of the studies suggest. Thus, while refugees start off with much greater difficulties of finding jobs (given the lack of prior preparation and of pre-existing networks and information), earn less and experience greater jobs-skills mismatches than other types of migrants (controlling for other characteristics), these deficits will disappear over time. Studies suggest that earnings profiles (and inter-generational mobility) might supersede those of other types of migrants over time (see, e.g., Cortes, 2004).

Finally, we come to the issue of policies in relation to refugees: a large part of the literature is occupied with the question of coordination of refugee policies across countries, especially of advanced economies and the European Union in particular (Hatton, 2015, 2016; Dustmann et al., 2016; Fasani et al., 2018). The other policy area is what we can learn from the integration experiences of refugees in relation to specific policies that are designed to accompany first the asylum application process and then from policy-settings that target social and economic integration after that. We shall concentrate here on this second policy area as our study will also come up with some policy lessons that could be learnt.

One branch of the literature of the impact of policy on refugee integration is concerned with policies that affect refugees during the asylum application process. In particular, the impacts of length of asylum application procedures, of location and type of initial accommodation/housing and of access to some type of occupation (or training) during the application stage on subsequent health, social integration and labour market performance have been analysed in a range of studies (Bakker et al., 2013, 2016; Philipps, 2006; Phillimore, 2012; Fasani et al., 2018; Home Office, 2005, 2009; Hainmueller et al., 2016; Hvidtfeldt et al., 2018; Marbach et al., 2018).

The accommodation/housing issue has implications for developing contacts with the host population (as compared to being limited to the refugee community) during the asylum application stage. Studies examined in particular whether countries should opt for a wide 'dispersal' of refugees across space (in local communities; this happened quite often into more peripheral areas as housing costs could be kept down) or be concentrated in refugee centres with little possibility to interact with the host population (Bakker et al., 2016; Stewart, 2012; Madanipour and Weck, 2015). Furthermore, length and living conditions during the asylum application stage can significantly affect health (in particular mental health) as well as skill (and motivational) attrition and thus future job market integration. An interesting examination of 'comparative integration contexts' is undertaken by Schneider and Crul (2010).

Once a positive decision on their asylum application has been reached, the following policy issues arise: how can pre-migration education/training be complemented by post-migration training and further education? What are the returns that refugees obtain from further training and education, and to which

⁴ This can take the form of a strong incentive to make use of educational and training facilities, acquire further degrees and qualifications, and it might also show up in incentives to quickly acquire language skills. Further – at the level of social and cultural integration – refugees might make strong attempts to speed up naturalisation and invest strongly into the integration possibilities of the children (particularly through education).

extent can this build on pre-migration educational attainment and skill levels? Further, how should authorities proceed with respect to the recognition of (at times informally acquired) skill levels (e.g. a carpenter who was trained in a family's workshop without getting any formal certificate or diploma)?

In this context, there are many studies that emphasise and prove the importance of acquiring a command of the host country's language (see literature cited above).

As regards labour market integration and further training and education, research points to a short-term vs. longer-term trade-off between the advantage of gaining a quick entry into some type of employment vs. the possible disadvantage of longer-term under-utilisation of skill potential and longer-term skills-jobs mismatches. The latter would lead to a lower longer-term trajectory of earnings and jobs quality (and even employment rates) (Fasani et al., 2018).

As regards successful entry into the jobs market, the issue of support systems that public labour market institutions (in particular those providing active labour market policy support) and other institutions in the home country may provide is highly relevant. This is on top of 'social network' supports (either by utilising contacts with the co-ethnic or immigrant community or with members of the host society). Not only are the labour market institutions that central or local governments provide (such as the Austrian Public Employment Service, AMS, in Austria) important but also the assistance and types of support of various NGOs. The degree and ways in which they complement government policies at the national and local levels are essential to economic and social integration in many countries. In this respect research has also been undertaken on the impact of policy frameworks tailored to the needs of different groups of refugees (by country of origin, by gender, by age and by educational attainment levels) (Luik et al., 2016; Waxman, 2001; Adesera and Chiswick, 2007; Andersson et al., 2015; Bratsberg et al., 2017).

As mentioned earlier, the situation with regard to health is of specific importance in the case of refugees given the often traumatic experiences during their escape and on the move and also further after arriving in the asylum destination country. The often precarious health situation of refugees does affect social and economic integration – as our study will also show – and thus specific care provided by the institutions of the host country are important (see also the accompanying studies conducted in the context of this project, Kohlenberger et al., 2019; Leitner et al., 2019).

Let us finally address a basic contradiction in advanced economies between refugees' admission and integration policies. Given the lack of international cooperation in the design of admissions policies there is, on the one hand, an incentive of a 'race to the bottom', i.e. to make a country less attractive as a destination country for refugees (e.g. tightening up on granting asylum; prolonging the period of decision-making, providing little integration possibilities during the asylum application stage in terms of work and training opportunities and in terms of housing and cutting down on any monetary support). On the other hand, policy-makers know that bad conditions during the asylum application stage unfavourably affect the later social and labour market integration processes (impact on health, skill and motivation, contact with the host society and possibly criminality). This contradiction could be eased through much stronger international cooperation in the design and implementation of asylum criteria, jointly dealing with the geo-politics that generate large refugee waves and – probably the most difficult issue – explicitly tackling the cross-country allocation of refugees once conflictual situations in the neighbourhood lead to strong refugee waves (see also Fasani et al., 2018; Hatton, 2015).

3. Data

The data of this study stem from the FIMAS+ INTEGRATION survey (ICMPD, 2018). It is a unique survey dataset designed as a longitudinal dataset which aims at capturing the integration processes of recent refugees of working age (between 15 and 60 years of age) particularly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq in Austria along various dimensions.

All in all, three survey waves are envisaged with a one-year re-interview interval. Two rounds of data collection have been conducted to date while the third round is currently under way. The first round (FIMAS) was conducted between August 2016 and May 2017 in Vienna, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria and Tyrol through face-to-face interviews. The FIMAS+ INTEGRATION survey (2nd wave) was conducted between December 2017 and April 2018 in the five Austrian provinces of Vienna, Upper Austria, Styria, Salzburg and Tyrol either through face-to-face interviews (CAPI), self-administered questionnaires (tablet/PC, CASI) or online questionnaires (CAWI). Face-to-face interviews were conducted at various refugee, education and employment organisations in the five provinces' capital cities. Interviews were conducted by trained interviewers (native speakers) either in German, Arabic or Farsi depending on interviewees' preference and language proficiency. Similarly, online questionnaires were also available in German, Arabic and Farsi. Furthermore, a helpline was set up and staffed with native speakers to assist interviewees in completing the online questionnaires.


The majority of the interviewees were reached by a random sampling of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection who either are or were previously registered with the Austrian Public Employment Service (AMS), which was based on client data of the AMS. In addition, face-to-face interviews were conducted in the various Austrian provinces, plus respondents were approached from the first survey wave (conducted between August 2016 and May 2017), who had agreed to be contacted again for a new survey. Interviewees were selected based on random sampling, stratified by province and citizenship.

The survey sample FIMAS+INTEGRATION which has been used for this paper comprises around 1,640 refugees. Figure 1 shows that around 55% of the refugees in the sample are from Syria, 21% are from Afghanistan while 14% are from Iraq. Furthermore, the majority of the refugees in the sample are male (79%) while females (21%) are quite underrepresented. As concerns their resident status, around two-thirds are recognised refugees, 20% have subsidiary protection status while 11% have another resident title which allows them to live and work in Austria. The remaining persons in the sample are either Austrian citizens (2%) or have asylum or subsidiary protection in another country but no permanent resident status in Austria (1%). Moreover, while the majority of refugees in the sample in general came to Austria mainly in 2014, 2015 and 2016 (see Figure 2 below), refugees from Afghanistan had already started to arrive somewhat earlier.

The ensuing analysis uses a sub-sample of the total FIMAS+INTEGRATION refugee sample. In particular, given our interest in the recent wave of refugees predominantly from the Middle East and their labour market integration, we focus on refugees from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria and excluded


refugees who came to Austria before 2010 and who have a resident status which does not allow them to access the labour market. Furthermore, initial analyses of the total sample revealed that the small groups of very young refugees (aged below 19), as well as females, are characterised by different behavioural patterns from the main sample (i.e. males over the age of 18) which strongly biased our results. However, since both groups are too small in our dataset to warrant separate analyses⁵, we excluded them to guarantee more representative results.

Figure 1 / Demographic characteristics of sample: Citizenship, gender and resident status



Source: FIMAS+, own calculations.

Figure 2 / Year of arrival in Austria, by country of birth



Source: FIMAS+, own calculations.

⁵ The next two waves of refugee surveys, one currently completed and a further one planned, will include a sufficient number of women and young people to properly extend our analysis to these two groups.

4. Methodological approach and model specification

To shed light on the interrelationship between the two dimensions of integration of refugees in Austria, the following two-equation model is used:

$$LMI_{it} = \alpha_1 SI_{it} + \mathbf{x}_{it1} \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 + u_{it1} \quad (1)$$

$$SI_{it} = \alpha_2 LMI_{it} + \mathbf{x}_{it2} \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 + u_{it2} \quad (2)$$

where LMI_{it} refers to labour market integration and SI_{it} to social integration. Labour market integration is captured in terms of people's labour market status at the time of the interview, namely as (i) *unemployed* (and registered at the AMS as searching), (ii) *inactive* due to, for instance, maternity/parental leave, studying/training, ill-health/physical disabilities, household responsibilities, or other reasons (unspecified), and (iii) *employed*, only in paid employment (any type of unpaid, voluntary work is excluded). The composition of the group of inactive persons is rather skewed and dominated by (young) refugees in education or training (80%), while refugees in ill-health or with physical disabilities (7%), on maternity or parental leave (3%) or who are inactive due to other reasons (10%) only constitute small percentage shares. In the econometric analysis, the group of unemployed serves as reference group.

As concerns social integration, we construct different indices from various survey questions. To account for the complexity and multidimensionality of social integration, we distinguish the concept of social network from that of social capital. Social networks refer to the circle of friends, peers, acquaintances and professional contacts and the type and intensity of relationships between these different people, which can have both positive and negative influences on the people involved. For instance, Beaman (2012) shows that depending on the tenure of network members, having a larger network can both support employment prospects but also in some cases lead to a deterioration in labour market outcomes. In particular, competition between network members for job information (when larger networks are formed by new arrivals) can be detrimental for newcomers if many network members are looking for a job at the same time. In contrast, social capital refers to the concrete resources, help and support garnered from networks (Foley and Edwards, 1998). *Social networks* are measured not only by the size of the network but also by how frequently contacts are made with the people from the network. The size of the social network is captured by the question "How many people do you know in Austria who are important to you and who you feel close to (excluding parents, partner, children)?" Answers are coded on a 5 point scale, ranging from (1) none to (2) one, (3) two, (4) three, and (5) more than three. The latter was an open answer option. We further distinguish social networks by their ethnic composition and differentiate between *co-ethnic networks* only with people from the same country of birth and *networks with non-coethnics* (i.e. with Austrians and with migrants from a different home country). In particular, the size of co-ethnic networks comprising people who come from the same country of origin/are of the same nationality, is captured by the question "How many of the aforementioned persons are countrymen?". Since there was no similar question in the questionnaire which captures the size of

networks with non-coethnics, we approximated it through the difference between the size of the total network and the size of co-ethnic networks. The ethnic composition of the group of non-coethnics is not captured by this survey wave but is available from the follow-up third survey wave. Preliminary findings from the follow-up survey wave show that non-coethnic networks are dominated by Austrians while migrants from a different home country only play a minor role. Hence, in view of the dominance of Austrians in non-coethnic networks, we refer to these networks as networks with Austrians in the following. The frequency with which contacts are made with the people from the network is again differentiated by the ethnic composition of the social network in terms of either persons from the same country of origin or from Austria. In this respect, “*How often do you spend time with persons from your country of origin who are not related to you?*” captures the contact intensity with the co-ethnic network while “*How often do you spend time with Austrians?*” captures the contact intensity with Austrians. Both questions are measured on a 6 point scale, ranging from (1) never to (2) rarely, (3) every month, (4) ever week, (5) several times a week and (6) daily.

Social capital is measured by means of six different survey questions which capture whether respondents “*know someone in Austria who ...*” (1) “*would help you move or renovate your apartment*”, (2) “*would draw your attention to a job vacancy*”, (3) “*you could discuss personal problems with*”, (4) “*would assist you in completing a form from public authorities*”, (5) “*lend you 200 Euro*” or (6) “*you could have a pleasant time with over coffee or tea*”. By construction, this set of questions refers to the total social network and does not differentiate between social capital either related to people from the same country of origin or Austrians (or migrants from a different country than the refugees’ country of origin). All social capital variables are dummy variables which are coded as one in the case of an affirmative answer and zero otherwise.

Based on these questions, seven different SI indices are constructed (see Figure 3 for an overview):


- › **Total SI index (SI-TOT)** captures the total size of a person’s social network, the intensity of contact he has with it and the total social capital associated with it;
- › **Austrian SI index (SI-AT)** captures the social network with Austrians (in terms of the size of a person’s network predominantly with Austrians and the contact intensity with Austrians) and the total social capital;
- › **Co-ethnic SI index (SI-COB)** captures the social network with co-ethnics (in terms of size and contact intensity) and the total social capital;

This broad concept of social integration is further broken down into its key constituent parts, namely social network, on the one hand, and social capital, on the other, to form an additional set of social integration indices:

- › **Total network index (NETW-TOT)** captures the total size of a person’s network and the contact intensity he has with it;
- › **Austrian network index (NETW-AT)** captures the size of a person’s network predominantly with Austrians and the contact intensity with Austrians only;

- › **Co-ethnic network index (NETW-COB)** captures the size of a person's network with other persons from the same country of origin as well as the intensity of contact he has with them;
- › **Total social capital index (SC-TOT)** refers to a person's overall social capital;

Figure 3 / Different social integration indices



To construct a social integration index from the ten questionnaire items, the first principal component from a polychoric Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is extracted which, in contrast to a standard PCA, explicitly takes the binary and categorical nature of all items into account by using linear combinations of the polychoric correlation matrix of all items.⁶ The polychoric correlation matrices for the underlying questions point to partly strong correlations between the different variables (ranging between 0.4 and 0.9) which renders the data-reducing PCA a viable approach. Generally, the first principal components of the various SI indices explain between 55% and 70% of the variance in the data. Furthermore, all underlying variables show sufficient positive correlation with the first principal components suggesting that the first principal component increases with increases in any of the underlying variables and that all underlying variables vary together. To ease their interpretability, the first principal components of each SI indicator are rescaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

Furthermore, x_{it1} and x_{it2} are vectors of additional explanatory variables likely to determine each of the two dimensions of integration (see Table 1 for summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis⁷). The two vectors include the following variables:

The respondent's *age* (in years) and its square to also account for non-linear age-effects.

Marital status is captured by a dummy variable which is equal to one if a person is either married or in a same or different sex relationship, and zero if a person is either single (and was never married), divorced or widowed.

⁶ The approach originated in Pearson (1901) and was further developed in Pearson and Pearson (1922) and Olsson (1979).

⁷ See also Table A.1 in Annex A in which the summary statistics are provided for comparative purposes separately for the three principal groups of refugees in our dataset (Afghanis, Iraqis and Syrians).

Whether a person *lives with his or her family* is captured by a dummy variable which is equal to one if a person lives with either mother, father, siblings or other relatives in the same household and zero otherwise.

Similarly, to capture whether a person *wants to permanently stay in Austria* a dummy variable is included which is equal to one if he wants to stay permanently in Austria and zero if he wants to either move to another country or return to his country of origin.

The respondent's *length of stay in Austria* (in months) and its square are included to account for non-linear effects. Together, both variables capture that integration is a process which takes time and that integration may decrease with the length of stay as efforts (or the effectiveness of such efforts) in the host country made by refugees to integrate may decrease over time. Length of stay is calculated as the difference between the year and month the interview took place and the year and month the person arrived in Austria.

Pre-migration education is captured by the highest level of education a person had acquired prior to coming to Austria, following the nine different ISCED-08 classes (from ISCED-0: Early childhood education to ISCED-8: Doctoral or equivalent level). For simplicity, pre-migration education is captured by a dummy variable which is equal to one if a person has at least graduated high-school (Matura, ISCED-3 and above) and zero otherwise (ISCED-0 to ISCED-2).

A person's *religious affiliation* and its role for labour market and social integration is captured by separate dummy variables for Christians, Muslims and persons with no religious belief (as reference group).

Internal and external locus of control beliefs are included to capture a person's personality. Both variables refer to the degree to which a person believes that he has control over the outcome of events in his life (internal locus of control), as opposed to external forces beyond his control (external locus of control). Internal locus of control belief is constructed as the average score of (1) the degree to which a person considers he has control over his life and (2) will be successful if efforts are taken. External locus of control belief is constructed as the average score of (1) the degree to which a person considers that his life is predominantly controlled/determined by others and (2) that his plans are often disrupted by fate. By construction, higher scores signal a stronger belief that the locus of control is 'internal' or, respectively, 'external'.

Residential status in Austria is measured by means of three dummy variables which are one if a person was granted either asylum (and holds a Blue card⁸ as proof of identity and legality of residence in Austria) or subsidiary protection (and holds a Grey card as proof of identity and legality of residence in Austria) or has another residential status which allows him/her to live and work in Austria. In the analysis, the latter category is used as reference category.

The *province of residence* in Austria refers to the Austrian province a person lived in at the time of the interview. Generally, Austria has nine provinces. However, due to the low number of respondents for some provinces, some provinces were grouped together to form larger regions. Hence, the province of

⁸ The card for persons entitled to asylum is issued to aliens who made their applications for international protection after November 15, 2015 and to whom the status of persons entitled to asylum was granted after June 1, 2016.

residence is captured by six dummy variables which are equal to one if, at the time of the interview, a person lived either in Vienna, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, East and Southeast Austria (Lower Austria, Burgenland and Carinthia together) or Tyrol/Vorarlberg. In the statistical analysis, the latter group of provinces is used as a reference category.

The *country of birth* is measured by four dummy variables which capture whether a refugee was born in (1) Afghanistan, (2) Iran, (3) Iraq (reference group) or (4) Syria.

German language speaking proficiency is included to determine the role of the German language for labour market and social integration. Generally, detailed questions were asked about refugees' self-reported German language ability in terms of speaking, understanding, reading and writing. For each of the four categories of German language ability, responses were coded to form a scale from (0) none/very little, (1) average to (2) advanced/like mother tongue. Since the four categories are fairly strongly correlated, they could not be tested jointly in one model but were instead tested individually in separate models. In each of the models, category (0) serves as a reference category.

Various dummy variables were included to capture whether a person has completed one of the following *integration courses*: (1) Competence check (Kompetenzcheck), (2) Youth college (Jugendcollege), (3) Integration year (Integrationsjahr) or (4) Values and orientation course (Orientierungs- und Wertekurs). For a brief overview of the different labour market integration programmes see Box 1 below.

The frequency of *perceived discrimination* encountered in Austria is measured by means of four dummies which range from (1) never (reference), (2) rarely, (3) sometimes to (4) often or very often.

Finally, u_{it1} and u_{it2} are independent error terms.

BOX 1 / LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION PROGRAMMES FOR REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

Competence Check: The Competence Check is a tool to assess the skills, qualifications and language knowledge of recognised refugees whose competences are not apparent from documents. It is offered in the mother tongue of the refugees involved and in German for those with sufficient German language skills. It takes between 5 and 7 weeks to complete. The aim of the Competence Check is to check and recognise existing skills and qualifications and to define any additional needs for qualifications and training in order to support the integration into the labour market. It also provides refugees with general information about job seeking, the Austrian education system, and the rights and duties of employees and employers in Austria. The Competence Check was piloted in two phases from August 2015 to May 2016 by the Public Employment service (PES) Vienna and rolled out to PES branches in all other regions of Austria in 2016. Between August 2015 and December 2018, Competence Checks were carried out among 18,667 unemployed recognised refugees (77% men, 23% women), more than half of whom originated from Syria, 20% from Afghanistan, 8% from Iraq, 7% from Iran and 14% from other countries.⁹

⁹ Gatterbauer (2018).

Start Vienna-Youth-college for refugees: The Youth-college is a joint project of the PES Vienna, the Vienna Social Fund and the municipal administration responsible for integration and diversity. Its key aim is to provide young refugees and asylum seekers between 15 and 21 years of age with the necessary language skills and a basic education combined with practical work experience in preparation for their subsequent access to compulsory secondary education, vocational training or entry into the labour market. Apart from language courses, mathematics and IT courses, special modules are offered such as compulsory schooling exams, workshops, educational and vocational guidance, socially integrative activities and others. It takes between 6 and 24 months to complete. By August 2018, 2,068 young refugees had been supported as part of this project.

Voluntary integration year¹⁰: From 2016 on, persons who have been granted refugee or subsidiary protection status, who have been in this status for a maximum of two years and who were beneficiaries of the needs-based minimum income are entitled to complete a voluntary integration year (freiwilliges Integrationsjahr – FIJ). In September 2017, the Integration Year Act (Integrationsjahrgesetz – IJG) on the compulsory integration year for refugees became effective which states that persons who have been granted refugee or subsidiary protection status after December 2014 and are still unemployed are obliged to attend the integration year. Also, from January 2018 onwards, asylum seekers (from Syria or Iran) with a high probability of receiving asylum became eligible to complete an integration year (provided they possess sufficient German speaking skills and have completed compulsory schooling). During the integration year, participants attend German language courses, job orientation and job training courses, and vocational training. The main objective is their transition to a regular job. However, this initiative stopped receiving any further funding from March 2019 onwards.

Step2Austria: Following the completion of the Competence Check, Step2Austria offers professional counselling, coaching and placement services to asylum seekers, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (and persons with a migration background) aged 18 and above who are registered at the PES Vienna. The key aim is to place participants with a job that best fits their acquired training and education and previous work experience. In 2018, 635 recognised refugees and persons eligible for subsidiary protection were provided counselling at Step2Austria, 185 of which were successfully placed in employment.

Courses in Austrian values and culture: Values and orientation courses are compulsory one-day training courses in Austrian values and culture offered by the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF) to recently recognised refugees and persons under subsidiary protection who are entitled to the needs-based minimum income and AMS support. In the case of non-participation, the minimum income will be cut accordingly. The courses are seen to be an essential basis for a successful integration process. The courses were first launched in a pilot in December 2015 and, beginning in 2016, implemented nationwide in regular operations. Values and orientation courses comprise eight modules, two of which relate to legal and cultural integration. The courses cover everything from democratic values to system knowledge on key social sectors (such as education system, labour market, health care system, etc.). The functional mediation of values stands in the foreground.

Source: Adapted from Vidovic and Mara (forthcoming).

¹⁰ Pfeffer (2017).

Table 1 / Summary statistics

	Code	Mean	Std		Code	Mean	Std
Labour market integration				Wants to stay permanently in Austria			
Unemployed (ref)	1	0.476	0.499	Yes	1	0.827	0.379
Inactive	2	0.153	0.361	No	0	0.173	0.379
In paid employment	3	0.370	0.483	Country of birth			
Social integration: SI-TOT		0	1	Iraq (ref)	1	0.148	0.355
Social integration: SI-AT		0	1	Afghanistan	1	0.166	0.372
Social integration: SI-COB		0	1	Iran	1	0.031	0.175
Social integration: NETW-TOT		0	1	Syria	1	0.655	0.476
Social integration: NETW-AT		0	1	Province of residence			
Social integration: NETW-COB		0	1	Tyrol/Vorarlberg (ref)	1	0.088	0.283
Social integration: SC-TOT		0	1	Vienna	1	0.558	0.497
Age		30.66	8.67	Upper Austria	1	0.094	0.292
Married				Salzburg	1	0.095	0.293
Yes	1	0.467	0.499	Styria	1	0.144	0.352
No	0	0.533	0.499	ESE-AT (Lower Austria, Carinthia, Burgenland)	1	0.021	0.145
Lives with family				German speaking proficiency			
Yes	1	0.574	0.495	None/little (ref)	1	0.087	0.283
No	0	0.426	0.495	Average	2	0.591	0.492
Months of residence		37.34	14.972	Advanced/like mother tongue (MT)	3	0.322	0.467
Level of education				Integration course			
Matura	1	0.648	0.478	Competence check	1	0.333	0.472
No matura	0	0.352	0.478	Youth college	1	0.023	0.150
Religious affiliation				Integration year	1	0.096	0.294
None (ref)	1	0.145	0.353	Values and orientation course	1	0.148	0.356
Christian	2	0.076	0.265	Perceived discrimination			
Islamic	3	0.764	0.425	Never (ref.)	1	0.320	0.467
Locus of control				Rarely	2	0.244	0.430
Internal locus of control		4.462	0.906	Sometimes	3	0.276	0.447
External locus of control		2.328	1.085	Often/very often	4	0.159	0.366
Residential status				Instruments			
Blue card: granted asylum	1	0.691	0.462	Kessler index (K10)		20.153	9.417
Grey card: granted subsidiary protection	1	0.197	0.398	Ever had a job before (yes=1)	1	0.800	0.400
Other status	1	0.112	0.316	Worked during flight (yes=1)	1	0.224	0.417

Note: Summary statistics refer to the restricted sample.

Methodologically, to identify the key determinants of both labour market and social integration, we proceed in two steps. First, the above two-equation model is analysed in a purely exogenous setting. In view of the categorical nature of labour market integration LMI_{it} , a multinomial logit approach is taken with the group of unemployed as the reference group and SI_{it} as one additional exogenous variable. Conversely, given the continuous nature of the different social integration indices SI_{it} , a standard OLS approach is used with dummies for respondents' labour market status as additional exogenous variables.

In a second step, the endogeneity of the two-equation model is accounted for which also helps to establish causality between the two domains of integration under consideration. In particular, in the above model LMI_{it} and SI_{it} are generally correlated with the error terms u_{it1} and u_{it2} , which makes SI_{it} endogenous in Equation (1) and LMI_{it} endogenous in Equation (2). To solve this endogeneity problem and produce consistent estimators, instrumental variable (IV) procedures are used. In the absence of

any cross-equation restrictions on parameters, we estimate the above simultaneous equations model equation-by-equation and apply IV procedures which explicitly account for the partly non-continuous nature of the key variables of interest.

In particular, for Equation (1) where the endogenous explanatory variable SI_{it} is continuous and the dependent variable LMI_{it} is categorical the control function (CF) approach is used.¹¹ It rests on the idea that if a proxy variable can be identified (i.e. conditioned on the part of SI_{it} which depends on u_{it1}), the remaining variation in the endogenous variable SI_{it} will be independent of the error term u_{it1} so that standard estimation procedures are again consistent. Equation (1) is estimated in two steps. First, the endogenous variable SI_{it} is regressed on a set of exogenous control variables and an instrument. Second, the residuals are retained and used as additional regressors in a multinomial logit model together with the endogenous variable SI_{it} and all exogenous variables x_{it1} . The residuals control for the endogeneity of SI_{it} in the original equation.

This approach requires a relevant and exogenous instrument for the first-stage regression which is sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable SI_{it} but uncorrelated with the outcome variable LMI_{it} , conditional on other control variables. We use the Kessler Psychological Distress Index (K10) as instrument which is based on 10 specific questions about anxiety and depressive symptoms that a person has experienced in the last four weeks and intends to yield a global measure of distress. Responses to the 10 questions are used to calculate a total score which ranges from 10 to 50. Generally, people with a score below 20 are considered to be well. By contrast, people with a score between 20 and 24 are considered to have a mild mental disorder while those with scores between 25 and 29 are considered to have moderate mental disorder. Finally, people with scores of 30 and over are considered to have a severe mental disorder. While the Kessler index might be generally relevant for social and labour market integration, our analyses revealed that it is statistically unrelated to labour market integration which renders it a viable instrument for social integration. This finding is robust for various different model specifications (see Table A.2 in Annex A).

The CF approach also provides a robust, regression-based Hausman test of whether SI_{it} is actually endogenous: the multinomial logit t-statistic on the residual is a valid test of the null hypothesis that SI_{it} is exogenous. Furthermore, since the usual standard errors are incorrect, we use bootstrapping methods to correct the standard errors. In particular, we use a two-stage bootstrap and, to guarantee a certain degree of precision, use 1,000 bootstrap replications to calculate correct standard errors.

For Equation (2), where conversely the endogenous explanatory variable LMI_{it} is categorical and the dependent variable SI_{it} is continuous, we follow Wooldridge (2007) and use a particular 2-step IV estimation procedure. In particular, first, the endogenous variable LMI_{it} is regressed on a set of exogenous control variables and two instruments and fitted values are derived for both outcomes (i.e. inactive and in paid employment). Second, Equation (2) is estimated by IV with the fitted values and all other exogenous variables as instruments (instead of additional regressors as in a standard IV approach). In this context, since the usual standard errors are (asymptotically) valid, they need not be adjusted for the first-stage multinomial logit.

¹¹ For a discussion see, e.g., Wooldridge (2015) or Wooldridge and Imbens (2007).

This approach also requires the identification of a relevant and exogenous instrument. However, since there are two endogenous variables – ‘inactivity’ and ‘in paid employment’ – two such instruments are needed. We use two variables which capture a person’s past labour market experience prior to arriving in Austria. On the one hand, we create a dummy variable which is equal to one if a person has ever had a job for more than 2 months before arriving in Austria. On the other hand, we construct a dummy variable which is equal to one if a person reported that (s)he has worked since they moved from their home country and before arriving in Austria (for more than 4 weeks in a row or in terms of different odd jobs). Both of these instruments are exogenous since, unless previous employers or co-workers form part and parcel of a refugee’s current social network in Austria, which is highly unlikely, they exclusively affect social integration only through labour market integration. Furthermore, both instruments are relevant as past labour market experience is considered to be a good predictor of current labour market status due to acquired experience and human capital in past jobs.

5. The level and frequency of labour market and social integration among refugees in Austria

The labour market status of all respondents – in terms of their share in each labour market category – for the restricted sample as well as broken down by different socio-demographic and geographical characteristics (country of origin, Austrian provinces) is reported in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 2. It highlights that almost half of all respondents with relevant labour market information are unemployed while only around a third are currently in paid employment. Furthermore, it points to partly pronounced differences across various refugee characteristics. For instance, the labour market status differs across age groups and by level of educational attainment. In particular, the share of unemployed increases with age while the share of employed is highest among the youngest two age cohorts (19-24 and 25-34 years of age). Furthermore, the share of inactive is highest among the youngest cohort (19-24 years of age). Moreover, a higher share of refugees with at least higher-secondary education (Matura) is in paid employment. Differences are also apparent across ethnic groups/refugees' country of origin. While most (in some instances more than half) of refugees from either Iran, Iraq or Syria are unemployed, most refugees from Afghanistan are in paid employment. Finally, refugees' employment status also differs across Austrian provinces. More than half of all refugees residing in either Upper Austria or Tyrol are in paid employment while half of the refugees living in either Styria, Vienna or the remaining Eastern and Southern provinces (Lower Austria, Burgenland and Carinthia) are unemployed.

An overview of the average social integration indices is provided in Columns (4) to (10) of Table 2, for the restricted sample as a whole as well as broken down by different socio-demographic and geographical characteristics (country of origin, Austrian provinces). It highlights that social integration differs across the characteristics considered. In particular, younger refugees are socially better integrated and have larger networks and more social capital to fall back on. Furthermore, co-ethnic networks are more important for younger refugees than networks with Austrians. In contrast, no substantial differences are observable across educational attainment levels, as captured by whether refugees have at least finished post-secondary education in terms of a completed high-school examination (Matura). However, social integration differs by country of origin of refugees and is generally higher among refugees from Afghanistan and Iran, who have the strongest networks and can rely on the highest social capital. Of all refugees considered, refugees from Afghanistan can avail of the highest social capital while co-ethnic networks are strongest for refugees from Iran. In contrast, co-ethnic networks and networks with Austrians are similarly strong for refugees from Iraq. Furthermore, social integration also differs across refugees residing in different Austrian provinces. In particular, social integration is highest among refugees living in Upper Austria and Salzburg, who not only have the strongest social networks but can also rely on the highest social capital. Interestingly, refugees living in these two provinces have similarly strong networks with people from their countries of birth as well as with Austrians. In contrast, social integration is lowest among those living in Vienna or East and Southeast Austria (comprising Lower Austria, Burgenland and Carinthia). Interestingly, while social networks are particularly weak among refugees living in Vienna, social capital is extremely low among refugees living in East and Southeast Austria. The ethnic composition of refugees' networks is

particularly skewed for refugees living in Vienna who are integrated the most in co-ethnic networks but integrated the least in networks with Austrians.

Table 2 / Labour market integration (LMI) and social integration (SI) by different characteristics

	Labour market integration				Social integration*						
	Unemployed	Inactive	Employed	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT	
	N	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Total/male	47.62	15.33	37.04	0.513	0.442	0.568	0.190	0.143	0.184	0.615	
19-24	274	40.68	24.58	34.75	0.519	0.447	0.568	0.195	0.147	0.189	0.627
25-34	411	44.32	11.08	44.60	0.514	0.442	0.568	0.192	0.143	0.189	0.625
35-44	190	56.36	9.70	33.94	0.526	0.457	0.591	0.188	0.146	0.176	0.625
45-54	69	68.42	10.53	21.05	0.500	0.426	0.545	0.173	0.135	0.156	0.594
55+	14	69.23	15.38	15.38	0.490	0.417	0.558	0.166	0.106	0.174	0.610
Matura: No	371	49.68	17.52	32.80	0.518	0.443	0.570	0.192	0.141	0.188	0.621
Matura: Yes	683	46.76	14.14	39.10	0.513	0.443	0.569	0.190	0.144	0.183	0.615
Afghanistan	174	31.16	22.46	46.38	0.556	0.467	0.604	0.199	0.146	0.186	0.650
Iran	33	39.13	30.43	30.43	0.535	0.453	0.579	0.200	0.148	0.206	0.639
Iraq	155	51.13	14.29	34.59	0.510	0.452	0.570	0.187	0.155	0.156	0.616
Syria	688	51.14	13.31	35.55	0.507	0.435	0.561	0.189	0.139	0.191	0.610
Upper Austria	101	30.68	13.64	55.68	0.570	0.504	0.620	0.227	0.182	0.182	0.654
Salzburg	102	43.33	12.22	44.44	0.575	0.504	0.628	0.219	0.182	0.181	0.666
Styria	155	44.27	14.50	41.22	0.539	0.466	0.592	0.197	0.157	0.176	0.646
Tyrol/Vbg	94	36.14	7.23	56.63	0.539	0.464	0.587	0.191	0.150	0.165	0.642
Vienna	599	53.59	17.86	28.54	0.490	0.417	0.545	0.177	0.125	0.190	0.594
SEA-AT**	23	57.89	10.53	31.58	0.392	0.385	0.489	0.189	0.146	0.177	0.479

Note: Refers to the restricted sample. *All social integration indices are standardised to lie between 0 and 1. **SEA-AT refers to South and Southeast Austria and encompasses Lower Austria, Burgenland and Carinthia. Numbers of observations across the different sub-groups do not necessarily add up to the total, as we had to drop observations in the various econometric estimations if some crucial variables were missing for specific specifications.

Source: FIMAS+, own calculations.

6. Results

6.1. DETERMINANTS OF LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES IN AUSTRIA

Our results show that labour market integration and social integration are related such that socially more integrated refugees are also more likely to be in paid employment (and partly also in inactivity) (see Table B.1 in Annex B). In quantitative terms, our estimates suggest that an increase in total social integration by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in the probability of being in paid employment by 8.5 percentage points. Furthermore, our results show that the employment effects of social integration differ across the various social integration measures. In particular, social networks tend to have a stronger effect on a refugee's chances of being in paid employment than social capital (8.6 versus 7.1 percentage points). Moreover, the ethnic composition of social networks matters for the probability of being in paid employment. More specifically, stronger social networks with Austrians are of particular importance: An increase in social network integration with Austrians by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in the probability of being in paid employment by 11.5 percentage points. Conversely, co-ethnic social networks have no statistically significant relationship with the probability of being in paid employment.

In contrast, except for co-ethnic networks, there is no statistically significant relationship between social integration and the probability of being inactive. In particular, the probability of being inactive is higher for refugees with stronger co-ethnic networks.¹² In quantitative terms, the effect is however rather small: an increase in co-ethnic networks by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in the probability of being inactive by only 2.4 percentage points.

Furthermore, labour market integration is determined by a set of additional factors. For instance, the probability of being in paid employment is higher among refugees who have lived longer in Austria, are better educated (have at least a high-school leaving examination, i.e. Matura), or were granted subsidiary protection status. Hence, our results confirm that labour market integration takes time and that the probability of being in paid employment increases by around 1 percentage point, on average, for each additional month a refugee lives in Austria. However, there is no statistical indication of a non-linear effect such that labour market integration decreases over time, e.g. linked to the possibility that refugees might reduce their investments into and efforts towards better integration or that the pool of those who remain without employment being different from those that got employed. Furthermore, better education helps smooth the transition into employment. In particular, refugees with at least a high-school leaving examination (Matura) are around 10 percentage points more likely to be in paid employment than refugees with either no formal education or only primary or lower secondary education.

Results reported in Table B.3 to Table B.6 focus on whether a good command of the German language is decisive for refugees' labour market integration. Generally, the causality between language proficiency and labour market outcome is unclear and can run both ways as a better command of German helps

¹² In the interpretation of the results regarding inactivity, we should keep in mind that 80% in our sample that belong to the group of 'inactive' are in education or training. This might explain the strong co-ethnic network for those in inactivity i.e. mostly young people in education, training and in courses provided for refugees.

refugees improve their chances of being in paid employment while, conversely, a regular job and stronger exposure to native speakers helps improve their German language skills and proficiency. Our results show that only fluency in German in terms of German speaking and understanding abilities appears to matter. In particular, refugees with average and advanced German speaking abilities are between 20 and 30 percentage points more likely to be in paid employment than those with no or very little German speaking abilities. Similarly, refugees with advanced German understanding abilities are between 20 and 26 percentage points more likely to be in paid employment than those with no or very little German understanding abilities. In contrast, literacy in terms of German reading and writing abilities has no statistically significant relationship with a refugee's chances of being in paid employment. The lacking relevance of literacy for labour market success is somewhat surprising but seems to be reflective of the type of jobs refugees tend to hold in Austria in terms of potentially lower quality jobs which require comparatively lower literacy skills. In particular, of all refugees in our sample, around 40% of all refugees in paid employment hold jobs which do not require any formal education.

Results in Table B.7 shed light on the relationship between perceived discrimination and labour market outcomes. The causal relationship between perceived discrimination and labour market outcomes is unclear a priori. On the one hand, as has been widely documented in the literature, discrimination may lead to lower labour market integration in terms of fewer job offers or lower pay. On the other hand, stronger labour market integration may increase perceived discrimination as the risk of being discriminated against increases with the stronger exposure to, and competition with, native co-workers. Conversely, stronger labour market integration may decrease perceived discrimination as, for instance, the mastery of German or the growing identification with Austria as integration proceeds should reduce the exposure to discrimination. Our results point to a positive relationship between experiences of discrimination and the probability of being in paid employment and suggest that refugees in paid employment tend to experience discrimination more often than unemployed refugees.

In contrast, the probability of being in paid employment is lower among Muslim refugees or refugees who live in Vienna, Styria or East and Southeast Austria. In particular, the 'Muslim penalty' is non-negligible: Muslim refugees are between 11 and 15 percentage points less likely to be in paid employment than refugees of no religious belief. Furthermore, we also included the provincial unemployment rate at the time a refugee received a residential status which gave access to the labour market to determine to what extent provincial differences can be explained by the generally worse labour market conditions in these three Austrian provinces. Our results show that for Vienna, the level of significance of the coefficient dropped substantially (but still remains significant at the 10% level) which suggests that most of the negative employment effect is the result of the generally high unemployment rate and the subsequently stronger competition for jobs among the unemployed (see Table B.2). In contrast, for Styria and East and Southeast Austria, the effect became even more pronounced which suggests that the negative employment effects are mainly due to worse structural (including the rural/urban divide) and/or institutional conditions affecting refugees in particular in these two provinces. Moreover, our results also suggest that refugees in paid employment have completed the value and orientation course less frequently¹³.

Additionally, the probability of being inactive is determined by several additional factors. For instance, the probability of being inactive is higher among younger refugees. This negative age effect is reflective of the composition of the group of inactive refugees which is predominantly composed of younger

¹³ Box 1 informs on these courses which became compulsory only from the beginning of 2016 which could explain this result.

refugees who are in education or training and are therefore inactive in the labour market. In quantitative terms, our estimates suggest that each additional year of age reduces a refugee's probability of being inactive by around 4 percentage points. Furthermore, there is evidence of a non-linear age effect such that the probability of being inactive decreases with age before it eventually reverses. Similarly, the probability of being inactive is also higher among unmarried refugees (by around 12 percentage points). Our results also point to a positive relationship between the successful completion of the value and orientation course and the probability of being inactive which stems from the more frequent attendance in such courses of pupils and students who then, however, remain inactive in the labour market until they finish their education or studies.¹⁴

Conversely, the probability of being inactive in the labour market is lower among refugees who live in East and Southeast Austria.

6.2. DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES IN AUSTRIA

Similarly, our results show that refugees in paid employment or in inactivity are also socially more integrated than unemployed refugees (see Table C.1 in Annex C). However, the degree of social integration differs by labour market status. Relative to unemployed refugees, inactive refugees have an around 0.3 standard deviations higher social integration index while refugees in paid employment are socially more strongly integrated, as reflected by their around half a standard deviation higher social integration index. Moreover, refugees in inactivity or paid employment score differently on the various social integration measures. For instance, both groups have somewhat stronger social networks than social capital. Furthermore, both groups have significantly stronger social networks with Austrians. Social networks with Austrians are even twice as strong for refugees in paid employment than for refugees in inactivity. In contrast, irrespective of their labour market status, refugees seem to have similarly strong co-ethnic social networks.

Furthermore, several additional factors determine the various dimensions of social integration. For instance, together Table C.1 and Table C.2 show that social networks with Austrians are stronger for refugees who live in Upper Austria. In particular, refugees who live in Upper Austria have a 0.5 standard deviations higher social network index with Austrians. Similarly, social networks with Austrians are also stronger for refugees who intend to stay permanently in Austria or have a better command of German. For both variables, the causal relationship with social integration is complex and can run both ways. In particular, refugees who intend to stay permanently in Austria tend to put more effort and resources into integrating with Austrians while stronger social integration with Austrians may increase the wish and intention to stay permanently. Similarly, a good command of the German language helps facilitate social interaction and integration with Austrians while, conversely, stronger social integration with Austrians helps improve language skills. Our results point to a positive relationship between social integration with Austrians and refugees' intention to stay permanently or their German language skills. In particular, refugees who intend to stay permanently in Austria have a 0.3 standard deviations higher social network index with Austrians than refugees who intend to return to their home country or move to another country. Likewise, a good command of German is important for refugees' integration into social networks with Austrians. In contrast to labour market integration which is only related to literacy in German, all four dimensions of German language ability – speaking, understanding, reading and writing – are statistically

¹⁴ For the sake of brevity, results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request.

strongly related to a stronger network integration with Austrians, at the 1% level of statistical significance (see Table C.2 to Table C.5). However, differences in the size of the various coefficients suggest that advanced speaking and understanding abilities are more important than advanced reading and writing abilities. Likewise, Table C.6 establishes the relationship between social integration and perceived discrimination. As with German language proficiency and the intention to stay permanently, the causality can run both ways. On the one hand, social integration is associated with a gradual disappearance of differences between refugees and Austrians and subsequently fewer experiences of discrimination. Conversely, however, social integration is associated with stronger exposure to, and competition with, Austrians which increases the risk of discrimination. On the other hand, experiences of discrimination with Austrians may induce refugees to withdraw and reduce their efforts to socially integrate with Austrians and to step up their integration efforts with co-ethnics. Our results point to a positive relationship between frequent experiences of discrimination and social integration with Austrians which suggests that stronger network relations with the host community also go along with a stronger (self-recorded) experience of discrimination. Furthermore, we also find a positive relationship between refugees' experiences of discrimination and social integration in their co-ethnic networks (Table C.6). The higher coefficient for co-ethnic networks than for networks with Austrians seems to indicate that refugees who frequently experience discrimination from Austrians seek closer ties and stronger integration with other people from their home country. Social networks with co-ethnics are, furthermore, more important and stronger for Christian and Muslim refugees (relative to refugees of no religious belief) and refugees from Syria. In contrast, neither the intention to stay permanently in Austria nor a higher level of German proficiency are related to refugees' integration into social networks with co-ethnics (i.e. network links to co-ethnics are not loosened in such circumstances), at conventional levels of statistical significance.

Social capital is generally higher for refugees with a better command of German and for those who want to stay permanently in Austria. As concerns German language proficiency, our results show that, judged by the size of the coefficients, social capital is higher among refugees with advanced understanding and speaking abilities but somewhat lower among refugees with advanced reading abilities. In contrast, better or advanced writing abilities are statistically unrelated to a refugee's social capital. Furthermore, refugees who intend to stay permanently in Austria also have a quarter of a standard deviation higher social capital index than refugees who either intend to return to their home country or to move to another country. Hence, a comparison of coefficients suggests that the intention to stay permanently is associated with stronger networks than social capital. In contrast, social capital is lower among refugees who live in East and Southeast Austria.

Our analysis also looks into the relationship between a refugee's co-ethnic networks and his/her networks with Austrians to determine whether the two networks are complements, such that refugees with stronger (weaker) co-ethnic networks also have stronger (weaker) networks with Austrians, or substitutes, such that refugees with stronger co-ethnic networks have weaker networks with Austrians (or vice versa). The latter could result from the lower incentive and efforts to establish and expand networks with Austrians if co-ethnic networks, which tend to form earlier upon arrival in the host country, are considered to suffice and to provide the necessary resources. Our results show that both networks are complements (see Table C.7, Columns (1) and (2)) but that with a coefficient of only 0.2 the relationship is rather weak. Further analysis shows that the complementarity between both networks differs across ethnic groups and only holds for Syrian refugees (see Table C.7, Columns (3) and (4)).

7. Accounting for endogeneity

Furthermore, we also account for endogeneity in the above-outlined two-equation model in the sense that labour market integration is endogenous to social integration and, conversely, social integration is endogenous to labour market integration. Addressing endogeneity also allows us to establish causality between the two domains of integration under consideration. In what follows, results from instrumental variable procedures are discussed. While Section 7.1 focuses on labour market integration with endogenous social integration, Section 7.2 focuses on social integration with endogenous labour market integration.

7.1. LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES IN AUSTRIA

7.1.1. First stage results

To determine whether the instrument for social integration is strong enough we ran the first stage regression and regressed the different social integration measures on the instrument which measures a person's distress by means of the Kessler Psychological Distress Index (K10). Our results show that higher psychological distress has a strong and statistically highly significant negative effect on social integration in the range of -0.017 to -0.27 (see Table D.1 and Table D.2). This finding holds for all social integration measures, except for social integration with co-ethnic networks which shows no significant relationship at conventional levels of statistical significance.

7.1.2. Causality: main effect of social integration on labour market integration

Generally, the Hausman test of whether social integration is actually exogenous is rejected, highlighting that social integration is endogenous and that our approach is appropriate and produces unbiased and consistent estimates.

Results from the second stage regression point to a causal relationship between social integration and labour market integration and demonstrate that better social integration leads to better labour market integration (see Table D.3 and Table D.4). However, this effect only holds for paid employment and suggests that better social integration improves a refugee's labour market success and leads to a higher probability of being in paid employment. Furthermore, this causal effect predominantly comes from social networks but is absent for social capital. Moreover, our results point to the important role the network's ethnic composition plays and show that what matters the most for a refugee's employment chances are strong social networks with Austrians while strong co-ethnic networks appear to be unable to significantly improve a refugee's chances of being in paid employment.

7.2. SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES IN AUSTRIA

7.2.1. First stage results

Similarly, to determine whether the two instruments for labour market integration are strong enough, we ran the first stage regression and regressed the different labour market statuses on the two instruments which capture different pre-migration employment experiences. The two instruments are dummy variables which capture (i) whether a person has ever had a job for more than 2 months before arriving in Austria, and (ii) whether a person has worked their escape and on the move (for more than 4 weeks in a row or in terms of different odd jobs).

Our results show that while both instruments are statistically related to a refugee's probability of being inactive, they are however unrelated to his probability of being in paid employment, at conventional levels of statistical significance (see Table D.5 and Table D.6). Hence, for being in paid employment, one of the preconditions of a valid instrument is unmet – i.e. relevance – which leads to biased second stage IV estimators and misleading statistical inference. However, as concerns the probability of being inactive, coefficients of both instruments are statistically significant at the 10 percent level and negative which implies that refugees who were inactive before or during their escape and on the move (i.e. mothers of dependent children, pupils, students, persons with health issues or physical disabilities) were also inactive after they arrived in Austria. In contrast, the insignificant coefficients of the instruments for paid employment suggest that previous work experience outside Austria is unable to predict the probability of being in paid employment in Austria.

7.2.2. Causality: main effect of labour market integration on social integration

Since the analysis revealed that the two instruments are uncorrelated with and therefore irrelevant for being in paid employment, IV estimates are biased and lead to wrong statistical inference. Furthermore, in the absence of valid instruments, no causal inferences can be drawn as to whether better labour market integration causes better social integration.

8. Summary and some policy implications

This paper focuses on the labour market integration and the social integration of recent refugees in Austria and studies the complexity and the direction and size of prevailing interrelationships between employment, inactivity, social networks (differentiated by their ethnic composition) and social capital.

It uses a unique survey dataset of about 1,600 refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran who had predominantly come to Austria since 2010, also covering in particular the recent strong refugee wave of 2015/16.

The analysis shows that labour market integration and social integration are generally strongly interrelated such that socially more integrated refugees are also more likely to be in paid employment, and vice versa. However, it also establishes that interrelationships are complex and not uniform across all domains and finds that refugees in paid employment are not only socially better integrated with Austrians but can also rely on more social capital than either inactive or unemployed refugees.

The analysis also addresses the inherent *endogeneity between labour market and social integration* and investigates the causal relationship between both domains of integration. It finds an important causal link and shows that social integration causes better labour market integration, in terms of better chances of finding paid employment. However, only social networks matter in this context and while both social network effects with Austrians as well as with co-ethnics are important, the former is stronger and more important than the latter. From a policy-point of view, this shows that in addition to labour market integration measures, policies to enhance social network development with Austrians are key for refugees' quicker and smoother transition into employment.

Hence, the important aspect of the model estimated in this paper which analyses the interdependence between social and labour market integration, is that factors that do affect social integration also have a further impact through this channel on labour market integration (i.e. employment prospects). Thus the determinants of social network linkages are not only directly important for social integration but also indirectly for labour market integration. Some of these factors, such as German language skills, thus affect successful labour market access twice; once directly but then also indirectly through the channel of social integration.

The study identifies key determinants of labour market integration and social integration which have important implications for integration policy in Austria.

As in many other studies (see Section 2), this study also reports the great importance of command of the *host country's language* (in this case German) for both social and labour market integration. The interesting additional finding of the present study is the greater importance of speaking and understanding than of writing and reading skills. We should keep in mind that we are analysing here mostly early experiences of refugees (the bulk of them arrived 2014-16 and the survey was conducted in 2018) and hence it reflects the importance of speaking and understanding of the local language in these

early phases. This does have implications for the way language courses are designed for these early phases of integration. Further analysis will be undertaken following the sample longitudinally to see whether the *weights of oral vs. writing skills* change over time and whether this has an impact on job placements or quality of jobs and might be different for different jobs along the pay scale and for persons with different educational attainment levels.

Not surprisingly our study also finds a positive impact of our *human capital* variable (completed high-school i.e. Matura) for employment but it makes no difference for our indicators of social integration. However, persons who completed high-school also have more access to support derived from social capital.

The study also contributes to the significance of *mental health aspects* (captured by the Kessler Index) for the social integration of refugees. A serious mental health problem (quite widespread particularly amongst the young; see the complementary analysis by Leitner et al, 2019) is a handicap for social integration and thus indirectly – but not directly - for labour market integration. This again has policy implications as attention to providing health services adapted to the requirements of refugees (see also Kohlenberger et al, 2019) also improves overall integration perspectives and counters longer-term marginalisation.

Returning to the social networks issue, where we found a greater role for *social networks with Austrians* than *with co-ethnics* for labour market integration (although the latter also provides support), we also found that the two networks were *complementary rather than rivals*. This is important in that stronger linkages with the co-ethnic community do not hinder, but are rather complementary to, contacts with non-coethnics, predominantly Austrians. Of course, this result reflects again the characteristics of the sample, i.e. recent waves of refugees which have not been followed over a longer time period. This however would be required to study phenomena of ghettoisation which might have negative consequences for social and labour market integration (see the literature review in Section 2). Nonetheless, it will be interesting to study over the next waves whether the relative importance of different social networks (and also of associated social capital) as well as their relationships to each other change over time as the same groups of refugees move on to the next stages of integration.

An interesting result was obtained with regard to (the self-recorded and thus perception of) *discrimination*: it was higher for those refugees who are employed and who are more socially integrated with Austrians. This indicates that stronger labour market integration (encounters in the work place) and also more social interaction with Austrians leads to a stronger perception of instances of discrimination. The literature on 'acculturation' (Berry, 1997) emphasises that integration is a two-sided process. Hence from a policy perspective, targeting discrimination at the work place and in the social settings of recently arrived migrants would reduce this negative aspect of more intense encounters at work and in social life with the host community. It would thereby counter a defensive withdrawal into co-ethnic networks which in turn would have a negative impact on labour market integration.

Let us also mention some work that we shall embark upon but which could not yet be pursued because of limitations of the dataset available to us:

Inactivity could not properly be analysed in this study as the inactive in this sample are dominated by people in training/education/integration courses and their inactivity might only be a transitory phase.

Future work with an extended dataset will focus – among other things – on the access of the young to the labour market. The longitudinal dimension provided by future waves of the survey will also facilitate analysis of jobs-skills matching and its evolution over time (plus evolution of occupational status – see the study by de Vroome and van Tubergen, 2010).

Further, the sampling of *women* in the current survey was too small to undertake a separate analysis of the determinants of social and labour market integration of women. Again, this will be rectified by the more extensive sampling of women in the next wave. This is particularly important, as the more recent waves of refugees from the Middle East were predominantly men, but the follow-up family re-unifications will also lead to a stronger presence of women from the same source countries.

9. References

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10. Annex A

Table A.1 / Summary statistics by country of birth

	AFG		IRQ		SYR			AFG		IRQ		SYR			
	Code	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean		Std	Code	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std
Labour market integration							Wants to stay permanently in AT								
Unemployed (ref)	1	0.312	0.465	0.511	0.502	0.511	0.500	Yes	1	0.906	0.293	0.884	0.321	0.787	0.410
Inactive	2	0.225	0.419	0.143	0.351	0.133	0.340	No	0	0.094	0.293	0.116	0.321	0.213	0.410
In paid employment	3	0.464	0.501	0.346	0.477	0.356	0.479	Province of residence							
Social integration: SI-TOT		0.556	0.256	0.510	0.262	0.507	0.251	Tyrol/Vorarlberg (ref)	1	0.040	0.197	0.071	0.258	0.108	0.310
Social integration: SI-AT		0.467	0.230	0.452	0.235	0.435	0.226	Vienna	1	0.575	0.496	0.729	0.446	0.499	0.500
Social integration: SI-COB		0.604	0.307	0.570	0.314	0.561	0.298	Upper Austria	1	0.052	0.222	0.045	0.208	0.122	0.328
Social integration: NETW-TOT		0.199	0.104	0.187	0.100	0.189	0.107	Salzburg	1	0.121	0.327	0.019	0.138	0.105	0.306
Social integration: NETW-AT		0.146	0.092	0.155	0.112	0.139	0.104	Styria	1	0.195	0.398	0.123	0.329	0.142	0.350
Social integration: NETW-COB		0.186	0.106	0.156	0.094	0.191	0.107	ESE-AT*	1	0.017	0.131	0.013	0.113	0.025	0.155
Social integration: SC-TOT		0.650	0.352	0.616	0.348	0.610	0.342	German speaking proficiency							
Age		27.980	8.448	31.951	8.704	31.159	8.553	None/little (ref)	1	0.128	0.335	0.039	0.194	0.078	0.268
Married								Average	2	0.506	0.501	0.652	0.478	0.601	0.490
Yes	1	0.441	0.498	0.419	0.495	0.496	0.500	Advanced/like mother tongue	3	0.366	0.483	0.310	0.464	0.322	0.467
No	0	0.559	0.498	0.581	0.495	0.504	0.500	Integration course							
Lives with family								Competence check	1	0.353	0.479	0.336	0.474	0.322	0.467
Yes	1	0.500	0.502	0.534	0.501	0.607	0.489	Youth college	1	0.065	0.248	0.008	0.087	0.005	0.069
No	0	0.500	0.502	0.466	0.501	0.393	0.489	Integration year	1	0.052	0.223	0.115	0.320	0.105	0.306
Months of residence		46.503	21.188	38.530	15.162	34.520	11.178	Values & orientation course	1	0.229	0.421	0.122	0.329	0.133	0.340
Level of education								Perceived discrimination							
Matura	1	0.285	0.453	0.791	0.408	0.723	0.448	Never (ref.)	1	0.287	0.454	0.285	0.453	0.342	0.475
No matura	0	0.715	0.453	0.209	0.408	0.277	0.448	Rarely	2	0.189	0.393	0.252	0.435	0.260	0.439
Religious affiliation								Sometimes	3	0.299	0.459	0.278	0.450	0.266	0.442
None (ref)	1	0.113	0.318	0.218	0.415	0.130	0.337	Frequently/very often	4	0.226	0.419	0.185	0.390	0.132	0.339
Christian	2	0.113	0.318	0.049	0.217	0.070	0.255	Instruments							
Islamic	3	0.759	0.429	0.732	0.444	0.800	0.400	Kessler index (K10)		19.380	9.147	21.359	10.574	20.044	9.079
Locus of control								Ever had a job before (yes=1)	1	0.747	0.436	0.861	0.347	0.803	0.398
Internal locus of control		4.151	1.106	4.533	0.917	4.527	0.845	Worked during flight (yes=1)	1	0.265	0.443	0.102	0.304	0.241	0.428
External locus of control		2.617	1.236	2.276	0.995	2.262	1.053								
Residential status															
Blue card: eligible for asylum	1	0.512	0.501	0.532	0.501	0.785	0.411								
Grey card: eligible for subsid. prot.	1	0.452	0.499	0.409	0.493	0.067	0.250								
Other status	1	0.036	0.186	0.058	0.235	0.147	0.355								

Note: * comprises Lower Austria, Carinthia and Burgenland.

Table A.2 / Labour market integration and the Kessler Psychological Distress Index (K10)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Kessler index (K10)	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004
	(-1.196)	(-1.188)	(-1.276)	(-1.319)	(-1.192)	(-1.601)	(-1.111)	(-1.571)	(-1.292)	(-1.122)	(-1.088)	(-1.571)
Age	-0.035***	0.020	-0.036***	0.016	-0.035***	0.014	-0.034***	0.015	-0.033**	0.022	-0.034***	0.020
	(-2.868)	(1.048)	(-2.966)	(0.844)	(-2.854)	(0.750)	(-2.753)	(0.776)	(-2.498)	(1.123)	(-2.744)	(1.046)
Age ²	0.000***	-0.000	0.001***	-0.000	0.001***	-0.000	0.000***	-0.000	0.000***	-0.000	0.000***	-0.000
	(2.995)	(-1.437)	(3.097)	(-1.264)	(3.046)	(-1.292)	(2.949)	(-1.322)	(2.606)	(-1.515)	(2.889)	(-1.369)
Married	-0.088**	0.031	-0.089**	0.030	-0.092**	0.039	-0.093**	0.036	-0.098**	0.008	-0.090**	0.022
	(-1.978)	(0.579)	(-2.006)	(0.556)	(-2.055)	(0.716)	(-2.085)	(0.659)	(-2.142)	(0.137)	(-1.998)	(0.408)
Lives with family	0.007	-0.001	0.007	-0.000	0.010	-0.004	0.010	-0.002	0.006	0.013	0.008	0.005
	(0.186)	(-0.017)	(0.195)	(-0.011)	(0.280)	(-0.089)	(0.282)	(-0.034)	(0.167)	(0.266)	(0.235)	(0.107)
Months of residence	0.003	0.007	0.003	0.008	0.003	0.009	0.003	0.009	0.002	0.005	0.003	0.007
	(0.672)	(1.106)	(0.636)	(1.198)	(0.542)	(1.392)	(0.515)	(1.350)	(0.365)	(0.714)	(0.668)	(1.128)
Months of residence ²	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-0.959)	(0.033)	(-0.915)	(0.005)	(-0.875)	(-0.032)	(-0.849)	(0.007)	(-0.502)	(0.482)	(-0.960)	(-0.037)
Matura	0.050	0.081	0.049	0.085*	0.040	0.101**	0.039	0.101*	0.041	0.082	0.042	0.079
	(1.246)	(1.596)	(1.219)	(1.679)	(1.005)	(1.969)	(0.972)	(1.954)	(0.988)	(1.550)	(1.039)	(1.524)
Christian	-0.043	0.100	-0.044	0.108	-0.044	0.111	-0.044	0.114	-0.037	0.103	-0.042	0.110
	(-0.732)	(1.084)	(-0.737)	(1.171)	(-0.759)	(1.195)	(-0.762)	(1.229)	(-0.627)	(1.094)	(-0.698)	(1.199)
Muslim	0.024	-0.109*	0.021	-0.102*	0.027	-0.114*	0.028	-0.117*	0.030	-0.107*	0.019	-0.107*
	(0.552)	(-1.767)	(0.483)	(-1.655)	(0.635)	(-1.819)	(0.641)	(-1.871)	(0.679)	(-1.734)	(0.424)	(-1.732)
Internal locus of control	0.010	-0.011	0.009	-0.011	0.009	-0.011	0.010	-0.010	0.009	0.005	0.010	-0.005
	(0.516)	(-0.446)	(0.435)	(-0.458)	(0.458)	(-0.457)	(0.529)	(-0.395)	(0.440)	(0.187)	(0.510)	(-0.187)
External locus of control	-0.007	0.006	-0.005	0.004	-0.004	0.003	-0.004	0.005	-0.006	0.012	-0.011	-0.003
	(-0.458)	(0.264)	(-0.327)	(0.176)	(-0.218)	(0.134)	(-0.224)	(0.244)	(-0.359)	(0.544)	(-0.677)	(-0.126)
Granted asylum	0.008	0.016	0.007	0.022	0.010	-0.006	0.012	-0.002	0.025	0.026	0.013	0.027
	(0.155)	(0.268)	(0.133)	(0.363)	(0.206)	(-0.101)	(0.237)	(-0.037)	(0.491)	(0.422)	(0.252)	(0.450)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.019	0.162**	-0.015	0.160**	-0.012	0.139*	-0.011	0.148*	-0.020	0.180**	-0.019	0.166**
	(-0.329)	(1.990)	(-0.256)	(1.979)	(-0.212)	(1.664)	(-0.183)	(1.781)	(-0.342)	(2.170)	(-0.341)	(2.065)
COB: AFG	0.165**	-0.003	0.172**	-0.022	0.183**	-0.012	0.181**	-0.010	0.131	-0.033	0.157*	0.006
	(2.053)	(-0.042)	(2.169)	(-0.278)	(2.294)	(-0.145)	(2.279)	(-0.122)	(1.607)	(-0.392)	(1.930)	(0.069)
COB: IRN	0.132	0.004	0.159	-0.035	0.185	-0.056	0.183	-0.057	0.184	-0.051	0.125	-0.001
	(1.102)	(0.036)	(1.328)	(-0.307)	(1.488)	(-0.499)	(1.484)	(-0.517)	(1.234)	(-0.381)	(1.063)	(-0.007)
COB: SYR	-0.019	0.064	-0.007	0.066	-0.005	0.069	-0.006	0.071	-0.027	0.031	-0.024	0.060
	(-0.397)	(1.035)	(-0.163)	(1.068)	(-0.105)	(1.119)	(-0.143)	(1.153)	(-0.550)	(0.492)	(-0.500)	(0.975)

ctd.

Table A.2 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.097*	-0.372**	-0.095*	-0.366**	-0.099*	-0.343**	-0.097*	-0.342**	-0.102*	-0.331**	-0.094*	-0.381**
	(-1.916)	(-2.454)	(-1.876)	(-2.365)	(-1.888)	(-2.192)	(-1.878)	(-2.207)	(-1.945)	(-2.167)	(-1.898)	(-2.574)
Prov: Vienna	0.074	-0.287***	0.076	-0.290***	0.072	-0.279***	0.074	-0.273***	0.071	-0.258***	0.077	-0.285***
	(1.341)	(-3.566)	(1.373)	(-3.595)	(1.259)	(-3.376)	(1.314)	(-3.307)	(1.233)	(-3.035)	(1.418)	(-3.594)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.029	-0.023	0.026	-0.026	0.016	0.009	0.019	0.011	0.038	0.020	0.032	-0.015
	(0.407)	(-0.225)	(0.369)	(-0.257)	(0.221)	(0.085)	(0.274)	(0.111)	(0.502)	(0.184)	(0.454)	(-0.150)
Prov: Salzburg	-0.005	-0.100	-0.000	-0.100	0.002	-0.086	0.002	-0.078	0.007	-0.047	0.001	-0.104
	(-0.079)	(-0.961)	(-0.001)	(-0.963)	(0.030)	(-0.802)	(0.032)	(-0.742)	(0.094)	(-0.433)	(0.009)	(-1.017)
Prov: Styria	0.053	-0.223**	0.056	-0.237**	0.053	-0.223**	0.056	-0.218**	0.041	-0.144	0.058	-0.228**
	(0.788)	(-2.380)	(0.832)	(-2.533)	(0.761)	(-2.323)	(0.817)	(-2.272)	(0.598)	(-1.446)	(0.870)	(-2.469)
Wants to stay in AT	-0.045	0.041	-0.048	0.039	-0.046	0.039	-0.047	0.037	-0.045	0.023	-0.049	0.033
	(-1.112)	(0.748)	(-1.177)	(0.709)	(-1.136)	(0.693)	(-1.146)	(0.667)	(-1.064)	(0.415)	(-1.193)	(0.611)
Speak German: average	-0.150*	0.203***							-0.111	0.173**	-0.165*	0.200**
	(-1.671)	(2.633)							(-1.249)	(2.052)	(-1.780)	(2.511)
Speak German: advanced/MT	-0.105	0.334***							-0.080	0.307***	-0.119	0.325***
	(-1.075)	(3.882)							(-0.833)	(3.278)	(-1.187)	(3.676)
Understand German: average			-0.076	0.113								
			(-1.087)	(1.489)								
Understand German: advanced/MT			-0.069	0.249***								
			(-0.913)	(2.977)								
Read German: average					0.011	0.017						
					(0.193)	(0.211)						
Read German: advanced/MT					0.018	0.064						
					(0.293)	(0.769)						
Write German: average							0.000	0.063				
							(0.009)	(0.911)				
Write German: advanced/MT							0.019	0.091				
							(0.333)	(1.258)				
Course: Competence check									-0.028	0.067		
									(-0.706)	(1.370)		
Course: Youth college									0.002	0.125		
									(0.023)	(0.803)		
Course: Integration year									-0.068	-0.014		
									(-0.947)	(-0.188)		

ctd.

Table A.2 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Course: Values and orientation course									0.123***	-0.105		
									(2.912)	(-1.629)		
Discrimination: often/very often											0.025	0.139**
											(0.474)	(2.028)
Discrimination: sometimes											0.028	0.119**
											(0.669)	(2.194)
Discrimination: rarely											0.062	0.104**
											(1.438)	(1.963)
No of obs	468	468	468	468	467	467	467	467	444	444	467	467
ll	-385.2	-385.2	-388.5	-388.5	-393.5	-393.5	-393.1	-393.1	-355.9	-355.9	-378.8	-378.8

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

11. Annex B

Table B.1 / Regression results: Labour market integration (basic model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
SI-TOT	0.007 (0.488)	0.085*** (4.373)												
SI-AT			0.007 (0.472)	0.089*** (4.425)										
SI-COB					0.012 (0.795)	0.070*** (3.517)								
NETW-TOT							0.021 (1.402)	0.086*** (4.179)						
NETW-AT									0.004 (0.238)	0.115*** (5.546)				
NETW-COB											0.024* (1.916)	-0.019 (-1.023)		
SC-TOT													0.007 (0.490)	0.071*** (3.654)
Age	-0.037*** (-3.381)	0.026 (1.517)	-0.037*** (-3.231)	0.025 (1.412)	-0.036*** (-3.233)	0.025 (1.405)	-0.036*** (-3.317)	0.028 (1.587)	-0.036*** (-3.209)	0.026 (1.501)	-0.037*** (-3.248)	0.026 (1.443)	-0.037*** (-3.395)	0.026 (1.502)
Age ²	0.001*** (3.471)	-0.000* (-1.928)	0.001*** (3.320)	-0.000* (-1.811)	0.001*** (3.327)	-0.000* (-1.816)	0.000*** (3.407)	-0.000** (-2.003)	0.001*** (3.300)	-0.000* (-1.912)	0.001*** (3.335)	-0.000* (-1.907)	0.001*** (3.486)	-0.000* (-1.927)
Married	-0.115*** (-2.798)	0.009 (0.173)	-0.121*** (-2.783)	0.010 (0.203)	-0.121*** (-2.806)	0.014 (0.266)	-0.117*** (-2.845)	0.021 (0.420)	-0.123*** (-2.832)	0.023 (0.454)	-0.124*** (-2.874)	0.024 (0.467)	-0.116*** (-2.810)	0.010 (0.193)
Lives with family	0.044 (1.406)	0.007 (0.171)	0.046 (1.368)	0.006 (0.143)	0.046 (1.372)	0.002 (0.052)	0.046 (1.448)	0.007 (0.155)	0.047 (1.406)	0.007 (0.158)	0.051 (1.530)	-0.001 (-0.029)	0.045 (1.428)	0.007 (0.158)
Months of residence	0.000 (0.017)	0.012** (2.146)	-0.000 (-0.043)	0.010* (1.752)	-0.000 (-0.048)	0.011* (1.757)	0.001 (0.138)	0.013** (2.207)	-0.000 (-0.020)	0.011* (1.840)	0.000 (0.045)	0.011* (1.843)	0.000 (0.021)	0.012** (2.161)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.460)	-0.000 (-0.759)	-0.000 (-0.399)	-0.000 (-0.423)	-0.000 (-0.395)	-0.000 (-0.423)	-0.000 (-0.563)	-0.000 (-0.861)	-0.000 (-0.408)	-0.000 (-0.567)	-0.000 (-0.478)	-0.000 (-0.483)	-0.000 (-0.462)	-0.000 (-0.762)
Matura	0.049 (1.365)	0.109** (2.296)	0.050 (1.349)	0.093* (1.930)	0.051 (1.371)	0.099** (2.039)	0.049 (1.363)	0.094* (1.958)	0.051 (1.360)	0.072 (1.490)	0.053 (1.420)	0.096* (1.945)	0.049 (1.362)	0.111** (2.320)
Christian	0.016 (0.282)	0.013 (0.150)	0.008 (0.134)	-0.008 (-0.092)	0.006 (0.103)	-0.001 (-0.017)	0.015 (0.266)	0.017 (0.200)	0.012 (0.194)	-0.008 (-0.097)	0.002 (0.039)	0.026 (0.293)	0.016 (0.275)	0.018 (0.211)
Muslim	0.040 (1.079)	-0.111** (-2.012)	0.039 (0.981)	-0.136** (-2.366)	0.039 (0.990)	-0.145** (-2.495)	0.041 (1.135)	-0.120** (-2.159)	0.038 (0.959)	-0.130** (-2.286)	0.031 (0.766)	-0.154*** (-2.585)	0.039 (1.069)	-0.116** (-2.087)
Internal locus of control	0.009 (0.525)	-0.002 (-0.101)	0.010 (0.533)	-0.011 (-0.481)	0.010 (0.506)	-0.012 (-0.527)	0.009 (0.478)	-0.000 (-0.003)	0.011 (0.567)	-0.009 (-0.374)	0.013 (0.676)	-0.016 (-0.671)	0.009 (0.518)	-0.003 (-0.138)

ctd.

Table B.1 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
External locus of control	-0.005 (-0.390)	-0.007 (-0.366)	-0.005 (-0.358)	-0.005 (-0.246)	-0.005 (-0.339)	-0.007 (-0.397)	-0.005 (-0.342)	-0.008 (-0.462)	-0.006 (-0.424)	-0.002 (-0.121)	-0.005 (-0.363)	-0.013 (-0.698)	-0.005 (-0.395)	-0.008 (-0.430)
Granted asylum	0.027 (0.635)	-0.035 (-0.608)	0.024 (0.505)	-0.030 (-0.499)	0.025 (0.545)	-0.028 (-0.457)	0.026 (0.597)	-0.023 (-0.396)	0.020 (0.434)	-0.006 (-0.095)	0.027 (0.601)	-0.024 (-0.383)	0.027 (0.621)	-0.041 (-0.688)
Granted subsidiary protection	0.005 (0.097)	0.138* (1.793)	0.005 (0.097)	0.119 (1.494)	0.007 (0.134)	0.125 (1.559)	0.004 (0.076)	0.157** (2.034)	-0.000 (-0.001)	0.144* (1.824)	0.012 (0.213)	0.130 (1.588)	0.005 (0.089)	0.133* (1.722)
COB: AFG	0.175** (2.439)	-0.014 (-0.185)	0.193*** (2.595)	-0.014 (-0.186)	0.194*** (2.600)	-0.014 (-0.187)	0.171** (2.409)	-0.005 (-0.070)	0.189** (2.543)	-0.000 (-0.004)	0.193** (2.575)	-0.007 (-0.095)	0.175** (2.439)	-0.013 (-0.174)
COB: IRN	0.163 (1.486)	-0.035 (-0.302)	0.164 (1.469)	-0.042 (-0.365)	0.167 (1.494)	-0.046 (-0.393)	0.156 (1.443)	-0.055 (-0.495)	0.159 (1.417)	-0.060 (-0.545)	0.150 (1.369)	-0.046 (-0.396)	0.164 (1.489)	-0.036 (-0.304)
COB: SYR	0.017 (0.442)	0.042 (0.727)	0.021 (0.542)	0.041 (0.706)	0.021 (0.542)	0.037 (0.632)	0.017 (0.452)	0.050 (0.883)	0.019 (0.472)	0.060 (1.062)	0.015 (0.365)	0.051 (0.852)	0.016 (0.431)	0.041 (0.709)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.089* (-1.899)	-0.206 (-1.267)	-0.096* (-1.904)	-0.328** (-1.985)	-0.096* (-1.904)	-0.337** (-2.072)	-0.089* (-1.897)	-0.217 (-1.411)	-0.095* (-1.901)	-0.301* (-1.847)	-0.103* (-1.938)	-0.355** (-2.286)	-0.089* (-1.899)	-0.223 (-1.381)
Prov: Vienna	0.079 (1.535)	-0.268*** (-3.599)	0.082 (1.494)	-0.285*** (-3.653)	0.082 (1.488)	-0.295*** (-3.750)	0.079 (1.550)	-0.266*** (-3.541)	0.082 (1.503)	-0.265*** (-3.408)	0.071 (1.238)	-0.298*** (-3.721)	0.079 (1.533)	-0.275*** (-3.676)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.025 (0.387)	0.036 (0.385)	0.025 (0.358)	-0.017 (-0.177)	0.020 (0.297)	-0.017 (-0.173)	0.023 (0.358)	0.022 (0.228)	0.029 (0.422)	-0.035 (-0.360)	0.014 (0.194)	0.002 (0.021)	0.025 (0.385)	0.043 (0.461)
Prov: Salzburg	0.012 (0.196)	-0.077 (-0.798)	0.008 (0.122)	-0.103 (-1.039)	0.008 (0.126)	-0.099 (-0.990)	0.014 (0.225)	-0.072 (-0.746)	0.011 (0.165)	-0.105 (-1.055)	0.006 (0.082)	-0.084 (-0.819)	0.012 (0.202)	-0.074 (-0.764)
Prov: Styria	0.027 (0.467)	-0.157* (-1.800)	0.033 (0.528)	-0.196** (-2.164)	0.032 (0.514)	-0.195** (-2.135)	0.030 (0.512)	-0.147* (-1.661)	0.037 (0.585)	-0.189** (-2.077)	0.025 (0.388)	-0.183** (-1.960)	0.027 (0.458)	-0.157* (-1.798)
No of obs	548	548	516	516	517	517	548	548	516	516	517	517	548	548
ll	-452.3	-452.3	-429.8	-429.8	-434.6	-434.6	-451.5	-451.5	-424.9	-424.9	-441.2	-441.2	-455.5	-455.5

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.2 / Regression results: Labour market integration (basic model) plus the regional unemployment rate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
SI-TOT	0.009 (0.612)	0.084*** (4.188)												
SI-AT			0.010 (0.623)	0.088*** (4.261)										
SI-COB					0.014 (0.913)	0.069*** (3.368)								
NETW-TOT							0.009 (0.562)	0.103*** (4.677)						
NETW-AT									-0.000 (-0.004)	0.123*** (5.624)				
NETW-COB											0.014 (0.923)	-0.009 (-0.420)		
SC-TOT													0.011 (0.726)	0.069*** (3.398)
Age	-0.037*** (-3.301)	0.029 (1.586)	-0.037*** (-3.179)	0.028 (1.545)	-0.037*** (-3.180)	0.028 (1.539)	-0.037*** (-3.239)	0.029* (1.645)	-0.037*** (-3.173)	0.029 (1.610)	-0.037*** (-3.182)	0.029 (1.534)	-0.037*** (-3.311)	0.028 (1.573)
Age ²	0.000*** (3.149)	-0.000* (-1.868)	0.000*** (3.033)	-0.000* (-1.805)	0.000*** (3.036)	-0.000* (-1.804)	0.000*** (3.084)	-0.000* (-1.954)	0.000*** (3.031)	-0.000* (-1.910)	0.000*** (3.028)	-0.000* (-1.845)	0.000*** (3.161)	-0.000* (-1.862)
Married	-0.087** (-2.148)	-0.007 (-0.126)	-0.092** (-2.142)	-0.008 (-0.147)	-0.093** (-2.168)	-0.005 (-0.094)	-0.087** (-2.146)	0.010 (0.205)	-0.094** (-2.187)	0.011 (0.224)	-0.095** (-2.223)	0.008 (0.146)	-0.088** (-2.168)	-0.005 (-0.105)
Lives with family	0.055* (1.760)	0.017 (0.373)	0.058* (1.737)	0.016 (0.353)	0.058* (1.758)	0.011 (0.243)	0.056* (1.787)	0.015 (0.335)	0.058* (1.758)	0.015 (0.325)	0.061* (1.853)	0.006 (0.121)	0.056* (1.785)	0.015 (0.342)
Months of residence	0.002 (0.434)	0.013** (2.021)	0.002 (0.373)	0.010 (1.536)	0.002 (0.376)	0.010 (1.563)	0.002 (0.502)	0.013** (2.131)	0.002 (0.392)	0.010 (1.605)	0.002 (0.429)	0.012* (1.717)	0.002 (0.435)	0.013** (2.049)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-1.000)	-0.000 (-0.718)	-0.000 (-0.937)	-0.000 (-0.297)	-0.000 (-0.949)	-0.000 (-0.296)	-0.000 (-1.022)	-0.000 (-0.801)	-0.000 (-0.905)	-0.000 (-0.372)	-0.000 (-0.964)	-0.000 (-0.367)	-0.000 (-1.004)	-0.000 (-0.723)
Matura	0.056 (1.515)	0.102** (2.061)	0.058 (1.519)	0.086* (1.717)	0.059 (1.548)	0.092* (1.822)	0.055 (1.483)	0.079 (1.588)	0.058 (1.499)	0.060 (1.196)	0.058 (1.520)	0.089* (1.746)	0.056 (1.523)	0.104** (2.090)
Christian	0.020 (0.338)	-0.015 (-0.174)	0.011 (0.178)	-0.040 (-0.446)	0.008 (0.135)	-0.036 (-0.394)	0.022 (0.369)	-0.006 (-0.072)	0.016 (0.249)	-0.030 (-0.343)	0.009 (0.149)	-0.013 (-0.145)	0.019 (0.318)	-0.012 (-0.131)
Muslim	0.036 (0.956)	-0.112* (-1.945)	0.034 (0.824)	-0.140** (-2.311)	0.034 (0.826)	-0.151** (-2.459)	0.036 (0.943)	-0.115** (-1.984)	0.031 (0.743)	-0.129** (-2.159)	0.028 (0.676)	-0.167*** (-2.676)	0.036 (0.952)	-0.120** (-2.053)
Internal locus of control	0.034 (1.630)	-0.016 (-0.666)	0.035 (1.597)	-0.024 (-1.002)	0.034 (1.580)	-0.026 (-1.063)	0.035* (1.668)	-0.017 (-0.745)	0.036* (1.672)	-0.024 (-1.012)	0.035 (1.610)	-0.028 (-1.158)	0.034 (1.622)	-0.016 (-0.684)
External locus of control	-0.003 (-0.217)	-0.004 (-0.206)	-0.003 (-0.214)	-0.001 (-0.062)	-0.003 (-0.190)	-0.004 (-0.210)	-0.003 (-0.237)	-0.003 (-0.175)	-0.005 (-0.339)	0.003 (0.140)	-0.003 (-0.237)	-0.010 (-0.509)	-0.003 (-0.205)	-0.005 (-0.290)

ctd.

Table B.2 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Granted asylum	0.051 (1.212)	-0.029 (-0.480)	0.048 (1.061)	-0.024 (-0.376)	0.049 (1.106)	-0.020 (-0.318)	0.049 (1.173)	-0.022 (-0.364)	0.046 (1.006)	-0.004 (-0.063)	0.048 (1.062)	-0.010 (-0.151)	0.050 (1.210)	-0.032 (-0.520)
Granted subsidiary protection	0.008 (0.172)	0.160** (1.999)	0.009 (0.168)	0.140* (1.687)	0.011 (0.209)	0.148* (1.770)	0.006 (0.125)	0.179** (2.246)	0.004 (0.069)	0.165** (2.008)	0.010 (0.188)	0.162* (1.921)	0.008 (0.172)	0.158** (1.966)
COB: AFG	0.160** (2.110)	0.008 (0.102)	0.174** (2.218)	0.012 (0.159)	0.174** (2.219)	0.013 (0.170)	0.157** (2.086)	0.007 (0.094)	0.172** (2.186)	0.015 (0.195)	0.171** (2.175)	0.018 (0.224)	0.160** (2.108)	0.010 (0.125)
COB: IRN	0.135 (1.248)	-0.003 (-0.023)	0.135 (1.228)	-0.008 (-0.066)	0.139 (1.252)	-0.010 (-0.081)	0.131 (1.212)	-0.033 (-0.290)	0.134 (1.192)	-0.036 (-0.325)	0.127 (1.160)	-0.015 (-0.124)	0.137 (1.259)	-0.002 (-0.020)
COB: SYR	-0.005 (-0.123)	0.066 (1.119)	-0.002 (-0.036)	0.067 (1.122)	-0.001 (-0.030)	0.065 (1.077)	-0.005 (-0.134)	0.071 (1.235)	-0.004 (-0.100)	0.081 (1.399)	-0.006 (-0.134)	0.075 (1.236)	-0.005 (-0.128)	0.066 (1.121)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.033* (-1.802)	-0.291 (-1.497)	-0.035* (-1.805)	-0.427** (-2.128)	-0.035* (-1.817)	-0.452** (-2.491)	-0.033* (-1.783)	-0.313* (-1.916)	-0.036* (-1.769)	-0.407** (-2.205)	-0.036* (-1.823)	-0.474*** (-2.786)	-0.033* (-1.808)	-0.319* (-1.748)
Prov: Vienna	0.436*** (3.616)	-0.469* (-1.735)	0.434*** (3.615)	-0.501* (-1.883)	0.439*** (3.836)	-0.542** (-2.304)	0.415*** (2.798)	-0.526** (-2.262)	0.405*** (2.642)	-0.522** (-2.084)	0.406** (2.513)	-0.623*** (-4.361)	0.438*** (3.693)	-0.502** (-1.999)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.011 (0.374)	-0.012 (-0.118)	0.010 (0.341)	-0.078 (-0.798)	0.009 (0.315)	-0.080 (-0.885)	0.010 (0.360)	-0.034 (-0.385)	0.010 (0.335)	-0.091 (-1.003)	0.008 (0.281)	-0.066 (-0.933)	0.011 (0.380)	-0.009 (-0.097)
Prov: Salzburg	-0.002 (-0.101)	-0.099 (-0.982)	-0.003 (-0.144)	-0.133 (-1.238)	-0.003 (-0.143)	-0.120 (-1.096)	-0.001 (-0.068)	-0.084 (-0.855)	-0.002 (-0.099)	-0.123 (-1.124)	-0.003 (-0.153)	-0.074 (-0.832)	-0.002 (-0.096)	-0.090 (-0.898)
Prov: Styria	0.040 (1.217)	-0.214** (-2.061)	0.045 (1.282)	-0.268*** (-2.652)	0.045 (1.303)	-0.272*** (-3.067)	0.039 (1.197)	-0.214** (-2.527)	0.042 (1.243)	-0.264*** (-2.933)	0.039 (1.176)	-0.249*** (-2.884)	0.040 (1.225)	-0.219** (-2.341)
Unemployment rate	-0.065 (-1.627)	0.032 (0.610)	-0.066 (-1.583)	0.033 (0.631)	-0.068 (-1.631)	0.041 (0.773)	-0.060 (-1.520)	0.042 (0.821)	-0.059 (-1.427)	0.039 (0.757)	-0.062 (-1.505)	0.062 (1.162)	-0.066* (-1.650)	0.038 (0.720)
No of obs	516	516	486	486	487	487	516	516	486	486	487	487	516	516
ll	-420.5	-420.5	-398.7	-398.7	-403.1	-403.1	-418.3	-418.3	-393.2	-393.2	-410.6	-410.6	-423.6	-423.6

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.3 / Regression results: Labour market integration and German speaking abilities (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
SI-TOT	0.009 (0.530)	0.071*** (3.332)												
SI-AT			0.006 (0.376)	0.074*** (3.349)										
SI-COB					0.012 (0.729)	0.059*** (2.761)								
NETW-TOT							0.025 (1.572)	0.061*** (2.784)						
NETW-AT									-0.002 (-0.079)	0.086*** (3.619)				
NETW-COB											0.029** (2.310)	-0.013 (-0.699)		
SC-TOT													0.008 (0.510)	0.060*** (2.845)
Age	-0.032*** (-2.781)	0.021 (1.191)	-0.032*** (-2.639)	0.021 (1.137)	-0.032*** (-2.644)	0.022 (1.199)	-0.033*** (-2.787)	0.022 (1.194)	-0.031** (-2.568)	0.019 (1.016)	-0.032*** (-2.640)	0.023 (1.253)	-0.032*** (-2.785)	0.022 (1.216)
Age ²	0.000*** (2.918)	-0.000 (-1.559)	0.000*** (2.774)	-0.000 (-1.484)	0.000*** (2.787)	-0.000 (-1.535)	0.000*** (2.909)	-0.000 (-1.579)	0.000*** (2.705)	-0.000 (-1.414)	0.000*** (2.790)	-0.000 (-1.614)	0.000*** (2.924)	-0.000 (-1.586)
Married	-0.085** (-1.987)	0.003 (0.065)	-0.091** (-2.025)	0.007 (0.141)	-0.091** (-2.045)	0.010 (0.186)	-0.087** (-2.041)	0.011 (0.207)	-0.092** (-2.060)	0.016 (0.305)	-0.094** (-2.114)	0.020 (0.370)	-0.085** (-1.993)	0.005 (0.093)
Lives with family	0.012 (0.349)	0.020 (0.457)	0.011 (0.308)	0.017 (0.375)	0.010 (0.295)	0.012 (0.266)	0.014 (0.419)	0.022 (0.500)	0.013 (0.375)	0.021 (0.466)	0.013 (0.375)	0.010 (0.223)	0.012 (0.364)	0.019 (0.426)
Months of residence	0.003 (0.671)	0.009 (1.468)	0.003 (0.593)	0.007 (1.077)	0.003 (0.607)	0.007 (1.053)	0.004 (0.770)	0.009 (1.426)	0.003 (0.589)	0.007 (1.063)	0.004 (0.684)	0.007 (1.020)	0.003 (0.671)	0.009 (1.465)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.955)	-0.000 (-0.254)	-0.000 (-0.864)	0.000 (0.089)	-0.000 (-0.878)	0.000 (0.102)	-0.000 (-1.041)	-0.000 (-0.242)	-0.000 (-0.860)	0.000 (0.080)	-0.000 (-0.977)	0.000 (0.131)	-0.000 (-0.958)	-0.000 (-0.250)
Matura	0.043 (1.133)	0.100** (2.032)	0.045 (1.126)	0.079 (1.575)	0.046 (1.146)	0.081 (1.616)	0.046 (1.193)	0.096* (1.933)	0.044 (1.102)	0.076 (1.514)	0.048 (1.205)	0.079 (1.566)	0.043 (1.128)	0.100** (2.027)
Christian	-0.032 (-0.557)	0.107 (1.203)	-0.040 (-0.683)	0.079 (0.874)	-0.043 (-0.731)	0.082 (0.900)	-0.030 (-0.545)	0.120 (1.339)	-0.039 (-0.656)	0.097 (1.075)	-0.049 (-0.836)	0.106 (1.159)	-0.032 (-0.562)	0.111 (1.238)
Muslim	0.027 (0.666)	-0.062 (-1.091)	0.025 (0.564)	-0.095 (-1.589)	0.025 (0.567)	-0.103* (-1.705)	0.030 (0.743)	-0.066 (-1.152)	0.022 (0.503)	-0.084 (-1.399)	0.017 (0.372)	-0.109* (-1.759)	0.026 (0.653)	-0.066 (-1.149)
Internal locus of control	0.012 (0.608)	-0.001 (-0.040)	0.012 (0.597)	-0.008 (-0.333)	0.011 (0.561)	-0.008 (-0.340)	0.011 (0.558)	0.004 (0.168)	0.012 (0.588)	-0.005 (-0.190)	0.015 (0.748)	-0.010 (-0.394)	0.011 (0.593)	-0.001 (-0.056)
External locus of control	-0.011 (-0.761)	-0.004 (-0.190)	-0.012 (-0.784)	0.001 (0.038)	-0.012 (-0.782)	-0.000 (-0.020)	-0.010 (-0.719)	-0.006 (-0.297)	-0.012 (-0.795)	0.001 (0.039)	-0.012 (-0.798)	-0.002 (-0.106)	-0.011 (-0.768)	-0.004 (-0.199)

ctd.

Table B.3 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Granted asylum	0.017 (0.367)	-0.006 (-0.109)	0.012 (0.241)	-0.001 (-0.017)	0.013 (0.268)	0.006 (0.092)	0.018 (0.382)	0.001 (0.025)	0.010 (0.189)	0.015 (0.243)	0.020 (0.419)	0.014 (0.232)	0.016 (0.350)	-0.008 (-0.135)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.012 (-0.225)	0.160** (2.033)	-0.015 (-0.256)	0.154* (1.908)	-0.013 (-0.217)	0.162** (2.012)	-0.011 (-0.206)	0.165** (2.079)	-0.020 (-0.337)	0.162** (2.025)	-0.005 (-0.084)	0.161** (1.969)	-0.013 (-0.232)	0.158** (1.996)
COB: AFG	0.157** (2.041)	0.003 (0.034)	0.176** (2.213)	0.002 (0.030)	0.176** (2.220)	0.002 (0.027)	0.154** (2.008)	0.014 (0.178)	0.173** (2.172)	0.014 (0.183)	0.178** (2.218)	0.004 (0.050)	0.158** (2.050)	0.003 (0.034)
COB: IRN	0.144 (1.212)	0.018 (0.143)	0.142 (1.185)	0.014 (0.115)	0.146 (1.211)	0.015 (0.125)	0.132 (1.137)	0.006 (0.053)	0.140 (1.154)	-0.009 (-0.074)	0.130 (1.101)	0.015 (0.120)	0.145 (1.218)	0.019 (0.156)
COB: SYR	-0.019 (-0.417)	0.059 (0.999)	-0.014 (-0.316)	0.064 (1.058)	-0.014 (-0.313)	0.060 (0.986)	-0.018 (-0.409)	0.063 (1.057)	-0.017 (-0.362)	0.075 (1.254)	-0.025 (-0.522)	0.068 (1.113)	-0.019 (-0.421)	0.059 (0.988)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.089* (-1.888)	-0.203 (-1.239)	-0.093* (-1.883)	-0.338** (-2.090)	-0.093* (-1.885)	-0.350** (-2.207)	-0.089* (-1.891)	-0.210 (-1.355)	-0.093* (-1.880)	-0.306* (-1.867)	-0.104* (-1.940)	-0.363** (-2.357)	-0.089* (-1.890)	-0.219 (-1.352)
Prov: Vienna	0.070 (1.361)	-0.264*** (-3.509)	0.076 (1.406)	-0.284*** (-3.609)	0.075 (1.389)	-0.290*** (-3.676)	0.070 (1.352)	-0.266*** (-3.488)	0.076 (1.395)	-0.275*** (-3.484)	0.061 (1.062)	-0.293*** (-3.654)	0.070 (1.350)	-0.269*** (-3.568)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.038 (0.562)	0.024 (0.252)	0.038 (0.539)	-0.029 (-0.294)	0.034 (0.482)	-0.030 (-0.304)	0.033 (0.492)	0.018 (0.190)	0.044 (0.604)	-0.039 (-0.391)	0.023 (0.310)	-0.014 (-0.143)	0.038 (0.560)	0.029 (0.306)
Prov: Salzburg	0.006 (0.091)	-0.093 (-0.941)	0.003 (0.039)	-0.113 (-1.117)	0.002 (0.036)	-0.110 (-1.074)	0.007 (0.116)	-0.088 (-0.883)	0.005 (0.079)	-0.116 (-1.138)	-0.002 (-0.036)	-0.097 (-0.934)	0.005 (0.087)	-0.091 (-0.916)
Prov: Styria	0.049 (0.782)	-0.190** (-2.152)	0.060 (0.902)	-0.228** (-2.488)	0.059 (0.885)	-0.229** (-2.482)	0.051 (0.804)	-0.181** (-2.017)	0.060 (0.906)	-0.218** (-2.364)	0.049 (0.707)	-0.219** (-2.344)	0.048 (0.774)	-0.193** (-2.170)
Wants to stay in AT	-0.035 (-0.918)	0.038 (0.732)	-0.039 (-0.977)	0.037 (0.679)	-0.041 (-1.007)	0.042 (0.774)	-0.041 (-1.068)	0.040 (0.772)	-0.037 (-0.916)	0.036 (0.670)	-0.042 (-1.049)	0.061 (1.135)	-0.034 (-0.897)	0.044 (0.851)
Speak German: average	-0.141* (-1.666)	0.198** (2.515)	-0.146 (-1.635)	0.198** (2.501)	-0.143 (-1.621)	0.203*** (2.674)	-0.151* (-1.732)	0.199** (2.528)	-0.142 (-1.573)	0.178** (2.080)	-0.127 (-1.502)	0.204*** (2.723)	-0.138 (-1.645)	0.202*** (2.631)
Speak German: advanced/MT	-0.099 (-1.071)	0.290*** (3.325)	-0.100 (-1.030)	0.297*** (3.390)	-0.098 (-1.020)	0.320*** (3.779)	-0.118 (-1.247)	0.289*** (3.284)	-0.091 (-0.909)	0.254*** (2.644)	-0.076 (-0.830)	0.344*** (4.121)	-0.094 (-1.037)	0.305*** (3.580)
No of obs	496	496	468	468	469	469	496	496	468	468	469	469	496	496
ll	-399.9	-399.9	-379.3	-379.3	-381.9	-381.9	-400.5	-400.5	-378.9	-378.9	-385.0	-385.0	-401.7	-401.7

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.4 / Regression results: Labour market integration and German understanding abilities (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
SI-TOT	0.010 (0.623)	0.067*** (3.048)												
SI-AT			0.009 (0.518)	0.073*** (3.236)										
SI-COB					0.014 (0.846)	0.056*** (2.598)								
NETW-TOT							0.027* (1.741)	0.058*** (2.687)						
NETW-AT									0.003 (0.142)	0.088*** (3.706)				
NETW-COB											0.029** (2.293)	-0.012 (-0.647)		
SC-TOT													0.009 (0.575)	0.055** (2.557)
Age	-0.033*** (-2.863)	0.019 (1.049)	-0.033*** (-2.727)	0.017 (0.952)	-0.033*** (-2.724)	0.018 (0.994)	-0.033*** (-2.856)	0.019 (1.070)	-0.032*** (-2.670)	0.016 (0.881)	-0.033*** (-2.738)	0.019 (1.058)	-0.033*** (-2.869)	0.019 (1.066)
Age ²	0.000*** (3.009)	-0.000 (-1.437)	0.000*** (2.871)	-0.000 (-1.349)	0.000*** (2.874)	-0.000 (-1.379)	0.000*** (2.986)	-0.000 (-1.457)	0.000*** (2.812)	-0.000 (-1.312)	0.000*** (2.891)	-0.000 (-1.455)	0.000*** (3.016)	-0.000 (-1.453)
Married	-0.088** (-2.052)	0.003 (0.062)	-0.092** (-2.070)	0.007 (0.130)	-0.093** (-2.091)	0.009 (0.177)	-0.089** (-2.087)	0.009 (0.185)	-0.094** (-2.104)	0.016 (0.299)	-0.094** (-2.130)	0.018 (0.333)	-0.088** (-2.060)	0.005 (0.089)
Lives with family	0.011 (0.333)	0.019 (0.435)	0.011 (0.301)	0.018 (0.401)	0.010 (0.287)	0.013 (0.288)	0.014 (0.408)	0.022 (0.481)	0.014 (0.380)	0.022 (0.489)	0.014 (0.392)	0.011 (0.233)	0.012 (0.349)	0.018 (0.399)
Months of residence	0.004 (0.703)	0.009 (1.390)	0.003 (0.574)	0.008 (1.171)	0.003 (0.585)	0.007 (1.149)	0.004 (0.820)	0.008 (1.321)	0.003 (0.573)	0.007 (1.141)	0.004 (0.674)	0.007 (1.093)	0.004 (0.701)	0.009 (1.378)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.975)	-0.000 (-0.136)	-0.000 (-0.834)	0.000 (0.065)	-0.000 (-0.847)	0.000 (0.079)	-0.000 (-1.083)	-0.000 (-0.111)	-0.000 (-0.832)	0.000 (0.052)	-0.000 (-0.954)	0.000 (0.123)	-0.000 (-0.974)	-0.000 (-0.123)
Matura	0.043 (1.110)	0.099** (2.019)	0.044 (1.092)	0.086* (1.709)	0.045 (1.117)	0.088* (1.741)	0.045 (1.150)	0.095* (1.903)	0.042 (1.056)	0.081 (1.618)	0.048 (1.186)	0.083* (1.650)	0.043 (1.112)	0.099** (1.997)
Christian	-0.033 (-0.570)	0.113 (1.270)	-0.042 (-0.699)	0.087 (0.953)	-0.044 (-0.745)	0.091 (0.994)	-0.031 (-0.545)	0.125 (1.398)	-0.039 (-0.644)	0.102 (1.125)	-0.050 (-0.829)	0.115 (1.253)	-0.033 (-0.571)	0.117 (1.311)
Muslim	0.023 (0.552)	-0.056 (-0.980)	0.022 (0.498)	-0.092 (-1.525)	0.022 (0.495)	-0.099 (-1.630)	0.026 (0.643)	-0.058 (-1.011)	0.021 (0.468)	-0.080 (-1.333)	0.015 (0.323)	-0.103* (-1.668)	0.022 (0.537)	-0.059 (-1.028)
Internal locus of control	0.009 (0.495)	0.000 (0.007)	0.010 (0.488)	-0.007 (-0.298)	0.009 (0.453)	-0.008 (-0.317)	0.009 (0.486)	0.005 (0.188)	0.010 (0.508)	-0.004 (-0.161)	0.013 (0.680)	-0.010 (-0.387)	0.009 (0.486)	-0.000 (-0.011)
External locus of control	-0.010 (-0.676)	-0.004 (-0.237)	-0.010 (-0.672)	-0.002 (-0.089)	-0.010 (-0.672)	-0.003 (-0.159)	-0.009 (-0.639)	-0.006 (-0.321)	-0.010 (-0.666)	-0.001 (-0.066)	-0.010 (-0.682)	-0.005 (-0.245)	-0.010 (-0.684)	-0.005 (-0.245)

ctd.

Table B.4 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Granted asylum	0.016 (0.336)	0.001 (0.013)	0.010 (0.204)	0.003 (0.044)	0.012 (0.232)	0.011 (0.175)	0.017 (0.370)	0.010 (0.167)	0.008 (0.164)	0.018 (0.299)	0.021 (0.444)	0.021 (0.336)	0.015 (0.323)	0.000 (0.003)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.007 (-0.125)	0.156** (1.980)	-0.010 (-0.177)	0.150* (1.851)	-0.008 (-0.137)	0.158** (1.964)	-0.005 (-0.085)	0.162** (2.055)	-0.015 (-0.257)	0.160** (1.998)	0.001 (0.023)	0.159** (1.962)	-0.007 (-0.134)	0.154* (1.953)
COB: AFG	0.165** (2.162)	-0.012 (-0.159)	0.185** (2.337)	-0.013 (-0.171)	0.185** (2.339)	-0.015 (-0.199)	0.165** (2.171)	-0.003 (-0.039)	0.181** (2.291)	0.003 (0.039)	0.186** (2.329)	-0.014 (-0.184)	0.166** (2.164)	-0.013 (-0.172)
COB: IRN	0.169 (1.423)	-0.013 (-0.115)	0.168 (1.402)	-0.022 (-0.194)	0.172 (1.426)	-0.024 (-0.211)	0.160 (1.369)	-0.025 (-0.221)	0.165 (1.358)	-0.039 (-0.356)	0.158 (1.329)	-0.027 (-0.236)	0.170 (1.424)	-0.013 (-0.113)
COB: SYR	-0.007 (-0.168)	0.057 (0.966)	-0.003 (-0.071)	0.065 (1.081)	-0.003 (-0.071)	0.062 (1.016)	-0.007 (-0.163)	0.059 (0.992)	-0.005 (-0.118)	0.076 (1.281)	-0.013 (-0.294)	0.070 (1.150)	-0.007 (-0.175)	0.057 (0.960)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.087* (-1.859)	-0.203 (-1.237)	-0.093* (-1.858)	-0.323* (-1.945)	-0.093* (-1.861)	-0.336** (-2.060)	-0.087* (-1.859)	-0.212 (-1.365)	-0.092* (-1.851)	-0.294* (-1.766)	-0.103* (-1.911)	-0.352** (-2.236)	-0.087* (-1.860)	-0.220 (-1.352)
Prov: Vienna	0.072 (1.411)	-0.271*** (-3.588)	0.076 (1.397)	-0.283*** (-3.593)	0.076 (1.384)	-0.291*** (-3.671)	0.073 (1.421)	-0.274*** (-3.595)	0.076 (1.391)	-0.273*** (-3.452)	0.062 (1.055)	-0.295*** (-3.657)	0.072 (1.401)	-0.277*** (-3.657)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.034 (0.508)	0.019 (0.199)	0.033 (0.462)	-0.025 (-0.252)	0.029 (0.410)	-0.028 (-0.280)	0.030 (0.452)	0.010 (0.103)	0.037 (0.521)	-0.037 (-0.371)	0.018 (0.250)	-0.017 (-0.172)	0.034 (0.511)	0.023 (0.236)
Prov: Salzburg	0.010 (0.165)	-0.096 (-0.968)	0.005 (0.085)	-0.109 (-1.079)	0.005 (0.085)	-0.106 (-1.038)	0.011 (0.182)	-0.093 (-0.935)	0.008 (0.118)	-0.113 (-1.114)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.094 (-0.912)	0.010 (0.164)	-0.094 (-0.949)
Prov: Styria	0.050 (0.797)	-0.202** (-2.282)	0.061 (0.906)	-0.236** (-2.576)	0.060 (0.893)	-0.240*** (-2.595)	0.053 (0.839)	-0.195** (-2.172)	0.062 (0.921)	-0.225** (-2.427)	0.050 (0.704)	-0.234** (-2.498)	0.049 (0.787)	-0.206** (-2.314)
Wants to stay in AT	-0.041 (-1.075)	0.042 (0.813)	-0.044 (-1.077)	0.038 (0.696)	-0.045 (-1.105)	0.043 (0.790)	-0.047 (-1.218)	0.042 (0.811)	-0.041 (-1.016)	0.035 (0.645)	-0.045 (-1.108)	0.059 (1.095)	-0.040 (-1.050)	0.049 (0.931)
Understand German: average	-0.072 (-1.079)	0.123* (1.694)	-0.074 (-1.061)	0.106 (1.374)	-0.074 (-1.064)	0.111 (1.463)	-0.076 (-1.116)	0.126* (1.759)	-0.068 (-0.989)	0.096 (1.235)	-0.060 (-0.911)	0.118 (1.591)	-0.070 (-1.061)	0.127* (1.774)
Understand German: advanced/MT	-0.069 (-0.958)	0.231*** (2.885)	-0.071 (-0.937)	0.202** (2.391)	-0.070 (-0.942)	0.225*** (2.711)	-0.080 (-1.102)	0.240*** (3.008)	-0.061 (-0.807)	0.172** (1.983)	-0.047 (-0.662)	0.259*** (3.177)	-0.065 (-0.925)	0.248*** (3.130)
No of obs	496	496	468	468	469	469	496	496	468	468	469	469	496	496
ll	-401.9	-401.9	-383.1	-383.1	-385.9	-385.9	-401.7	-401.7	-381.9	-381.9	-388.7	-388.7	-403.7	-403.7

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.5 / Regression results: Labour market integration and German reading abilities (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
SI-TOT	0.008 (0.486)	0.084*** (3.922)												
SI-AT			0.006 (0.362)	0.088*** (4.004)										
SI-COB					0.012 (0.729)	0.070*** (3.260)								
NETW-TOT							0.027* (1.688)	0.075*** (3.429)						
NETW-AT									0.001 (0.062)	0.107*** (4.614)				
NETW-COB											0.029** (2.301)	-0.017 (-0.891)		
SC-TOT													0.007 (0.466)	0.070*** (3.322)
Age	-0.033*** (-2.809)	0.018 (0.979)	-0.032*** (-2.658)	0.016 (0.883)	-0.032*** (-2.654)	0.017 (0.926)	-0.033*** (-2.795)	0.018 (0.991)	-0.032*** (-2.586)	0.014 (0.779)	-0.032*** (-2.631)	0.018 (0.960)	-0.033*** (-2.814)	0.018 (0.998)
Age ²	0.000*** (3.000)	-0.000 (-1.475)	0.000*** (2.855)	-0.000 (-1.377)	0.000*** (2.858)	-0.000 (-1.416)	0.000*** (2.979)	-0.000 (-1.498)	0.000*** (2.781)	-0.000 (-1.319)	0.000*** (2.832)	-0.000 (-1.484)	0.000*** (3.005)	-0.000 (-1.498)
Married	-0.089** (-2.092)	0.007 (0.131)	-0.093** (-2.092)	0.011 (0.200)	-0.094** (-2.118)	0.014 (0.263)	-0.091** (-2.140)	0.015 (0.293)	-0.095** (-2.135)	0.022 (0.413)	-0.096** (-2.173)	0.026 (0.473)	-0.090** (-2.104)	0.009 (0.169)
Lives with family	0.014 (0.409)	0.022 (0.482)	0.013 (0.367)	0.019 (0.400)	0.013 (0.366)	0.012 (0.263)	0.015 (0.458)	0.023 (0.509)	0.015 (0.428)	0.022 (0.490)	0.017 (0.475)	0.008 (0.164)	0.015 (0.431)	0.020 (0.442)
Months of residence	0.003 (0.594)	0.011* (1.715)	0.003 (0.485)	0.009 (1.356)	0.003 (0.500)	0.008 (1.330)	0.004 (0.741)	0.010* (1.668)	0.003 (0.487)	0.009 (1.372)	0.003 (0.612)	0.008 (1.297)	0.003 (0.595)	0.011* (1.713)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.907)	-0.000 (-0.314)	-0.000 (-0.799)	0.000 (0.011)	-0.000 (-0.815)	0.000 (0.039)	-0.000 (-1.039)	-0.000 (-0.305)	-0.000 (-0.792)	-0.000 (-0.042)	-0.000 (-0.933)	0.000 (0.090)	-0.000 (-0.908)	-0.000 (-0.301)
Matura	0.037 (0.952)	0.117** (2.360)	0.036 (0.910)	0.100** (1.987)	0.037 (0.921)	0.104** (2.045)	0.038 (0.987)	0.110** (2.194)	0.037 (0.918)	0.091* (1.807)	0.041 (1.025)	0.099* (1.943)	0.036 (0.952)	0.117** (2.351)
Christian	-0.032 (-0.570)	0.111 (1.238)	-0.041 (-0.695)	0.087 (0.948)	-0.043 (-0.741)	0.092 (1.000)	-0.032 (-0.578)	0.124 (1.371)	-0.039 (-0.654)	0.101 (1.105)	-0.049 (-0.839)	0.122 (1.312)	-0.033 (-0.575)	0.116 (1.284)
Muslim	0.027 (0.669)	-0.069 (-1.184)	0.027 (0.624)	-0.100 (-1.643)	0.027 (0.632)	-0.108* (-1.758)	0.030 (0.750)	-0.074 (-1.268)	0.025 (0.576)	-0.091 (-1.481)	0.020 (0.457)	-0.114* (-1.807)	0.027 (0.659)	-0.073 (-1.249)
Internal locus of control	0.010 (0.506)	-0.000 (-0.017)	0.010 (0.531)	-0.008 (-0.316)	0.010 (0.487)	-0.008 (-0.337)	0.009 (0.478)	0.005 (0.198)	0.011 (0.560)	-0.003 (-0.139)	0.014 (0.697)	-0.010 (-0.377)	0.009 (0.489)	-0.001 (-0.037)
External locus of control	-0.008 (-0.543)	-0.006 (-0.344)	-0.009 (-0.566)	-0.004 (-0.192)	-0.009 (-0.560)	-0.005 (-0.278)	-0.007 (-0.501)	-0.008 (-0.433)	-0.009 (-0.577)	-0.003 (-0.147)	-0.008 (-0.548)	-0.008 (-0.404)	-0.008 (-0.545)	-0.007 (-0.363)

ctd.

Table B.5 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Granted asylum	0.020 (0.438)	-0.027 (-0.439)	0.015 (0.299)	-0.022 (-0.346)	0.016 (0.327)	-0.017 (-0.262)	0.020 (0.440)	-0.017 (-0.286)	0.011 (0.211)	-0.000 (-0.007)	0.024 (0.490)	-0.009 (-0.146)	0.019 (0.417)	-0.030 (-0.496)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.006 (-0.102)	0.139* (1.725)	-0.008 (-0.130)	0.132 (1.604)	-0.005 (-0.088)	0.139* (1.681)	-0.004 (-0.081)	0.145* (1.787)	-0.014 (-0.242)	0.147* (1.799)	0.003 (0.060)	0.136 (1.613)	-0.006 (-0.112)	0.135* (1.660)
COB: AFG	0.175** (2.294)	-0.004 (-0.055)	0.195** (2.463)	-0.008 (-0.107)	0.195** (2.468)	-0.007 (-0.084)	0.171** (2.256)	0.006 (0.079)	0.192** (2.421)	-0.001 (-0.017)	0.198** (2.478)	-0.003 (-0.043)	0.176** (2.298)	-0.003 (-0.042)
COB: IRN	0.190 (1.553)	-0.033 (-0.288)	0.191 (1.545)	-0.043 (-0.382)	0.195 (1.572)	-0.044 (-0.385)	0.178 (1.483)	-0.048 (-0.438)	0.186 (1.492)	-0.066 (-0.642)	0.181 (1.477)	-0.045 (-0.404)	0.191 (1.556)	-0.032 (-0.279)
COB: SYR	-0.004 (-0.098)	0.059 (1.001)	-0.000 (-0.002)	0.066 (1.090)	0.000 (0.000)	0.062 (1.027)	-0.004 (-0.106)	0.063 (1.068)	-0.002 (-0.057)	0.080 (1.348)	-0.010 (-0.224)	0.075 (1.235)	-0.004 (-0.100)	0.060 (1.001)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.091* (-1.875)	-0.171 (-1.032)	-0.098* (-1.882)	-0.292* (-1.719)	-0.098* (-1.882)	-0.306* (-1.830)	-0.091* (-1.874)	-0.183 (-1.157)	-0.098* (-1.880)	-0.260 (-1.522)	-0.108* (-1.933)	-0.326** (-2.032)	-0.091* (-1.876)	-0.190 (-1.160)
Prov: Vienna	0.069 (1.286)	-0.256*** (-3.350)	0.072 (1.262)	-0.272*** (-3.408)	0.071 (1.254)	-0.280*** (-3.474)	0.069 (1.292)	-0.258*** (-3.319)	0.071 (1.250)	-0.259*** (-3.236)	0.057 (0.953)	-0.282*** (-3.419)	0.068 (1.279)	-0.263*** (-3.414)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.024 (0.352)	0.050 (0.520)	0.023 (0.320)	0.001 (0.009)	0.018 (0.257)	0.002 (0.022)	0.019 (0.284)	0.041 (0.423)	0.028 (0.390)	-0.016 (-0.160)	0.008 (0.104)	0.024 (0.230)	0.023 (0.349)	0.057 (0.590)
Prov: Salzburg	0.009 (0.147)	-0.083 (-0.829)	0.005 (0.072)	-0.104 (-1.009)	0.005 (0.073)	-0.096 (-0.923)	0.010 (0.150)	-0.077 (-0.755)	0.007 (0.106)	-0.114 (-1.100)	0.003 (0.045)	-0.079 (-0.743)	0.010 (0.149)	-0.079 (-0.785)
Prov: Styria	0.047 (0.727)	-0.193** (-2.151)	0.056 (0.815)	-0.227** (-2.444)	0.055 (0.798)	-0.228** (-2.433)	0.051 (0.785)	-0.180** (-1.962)	0.058 (0.837)	-0.211** (-2.247)	0.045 (0.624)	-0.215** (-2.242)	0.046 (0.717)	-0.196** (-2.169)
Wants to stay in AT	-0.040 (-1.028)	0.034 (0.643)	-0.041 (-1.013)	0.031 (0.555)	-0.043 (-1.053)	0.037 (0.675)	-0.046 (-1.200)	0.036 (0.671)	-0.040 (-0.973)	0.028 (0.523)	-0.044 (-1.094)	0.062 (1.117)	-0.039 (-1.011)	0.042 (0.786)
Read German: average	0.009 (0.152)	0.015 (0.197)	0.007 (0.124)	-0.003 (-0.032)	0.008 (0.143)	0.009 (0.112)	0.004 (0.072)	0.012 (0.148)	0.007 (0.121)	-0.041 (-0.493)	0.017 (0.298)	0.008 (0.099)	0.009 (0.151)	0.022 (0.282)
Read German: advanced/MT	0.007 (0.113)	0.042 (0.522)	0.013 (0.207)	0.020 (0.232)	0.013 (0.211)	0.042 (0.508)	-0.003 (-0.047)	0.039 (0.486)	0.015 (0.239)	-0.033 (-0.382)	0.023 (0.396)	0.060 (0.704)	0.007 (0.121)	0.056 (0.699)
No of obs	495	495	467	467	468	468	495	495	467	467	468	468	495	495
ll	-405.8	-405.8	-385.7	-385.7	-389.4	-389.4	-406.1	-406.1	-383.6	-383.6	-394.3	-394.3	-408.3	-408.3

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.6 / Regression results: Labour market integration and German writing abilities (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
SI-TOT	0.008 (0.486)	0.083*** (3.954)												
SI-AT			0.006 (0.379)	0.088*** (4.046)										
SI-COB					0.012 (0.751)	0.071*** (3.350)								
NETW-TOT							0.025 (1.622)	0.074*** (3.372)						
NETW-AT									0.000 (0.000)	0.103*** (4.523)				
NETW-COB											0.029** (2.273)	-0.017 (-0.915)		
SC-TOT													0.007 (0.476)	0.070*** (3.381)
Age	-0.032*** (-2.715)	0.019 (1.066)	-0.031** (-2.544)	0.018 (0.953)	-0.031** (-2.538)	0.018 (0.991)	-0.032*** (-2.723)	0.019 (1.056)	-0.031** (-2.485)	0.016 (0.841)	-0.031** (-2.545)	0.019 (1.011)	-0.032*** (-2.719)	0.020 (1.079)
Age ²	0.000*** (2.914)	-0.000 (-1.540)	0.000*** (2.747)	-0.000 (-1.427)	0.000*** (2.750)	-0.000 (-1.467)	0.000*** (2.915)	-0.000 (-1.548)	0.000*** (2.684)	-0.000 (-1.358)	0.000*** (2.749)	-0.000 (-1.534)	0.000*** (2.919)	-0.000 (-1.561)
Married	-0.089** (-2.090)	0.005 (0.092)	-0.094** (-2.109)	0.008 (0.148)	-0.095** (-2.134)	0.011 (0.202)	-0.090** (-2.135)	0.013 (0.258)	-0.096** (-2.152)	0.019 (0.367)	-0.097** (-2.199)	0.022 (0.409)	-0.090** (-2.103)	0.007 (0.125)
Lives with family	0.014 (0.416)	0.023 (0.511)	0.013 (0.361)	0.020 (0.425)	0.013 (0.359)	0.014 (0.296)	0.016 (0.463)	0.025 (0.556)	0.015 (0.421)	0.023 (0.506)	0.017 (0.493)	0.010 (0.202)	0.015 (0.438)	0.022 (0.474)
Months of residence	0.003 (0.575)	0.010 (1.631)	0.002 (0.455)	0.008 (1.285)	0.003 (0.468)	0.008 (1.260)	0.004 (0.722)	0.010 (1.596)	0.003 (0.463)	0.008 (1.306)	0.003 (0.571)	0.008 (1.238)	0.003 (0.576)	0.010 (1.630)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.892)	-0.000 (-0.264)	-0.000 (-0.773)	0.000 (0.052)	-0.000 (-0.788)	0.000 (0.085)	-0.000 (-1.028)	-0.000 (-0.260)	-0.000 (-0.773)	-0.000 (-0.009)	-0.000 (-0.895)	0.000 (0.135)	-0.000 (-0.892)	-0.000 (-0.249)
Matura	0.034 (0.881)	0.109** (2.186)	0.034 (0.847)	0.094* (1.873)	0.034 (0.854)	0.099* (1.947)	0.036 (0.928)	0.104** (2.067)	0.035 (0.860)	0.088* (1.745)	0.039 (0.976)	0.097* (1.898)	0.034 (0.881)	0.109** (2.182)
Christian	-0.032 (-0.556)	0.111 (1.234)	-0.040 (-0.683)	0.087 (0.952)	-0.043 (-0.735)	0.092 (0.999)	-0.032 (-0.576)	0.126 (1.396)	-0.039 (-0.648)	0.104 (1.132)	-0.049 (-0.834)	0.124 (1.334)	-0.032 (-0.567)	0.116 (1.280)
Muslim	0.028 (0.691)	-0.069 (-1.200)	0.028 (0.640)	-0.099 (-1.635)	0.028 (0.647)	-0.108* (-1.770)	0.031 (0.779)	-0.075 (-1.292)	0.026 (0.581)	-0.088 (-1.458)	0.020 (0.457)	-0.116* (-1.846)	0.027 (0.677)	-0.074 (-1.277)
Internal locus of control	0.010 (0.543)	0.002 (0.074)	0.012 (0.586)	-0.006 (-0.256)	0.011 (0.547)	-0.006 (-0.256)	0.009 (0.489)	0.007 (0.271)	0.012 (0.609)	-0.004 (-0.161)	0.015 (0.764)	-0.008 (-0.299)	0.010 (0.529)	0.002 (0.062)
External locus of control	-0.008 (-0.523)	-0.004 (-0.211)	-0.008 (-0.524)	-0.002 (-0.085)	-0.008 (-0.522)	-0.003 (-0.151)	-0.007 (-0.500)	-0.006 (-0.299)	-0.008 (-0.527)	-0.002 (-0.087)	-0.008 (-0.503)	-0.005 (-0.262)	-0.008 (-0.525)	-0.004 (-0.218)

ctd.

Table B.6 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Granted asylum	0.021 (0.460)	-0.024 (-0.404)	0.017 (0.347)	-0.018 (-0.295)	0.018 (0.374)	-0.013 (-0.206)	0.021 (0.453)	-0.016 (-0.259)	0.013 (0.259)	0.002 (0.038)	0.025 (0.513)	-0.004 (-0.063)	0.020 (0.439)	-0.027 (-0.454)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.004 (-0.070)	0.146* (1.835)	-0.004 (-0.074)	0.139* (1.706)	-0.002 (-0.036)	0.147* (1.799)	-0.004 (-0.071)	0.151* (1.887)	-0.011 (-0.189)	0.152* (1.871)	0.005 (0.090)	0.146* (1.752)	-0.004 (-0.082)	0.143* (1.782)
COB: AFG	0.174** (2.280)	-0.002 (-0.020)	0.193** (2.448)	-0.004 (-0.047)	0.193** (2.449)	-0.004 (-0.047)	0.170** (2.251)	0.010 (0.132)	0.190** (2.399)	0.008 (0.101)	0.196** (2.457)	-0.001 (-0.007)	0.174** (2.283)	-0.001 (-0.019)
COB: IRN	0.191 (1.571)	-0.030 (-0.268)	0.190 (1.550)	-0.038 (-0.343)	0.195 (1.578)	-0.042 (-0.371)	0.181 (1.514)	-0.045 (-0.414)	0.186 (1.502)	-0.057 (-0.552)	0.179 (1.470)	-0.046 (-0.413)	0.192 (1.574)	-0.031 (-0.272)
COB: SYR	-0.005 (-0.127)	0.058 (0.982)	-0.002 (-0.040)	0.065 (1.069)	-0.002 (-0.043)	0.061 (1.009)	-0.005 (-0.130)	0.064 (1.077)	-0.004 (-0.094)	0.079 (1.338)	-0.011 (-0.252)	0.076 (1.244)	-0.005 (-0.131)	0.059 (0.986)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.091* (-1.872)	-0.183 (-1.117)	-0.095* (-1.870)	-0.301* (-1.817)	-0.096* (-1.871)	-0.312* (-1.919)	-0.091* (-1.873)	-0.193 (-1.237)	-0.095* (-1.868)	-0.270 (-1.610)	-0.106* (-1.917)	-0.328** (-2.085)	-0.091* (-1.872)	-0.200 (-1.235)
Prov: Vienna	0.069 (1.297)	-0.255*** (-3.329)	0.074 (1.327)	-0.269*** (-3.371)	0.073 (1.312)	-0.275*** (-3.416)	0.068 (1.278)	-0.258*** (-3.325)	0.074 (1.325)	-0.259*** (-3.250)	0.059 (0.998)	-0.274*** (-3.334)	0.068 (1.290)	-0.260*** (-3.376)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.025 (0.374)	0.049 (0.506)	0.026 (0.365)	0.002 (0.020)	0.021 (0.304)	0.004 (0.040)	0.020 (0.299)	0.039 (0.402)	0.032 (0.441)	-0.017 (-0.166)	0.011 (0.152)	0.027 (0.259)	0.025 (0.372)	0.057 (0.585)
Prov: Salzburg	0.010 (0.153)	-0.078 (-0.777)	0.007 (0.099)	-0.096 (-0.933)	0.006 (0.097)	-0.089 (-0.858)	0.010 (0.149)	-0.072 (-0.713)	0.009 (0.136)	-0.102 (-0.999)	0.003 (0.048)	-0.070 (-0.668)	0.010 (0.154)	-0.074 (-0.736)
Prov: Styria	0.048 (0.754)	-0.192** (-2.141)	0.060 (0.879)	-0.225** (-2.424)	0.059 (0.858)	-0.224** (-2.397)	0.051 (0.792)	-0.180** (-1.966)	0.062 (0.907)	-0.213** (-2.272)	0.049 (0.684)	-0.209** (-2.184)	0.048 (0.744)	-0.194** (-2.148)
Wants to stay in AT	-0.040 (-1.038)	0.032 (0.601)	-0.042 (-1.040)	0.030 (0.542)	-0.044 (-1.075)	0.036 (0.645)	-0.046 (-1.184)	0.034 (0.646)	-0.040 (-0.991)	0.029 (0.538)	-0.044 (-1.101)	0.059 (1.076)	-0.039 (-1.021)	0.039 (0.733)
Write German: average	0.005 (0.102)	0.072 (1.126)	0.004 (0.078)	0.054 (0.804)	0.005 (0.085)	0.061 (0.918)	0.001 (0.023)	0.071 (1.104)	0.003 (0.059)	0.028 (0.396)	0.012 (0.229)	0.062 (0.904)	0.005 (0.104)	0.077 (1.208)
Write German: advanced/MT	0.018 (0.338)	0.108 (1.618)	0.025 (0.438)	0.082 (1.165)	0.026 (0.461)	0.096 (1.371)	0.008 (0.138)	0.098 (1.450)	0.023 (0.404)	0.036 (0.498)	0.029 (0.527)	0.104 (1.456)	0.019 (0.350)	0.118* (1.763)
No of obs	495	495	467	467	468	468	495	495	467	467	468	468	495	495
ll	-404.3	-404.3	-384.7	-384.7	-388.3	-388.3	-405.1	-405.1	-383.4	-383.4	-393.6	-393.6	-406.8	-406.8

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.7 / Regression results: Labour market integration and discrimination (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
SI-TOT	0.008 (0.514)	0.071*** (3.282)												
SI-AT			0.006 (0.365)	0.074*** (3.371)										
SI-COB					0.012 (0.717)	0.060*** (2.810)								
NETW-TOT							0.024 (1.529)	0.059*** (2.643)						
NETW-AT									-0.002 (-0.119)	0.083*** (3.506)				
NETW-COB											0.030** (2.363)	-0.016 (-0.847)		
SC-TOT													0.008 (0.480)	0.059*** (2.806)
Age	-0.032*** (-2.744)	0.023 (1.259)	-0.031** (-2.561)	0.023 (1.244)	-0.031** (-2.560)	0.024 (1.299)	-0.033*** (-2.760)	0.023 (1.269)	-0.031** (-2.490)	0.021 (1.142)	-0.031** (-2.567)	0.024 (1.320)	-0.032*** (-2.747)	0.023 (1.270)
Age ²	0.000*** (2.882)	-0.000 (-1.580)	0.000*** (2.702)	-0.000 (-1.523)	0.000*** (2.711)	-0.000 (-1.567)	0.000*** (2.888)	-0.000 (-1.612)	0.000*** (2.635)	-0.000 (-1.481)	0.000*** (2.727)	-0.000 (-1.631)	0.000*** (2.886)	-0.000 (-1.594)
Married	-0.084** (-1.961)	-0.006 (-0.115)	-0.090** (-2.001)	-0.003 (-0.052)	-0.091** (-2.022)	-0.000 (-0.006)	-0.086** (-2.014)	0.005 (0.089)	-0.092** (-2.044)	0.010 (0.187)	-0.092** (-2.068)	0.012 (0.217)	-0.085** (-1.966)	-0.004 (-0.086)
Lives with family	0.012 (0.343)	0.024 (0.539)	0.011 (0.314)	0.021 (0.465)	0.010 (0.287)	0.016 (0.360)	0.014 (0.411)	0.025 (0.551)	0.015 (0.405)	0.023 (0.517)	0.011 (0.323)	0.016 (0.348)	0.012 (0.356)	0.023 (0.520)
Months of residence	0.003 (0.686)	0.009 (1.480)	0.003 (0.604)	0.007 (1.095)	0.003 (0.621)	0.007 (1.067)	0.004 (0.782)	0.009 (1.432)	0.003 (0.575)	0.007 (1.086)	0.004 (0.709)	0.006 (1.000)	0.003 (0.685)	0.009 (1.473)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.955)	-0.000 (-0.295)	-0.000 (-0.869)	0.000 (0.033)	-0.000 (-0.889)	0.000 (0.049)	-0.000 (-1.039)	-0.000 (-0.265)	-0.000 (-0.848)	0.000 (0.031)	-0.000 (-0.993)	0.000 (0.121)	-0.000 (-0.956)	-0.000 (-0.285)
Matura	0.036 (0.923)	0.097* (1.943)	0.036 (0.900)	0.072 (1.418)	0.037 (0.919)	0.074 (1.466)	0.039 (0.984)	0.093* (1.856)	0.036 (0.881)	0.069 (1.369)	0.039 (0.957)	0.075 (1.463)	0.036 (0.918)	0.097* (1.948)
Christian	-0.032 (-0.536)	0.121 (1.347)	-0.040 (-0.650)	0.092 (1.012)	-0.042 (-0.696)	0.095 (1.039)	-0.031 (-0.535)	0.134 (1.488)	-0.040 (-0.642)	0.110 (1.213)	-0.050 (-0.821)	0.120 (1.306)	-0.032 (-0.537)	0.124 (1.382)
Muslim	0.022 (0.523)	-0.060 (-1.053)	0.019 (0.430)	-0.094 (-1.560)	0.020 (0.442)	-0.101* (-1.670)	0.024 (0.586)	-0.065 (-1.123)	0.016 (0.343)	-0.084 (-1.391)	0.010 (0.227)	-0.107* (-1.730)	0.021 (0.511)	-0.064 (-1.116)
Internal locus of control	0.010 (0.537)	0.002 (0.086)	0.011 (0.535)	-0.004 (-0.176)	0.010 (0.492)	-0.004 (-0.174)	0.010 (0.515)	0.007 (0.275)	0.011 (0.563)	-0.001 (-0.035)	0.014 (0.709)	-0.005 (-0.210)	0.010 (0.532)	0.002 (0.074)
External locus of control	-0.013 (-0.893)	-0.011 (-0.560)	-0.015 (-0.946)	-0.010 (-0.485)	-0.015 (-0.947)	-0.011 (-0.540)	-0.013 (-0.863)	-0.012 (-0.631)	-0.015 (-0.967)	-0.009 (-0.443)	-0.015 (-0.959)	-0.012 (-0.600)	-0.013 (-0.897)	-0.011 (-0.568)

ctd.

Table B.7 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Granted asylum	0.018 (0.398)	0.006 (0.106)	0.014 (0.280)	0.012 (0.202)	0.016 (0.328)	0.019 (0.313)	0.020 (0.436)	0.014 (0.240)	0.011 (0.217)	0.028 (0.474)	0.023 (0.487)	0.027 (0.449)	0.018 (0.383)	0.005 (0.080)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.014 (-0.271)	0.171** (2.181)	-0.018 (-0.308)	0.164** (2.064)	-0.014 (-0.251)	0.172** (2.165)	-0.013 (-0.245)	0.177** (2.256)	-0.023 (-0.406)	0.176** (2.221)	-0.006 (-0.109)	0.171** (2.125)	-0.015 (-0.275)	0.168** (2.143)
COB: AFG	0.143* (1.839)	0.010 (0.126)	0.163** (2.019)	0.011 (0.135)	0.163** (2.026)	0.011 (0.136)	0.139* (1.797)	0.018 (0.236)	0.160** (1.979)	0.019 (0.252)	0.162** (1.988)	0.012 (0.153)	0.144* (1.850)	0.010 (0.125)
COB: IRN	0.138 (1.175)	0.014 (0.111)	0.137 (1.156)	0.008 (0.065)	0.140 (1.177)	0.009 (0.075)	0.128 (1.102)	0.004 (0.033)	0.139 (1.151)	-0.016 (-0.138)	0.122 (1.042)	0.011 (0.086)	0.138 (1.177)	0.015 (0.123)
COB: SYR	-0.025 (-0.534)	0.056 (0.935)	-0.021 (-0.452)	0.060 (0.985)	-0.021 (-0.451)	0.056 (0.909)	-0.025 (-0.535)	0.059 (0.986)	-0.023 (-0.491)	0.070 (1.163)	-0.033 (-0.667)	0.065 (1.058)	-0.025 (-0.534)	0.056 (0.928)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.085* (-1.876)	-0.207 (-1.272)	-0.090* (-1.871)	-0.355** (-2.284)	-0.090* (-1.874)	-0.365** (-2.388)	-0.085* (-1.876)	-0.209 (-1.358)	-0.089* (-1.868)	-0.323** (-2.032)	-0.101* (-1.928)	-0.369** (-2.449)	-0.085* (-1.877)	-0.221 (-1.374)
Prov: Vienna	0.073 (1.471)	-0.260*** (-3.509)	0.079 (1.489)	-0.284*** (-3.659)	0.078 (1.475)	-0.290*** (-3.730)	0.073 (1.455)	-0.261*** (-3.480)	0.079 (1.484)	-0.276*** (-3.534)	0.063 (1.096)	-0.290*** (-3.671)	0.073 (1.461)	-0.265*** (-3.564)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.042 (0.631)	0.033 (0.352)	0.041 (0.590)	-0.022 (-0.224)	0.036 (0.526)	-0.023 (-0.235)	0.037 (0.560)	0.030 (0.316)	0.047 (0.656)	-0.029 (-0.298)	0.024 (0.331)	-0.003 (-0.027)	0.042 (0.632)	0.039 (0.414)
Prov: Salzburg	0.013 (0.218)	-0.089 (-0.905)	0.008 (0.134)	-0.115 (-1.146)	0.008 (0.130)	-0.111 (-1.109)	0.015 (0.242)	-0.081 (-0.817)	0.012 (0.187)	-0.114 (-1.134)	0.004 (0.062)	-0.096 (-0.941)	0.013 (0.213)	-0.086 (-0.875)
Prov: Styria	0.055 (0.887)	-0.188** (-2.140)	0.065 (0.986)	-0.231** (-2.543)	0.063 (0.967)	-0.232** (-2.542)	0.056 (0.906)	-0.177** (-1.986)	0.065 (0.996)	-0.219** (-2.393)	0.055 (0.790)	-0.221** (-2.387)	0.054 (0.880)	-0.190** (-2.156)
Wants to stay in AT	-0.040 (-1.027)	0.034 (0.638)	-0.045 (-1.093)	0.028 (0.517)	-0.046 (-1.130)	0.033 (0.607)	-0.046 (-1.170)	0.036 (0.681)	-0.042 (-1.010)	0.028 (0.517)	-0.049 (-1.215)	0.055 (1.006)	-0.039 (-1.005)	0.040 (0.759)
Write German: average	-0.155* (-1.775)	0.197** (2.459)	-0.160* (-1.741)	0.194** (2.407)	-0.157* (-1.727)	0.201*** (2.584)	-0.166* (-1.850)	0.199** (2.509)	-0.155* (-1.669)	0.176** (2.036)	-0.142 (-1.621)	0.202*** (2.639)	-0.152* (-1.758)	0.201** (2.572)
Write German: advanced/MT	-0.112 (-1.188)	0.287*** (3.247)	-0.114 (-1.143)	0.294*** (3.289)	-0.111 (-1.129)	0.317*** (3.675)	-0.131 (-1.351)	0.290*** (3.272)	-0.103 (-1.001)	0.255*** (2.632)	-0.088 (-0.928)	0.339*** (3.983)	-0.108 (-1.159)	0.301*** (3.484)
Discrimination: often/very often	0.004 (0.088)	0.093 (1.434)	0.009 (0.170)	0.102 (1.541)	0.008 (0.165)	0.103 (1.556)	0.001 (0.018)	0.074 (1.139)	0.011 (0.210)	0.081 (1.227)	-0.008 (-0.166)	0.107 (1.610)	0.004 (0.081)	0.096 (1.471)
Discrimination: sometimes	0.013 (0.330)	0.079 (1.526)	0.020 (0.474)	0.111** (2.081)	0.020 (0.477)	0.111** (2.082)	0.014 (0.359)	0.077 (1.482)	0.020 (0.466)	0.104** (1.966)	0.021 (0.491)	0.104* (1.939)	0.013 (0.326)	0.078 (1.505)
Discrimination: rarely	0.065 (1.519)	0.082 (1.573)	0.065 (1.471)	0.098* (1.856)	0.063 (1.433)	0.098* (1.856)	0.064 (1.508)	0.083 (1.573)	0.067 (1.518)	0.091* (1.718)	0.060 (1.367)	0.108** (2.013)	0.064 (1.511)	0.085 (1.630)
No of obs	495	495	467	467	468	468	495	495	467	467	468	468	495	495
ll	-391.9	-391.9	-395.0	-395.0	-370.5	-370.5	-393.2	-393.2	-395.9	-395.9	-370.9	-370.9	-393.1	-393.1

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

12. Annex C

Table C.1 / Regression results: Social integration (basic model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Inactive	0.318** (2.432)	0.333** (2.515)	0.336** (2.476)	0.337** (2.489)	0.255* (1.965)	0.230 (1.538)	0.286** (2.156)
Employed	0.477*** (4.752)	0.503*** (4.827)	0.435*** (4.076)	0.457*** (4.396)	0.549*** (5.378)	-0.035 (-0.298)	0.413*** (4.058)
Age	-0.020 (-0.573)	-0.019 (-0.550)	-0.020 (-0.569)	-0.016 (-0.452)	-0.002 (-0.053)	-0.019 (-0.487)	-0.017 (-0.488)
Age ²	0.000 (0.387)	0.000 (0.368)	0.000 (0.379)	0.000 (0.327)	0.000 (0.030)	0.000 (0.250)	0.000 (0.311)
Married	0.100 (0.867)	0.098 (0.824)	0.140 (1.152)	-0.016 (-0.138)	-0.063 (-0.544)	0.086 (0.643)	0.117 (1.007)
Lives with family	-0.016 (-0.163)	-0.045 (-0.438)	-0.053 (-0.508)	-0.031 (-0.298)	-0.066 (-0.661)	-0.083 (-0.720)	-0.015 (-0.154)
Months of residence	0.009 (0.755)	0.013 (1.059)	0.011 (0.864)	0.004 (0.349)	0.012 (1.012)	-0.008 (-0.551)	0.009 (0.739)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.875)	-0.000 (-1.173)	-0.000 (-1.002)	0.000 (0.018)	-0.000 (-0.870)	0.000 (0.929)	-0.000 (-0.917)
Matura	-0.065 (-0.624)	-0.040 (-0.374)	-0.061 (-0.557)	0.077 (0.719)	0.108 (1.037)	0.042 (0.353)	-0.090 (-0.855)
Christian	0.267 (1.429)	0.283 (1.493)	0.295 (1.515)	0.248 (1.284)	0.168 (0.905)	0.427** (1.990)	0.250 (1.322)
Muslim	-0.171 (-1.408)	-0.155 (-1.227)	-0.149 (-1.148)	-0.022 (-0.172)	-0.044 (-0.357)	0.338** (2.360)	-0.174 (-1.409)
Internal locus of control	-0.006 (-0.119)	-0.009 (-0.184)	-0.009 (-0.177)	-0.046 (-0.916)	-0.029 (-0.586)	-0.063 (-1.107)	0.003 (0.065)
External locus of control	-0.063 (-1.563)	-0.081* (-1.934)	-0.079* (-1.823)	-0.026 (-0.619)	-0.058 (-1.396)	-0.013 (-0.272)	-0.063 (-1.545)
Granted asylum	-0.081 (-0.606)	-0.035 (-0.250)	0.019 (0.132)	-0.324** (-2.335)	-0.215 (-1.556)	-0.252 (-1.587)	-0.035 (-0.256)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.050 (-0.299)	-0.005 (-0.030)	0.050 (0.278)	-0.413** (-2.366)	-0.216 (-1.257)	-0.365* (-1.842)	0.017 (0.100)
COB: AFG	0.046 (0.261)	-0.040 (-0.223)	-0.006 (-0.033)	-0.066 (-0.366)	-0.188 (-1.072)	0.193 (0.953)	0.050 (0.281)
COB: IRN	-0.385 (-1.340)	-0.416 (-1.440)	-0.411 (-1.386)	-0.151 (-0.508)	-0.227 (-0.803)	0.295 (0.903)	-0.400 (-1.373)
COB: SYR	-0.003 (-0.021)	-0.045 (-0.357)	0.011 (0.083)	-0.058 (-0.446)	-0.197 (-1.580)	0.286** (1.985)	0.022 (0.171)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.572* (-1.679)	-0.196 (-0.522)	-0.180 (-0.466)	-0.301 (-0.855)	-0.098 (-0.267)	-0.043 (-0.101)	-0.549 (-1.592)
Prov: Vienna	-0.087 (-0.539)	-0.051 (-0.297)	0.008 (0.044)	-0.121 (-0.724)	-0.137 (-0.823)	0.245 (1.274)	-0.048 (-0.294)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.162 (0.791)	0.240 (1.122)	0.158 (0.721)	0.489** (2.307)	0.463** (2.209)	0.349 (1.448)	0.097 (0.465)
Prov: Salzburg	0.204 (0.997)	0.259 (1.214)	0.238 (1.084)	0.195 (0.918)	0.261 (1.250)	0.064 (0.266)	0.186 (0.899)
Prov: Styria	0.041 (0.221)	0.099 (0.508)	0.103 (0.515)	0.060 (0.313)	0.175 (0.918)	0.140 (0.634)	0.057 (0.305)
Constant	0.424 (0.583)	0.305 (0.413)	0.282 (0.372)	0.542 (0.720)	0.109 (0.150)	0.347 (0.416)	0.337 (0.458)
No of obs	534	502	503	534	502	503	534
R ²	0.119	0.124	0.094	0.129	0.162	0.063	0.095
Adjusted R ²	0.0793	0.0819	0.0504	0.0898	0.121	0.0185	0.0537

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C.2 / Regression results: Social integration and German speaking abilities (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Inactive	0.265** (1.991)	0.262* (1.947)	0.282** (2.008)	0.321** (2.296)	0.175 (1.346)	0.327** (2.002)	0.236* (1.725)
Employed	0.394*** (3.806)	0.406*** (3.779)	0.367*** (3.289)	0.347*** (3.196)	0.394*** (3.790)	-0.002 (-0.019)	0.349*** (3.287)
Age	0.003 (0.099)	0.006 (0.172)	-0.002 (-0.067)	0.016 (0.452)	0.041 (1.201)	-0.029 (-0.684)	0.000 (0.008)
Age ²	-0.000 (-0.092)	-0.000 (-0.165)	0.000 (0.013)	-0.000 (-0.392)	-0.000 (-0.937)	0.000 (0.339)	-0.000 (-0.029)
Married	0.092 (0.794)	0.084 (0.702)	0.125 (1.004)	0.014 (0.117)	-0.066 (-0.571)	0.091 (0.626)	0.104 (0.870)
Lives with family	-0.019 (-0.189)	-0.052 (-0.505)	-0.046 (-0.431)	-0.055 (-0.526)	-0.113 (-1.136)	-0.013 (-0.105)	-0.010 (-0.095)
Months of residence	0.002 (0.171)	0.006 (0.505)	0.004 (0.284)	0.003 (0.237)	0.011 (0.888)	-0.011 (-0.684)	0.002 (0.140)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.453)	-0.000 (-0.733)	-0.000 (-0.504)	0.000 (0.038)	-0.000 (-0.902)	0.000 (1.215)	-0.000 (-0.454)
Matura	-0.084 (-0.799)	-0.064 (-0.593)	-0.067 (-0.594)	0.009 (0.079)	0.022 (0.213)	0.077 (0.587)	-0.095 (-0.879)
Christian	0.284 (1.472)	0.280 (1.433)	0.324 (1.590)	0.207 (1.026)	0.036 (0.190)	0.511** (2.153)	0.280 (1.412)
Muslim	-0.160 (-1.279)	-0.164 (-1.262)	-0.144 (-1.063)	-0.039 (-0.295)	-0.119 (-0.948)	0.327** (2.072)	-0.159 (-1.239)
Internal locus of control	0.029 (0.565)	0.020 (0.389)	0.020 (0.364)	-0.056 (-1.058)	-0.022 (-0.427)	-0.089 (-1.401)	0.041 (0.796)
External locus of control	-0.022 (-0.534)	-0.024 (-0.553)	-0.026 (-0.571)	0.003 (0.075)	-0.009 (-0.214)	-0.008 (-0.162)	-0.024 (-0.566)
Granted asylum	0.027 (0.196)	0.083 (0.589)	0.124 (0.845)	-0.213 (-1.500)	-0.109 (-0.794)	-0.280 (-1.638)	0.057 (0.412)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.031 (-0.183)	0.016 (0.091)	0.056 (0.310)	-0.305* (-1.721)	-0.146 (-0.869)	-0.383* (-1.820)	0.015 (0.085)
COB: AFG	0.076 (0.441)	-0.005 (-0.029)	0.018 (0.101)	-0.083 (-0.459)	-0.150 (-0.886)	0.133 (0.626)	0.080 (0.452)
COB: IRN	-0.229 (-0.802)	-0.278 (-0.971)	-0.314 (-1.052)	-0.042 (-0.139)	-0.032 (-0.115)	0.143 (0.410)	-0.267 (-0.911)
COB: SYR	-0.010 (-0.082)	-0.049 (-0.383)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.020 (-0.154)	-0.180 (-1.450)	0.340** (2.178)	0.005 (0.038)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.681** (-1.978)	-0.319 (-0.829)	-0.262 (-0.654)	-0.476 (-1.319)	-0.324 (-0.871)	-0.050 (-0.107)	-0.630* (-1.782)
Prov: Vienna	-0.078 (-0.486)	-0.032 (-0.190)	0.024 (0.137)	-0.120 (-0.714)	-0.122 (-0.742)	0.250 (1.211)	-0.040 (-0.243)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.161 (0.782)	0.263 (1.225)	0.176 (0.792)	0.452** (2.095)	0.488** (2.349)	0.374 (1.443)	0.101 (0.478)
Prov: Salzburg	0.188 (0.912)	0.255 (1.194)	0.235 (1.054)	0.144 (0.670)	0.244 (1.178)	0.021 (0.083)	0.178 (0.841)
Prov: Styria	0.029 (0.157)	0.085 (0.433)	0.103 (0.504)	-0.013 (-0.064)	0.087 (0.459)	0.084 (0.353)	0.055 (0.290)
Wants to stay in AT	0.286** (2.545)	0.303*** (2.605)	0.259** (2.134)	0.339*** (2.874)	0.322*** (2.861)	0.113 (0.801)	0.240** (2.083)
Speak German: average	0.249 (1.423)	0.183 (1.014)	0.109 (0.577)	0.236 (1.284)	0.324* (1.858)	-0.195 (-0.891)	0.198 (1.103)
Speak German: advanced/MT	0.638*** (3.268)	0.586*** (2.907)	0.441** (2.101)	0.648*** (3.165)	0.809*** (4.149)	-0.307 (-1.256)	0.522*** (2.604)
Constant	-0.724 (-0.969)	-0.851 (-1.122)	-0.610 (-0.772)	-0.666 (-0.849)	-1.405* (-1.915)	0.775 (0.841)	-0.610 (-0.795)
No of obs	482	454	455	482	454	455	482
R ²	0.167	0.171	0.126	0.172	0.226	0.076	0.129
Adjusted R ²	0.120	0.120	0.0728	0.124	0.178	0.0201	0.0793

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C.3 / Regression results: Social integration and German understanding abilities (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Inactive	0.271** (2.076)	0.279** (2.115)	0.295** (2.143)	0.335** (2.418)	0.197 (1.528)	0.331** (2.038)	0.239* (1.783)
Employed	0.355*** (3.478)	0.385*** (3.645)	0.345*** (3.130)	0.330*** (3.039)	0.392*** (3.786)	0.008 (0.059)	0.312*** (2.969)
Age	-0.001 (-0.025)	0.002 (0.067)	-0.005 (-0.132)	0.009 (0.248)	0.032 (0.948)	-0.028 (-0.661)	-0.003 (-0.075)
Age ²	0.000 (0.094)	0.000 (0.011)	0.000 (0.152)	-0.000 (-0.190)	-0.000 (-0.693)	0.000 (0.305)	0.000 (0.119)
Married	0.090 (0.788)	0.079 (0.673)	0.121 (0.984)	0.011 (0.093)	-0.071 (-0.620)	0.095 (0.652)	0.102 (0.867)
Lives with family	-0.032 (-0.327)	-0.055 (-0.544)	-0.049 (-0.462)	-0.065 (-0.618)	-0.115 (-1.154)	-0.013 (-0.108)	-0.022 (-0.215)
Months of residence	-0.001 (-0.108)	0.003 (0.271)	0.001 (0.053)	0.001 (0.088)	0.010 (0.821)	-0.010 (-0.666)	-0.001 (-0.117)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.166)	-0.000 (-0.522)	-0.000 (-0.311)	0.000 (0.265)	-0.000 (-0.754)	0.000 (1.196)	-0.000 (-0.207)
Matura	-0.119 (-1.151)	-0.097 (-0.920)	-0.101 (-0.915)	-0.008 (-0.075)	0.013 (0.122)	0.082 (0.628)	-0.129 (-1.209)
Christian	0.331* (1.744)	0.319* (1.661)	0.356* (1.769)	0.248 (1.229)	0.082 (0.436)	0.495** (2.090)	0.320 (1.639)
Muslim	-0.124 (-1.008)	-0.135 (-1.051)	-0.118 (-0.883)	-0.016 (-0.124)	-0.094 (-0.748)	0.315** (1.989)	-0.127 (-0.997)
Internal locus of control	0.029 (0.589)	0.021 (0.397)	0.020 (0.369)	-0.055 (-1.047)	-0.022 (-0.426)	-0.090 (-1.411)	0.042 (0.817)
External locus of control	-0.020 (-0.484)	-0.023 (-0.554)	-0.025 (-0.556)	0.005 (0.126)	-0.011 (-0.260)	-0.007 (-0.139)	-0.022 (-0.521)
Granted asylum	0.075 (0.561)	0.130 (0.927)	0.165 (1.136)	-0.184 (-1.296)	-0.076 (-0.556)	-0.296* (-1.727)	0.102 (0.743)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.006 (-0.036)	0.041 (0.241)	0.080 (0.448)	-0.293* (-1.658)	-0.135 (-0.805)	-0.387* (-1.842)	0.039 (0.229)
COB: AFG	0.010 (0.058)	-0.064 (-0.368)	-0.028 (-0.154)	-0.140 (-0.776)	-0.224 (-1.323)	0.164 (0.769)	0.024 (0.135)
COB: IRN	-0.277 (-1.003)	-0.301 (-1.084)	-0.315 (-1.086)	-0.115 (-0.391)	-0.127 (-0.468)	0.183 (0.534)	-0.298 (-1.049)
COB: SYR	-0.007 (-0.059)	-0.035 (-0.278)	0.014 (0.108)	-0.004 (-0.034)	-0.161 (-1.308)	0.346** (2.237)	0.006 (0.047)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.706** (-2.086)	-0.350 (-0.924)	-0.296 (-0.748)	-0.482 (-1.339)	-0.318 (-0.858)	-0.042 (-0.089)	-0.655* (-1.880)
Prov: Vienna	-0.125 (-0.788)	-0.066 (-0.393)	-0.008 (-0.044)	-0.151 (-0.893)	-0.143 (-0.870)	0.260 (1.262)	-0.083 (-0.506)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.105 (0.516)	0.205 (0.969)	0.122 (0.556)	0.417* (1.936)	0.454** (2.193)	0.388 (1.497)	0.049 (0.233)
Prov: Salzburg	0.164 (0.809)	0.240 (1.141)	0.219 (0.995)	0.136 (0.632)	0.243 (1.177)	0.028 (0.107)	0.155 (0.742)
Prov: Styria	-0.047 (-0.258)	0.004 (0.021)	0.032 (0.155)	-0.071 (-0.363)	0.017 (0.088)	0.113 (0.471)	-0.013 (-0.067)
Wants to stay in AT	0.298*** (2.693)	0.306*** (2.672)	0.261** (2.184)	0.344*** (2.930)	0.322*** (2.873)	0.110 (0.779)	0.251** (2.205)
Understand German: average	0.252* (1.693)	0.250 (1.617)	0.210 (1.297)	0.184 (1.159)	0.224 (1.480)	-0.124 (-0.650)	0.222 (1.447)
Understand German: advanced/MT	0.768*** (4.623)	0.759*** (4.407)	0.647*** (3.592)	0.609*** (3.444)	0.730*** (4.327)	-0.305 (-1.437)	0.674*** (3.939)
Constant	-0.653 (-0.893)	-0.855 (-1.150)	-0.664 (-0.853)	-0.484 (-0.622)	-1.186 (-1.628)	0.712 (0.776)	-0.581 (-0.772)
No of obs	482	454	455	482	454	455	482
R ²	0.195	0.197	0.148	0.175	0.231	0.079	0.153
Adjusted R ²	0.149	0.149	0.0958	0.128	0.185	0.0229	0.105

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C.4 / Regression results: Social integration and German reading abilities (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Inactive	0.288** (2.165)	0.292** (2.166)	0.308** (2.201)	0.348** (2.488)	0.207 (1.583)	0.323** (1.988)	0.255* (1.872)
Employed	0.444*** (4.305)	0.466*** (4.359)	0.418*** (3.769)	0.395*** (3.639)	0.465*** (4.469)	-0.026 (-0.198)	0.392*** (3.715)
Age	-0.002 (-0.049)	0.001 (0.030)	-0.007 (-0.198)	0.012 (0.328)	0.038 (1.097)	-0.029 (-0.673)	-0.004 (-0.120)
Age ²	-0.000 (-0.021)	-0.000 (-0.082)	0.000 (0.104)	-0.000 (-0.349)	-0.000 (-0.916)	0.000 (0.365)	0.000 (0.040)
Married	0.100 (0.854)	0.090 (0.750)	0.132 (1.057)	0.022 (0.179)	-0.063 (-0.537)	0.096 (0.658)	0.110 (0.921)
Lives with family	-0.031 (-0.310)	-0.070 (-0.674)	-0.064 (-0.597)	-0.062 (-0.587)	-0.127 (-1.252)	-0.015 (-0.121)	-0.022 (-0.215)
Months of residence	0.001 (0.108)	0.005 (0.376)	0.002 (0.169)	0.002 (0.164)	0.009 (0.736)	-0.011 (-0.711)	0.001 (0.083)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.254)	-0.000 (-0.494)	-0.000 (-0.306)	0.000 (0.248)	-0.000 (-0.618)	0.000 (1.205)	-0.000 (-0.292)
Matura	-0.085 (-0.808)	-0.068 (-0.631)	-0.070 (-0.626)	0.003 (0.027)	0.014 (0.129)	0.070 (0.533)	-0.096 (-0.887)
Christian	0.288 (1.483)	0.286 (1.456)	0.328 (1.606)	0.211 (1.034)	0.045 (0.237)	0.504** (2.124)	0.283 (1.424)
Muslim	-0.145 (-1.148)	-0.138 (-1.050)	-0.122 (-0.892)	-0.031 (-0.233)	-0.090 (-0.706)	0.320** (2.013)	-0.144 (-1.116)
Internal locus of control	0.030 (0.587)	0.023 (0.432)	0.023 (0.428)	-0.056 (-1.046)	-0.024 (-0.465)	-0.085 (-1.325)	0.043 (0.824)
External locus of control	-0.023 (-0.560)	-0.028 (-0.647)	-0.029 (-0.649)	0.002 (0.045)	-0.014 (-0.325)	-0.009 (-0.163)	-0.025 (-0.586)
Granted asylum	-0.022 (-0.159)	0.049 (0.340)	0.094 (0.637)	-0.264* (-1.842)	-0.144 (-1.037)	-0.282 (-1.642)	0.017 (0.122)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.084 (-0.496)	-0.029 (-0.163)	0.018 (0.098)	-0.356** (-1.993)	-0.192 (-1.126)	-0.381* (-1.807)	-0.031 (-0.176)
COB: AFG	0.077 (0.444)	0.006 (0.032)	0.023 (0.127)	-0.076 (-0.417)	-0.122 (-0.710)	0.118 (0.551)	0.080 (0.450)
COB: IRN	-0.281 (-0.999)	-0.306 (-1.084)	-0.329 (-1.119)	-0.094 (-0.319)	-0.082 (-0.300)	0.185 (0.541)	-0.305 (-1.061)
COB: SYR	0.010 (0.083)	-0.022 (-0.174)	0.025 (0.188)	0.004 (0.029)	-0.152 (-1.219)	0.333** (2.152)	0.023 (0.175)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.688** (-1.985)	-0.319 (-0.822)	-0.265 (-0.658)	-0.484 (-1.330)	-0.319 (-0.848)	-0.071 (-0.152)	-0.636* (-1.794)
Prov: Vienna	-0.086 (-0.530)	-0.028 (-0.166)	0.024 (0.136)	-0.126 (-0.739)	-0.109 (-0.658)	0.234 (1.131)	-0.048 (-0.288)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.190 (0.918)	0.305 (1.418)	0.208 (0.936)	0.481** (2.216)	0.541*** (2.589)	0.356 (1.377)	0.124 (0.588)
Prov: Salzburg	0.235 (1.131)	0.314 (1.456)	0.274 (1.223)	0.196 (0.901)	0.342 (1.629)	-0.027 (-0.103)	0.215 (1.011)
Prov: Styria	0.021 (0.110)	0.087 (0.440)	0.109 (0.527)	-0.035 (-0.175)	0.076 (0.394)	0.080 (0.334)	0.052 (0.270)
Wants to stay in AT	0.293*** (2.589)	0.309*** (2.636)	0.266** (2.188)	0.339*** (2.847)	0.320*** (2.807)	0.120 (0.845)	0.249** (2.145)
Read German: average	0.171 (1.065)	0.172 (1.034)	0.082 (0.473)	0.197 (1.172)	0.392** (2.427)	-0.245 (-1.221)	0.129 (0.784)
Read German: advanced/MT	0.458*** (2.751)	0.454*** (2.603)	0.332* (1.832)	0.470*** (2.685)	0.687*** (4.052)	-0.251 (-1.189)	0.380** (2.228)
Constant	-0.549 (-0.731)	-0.750 (-0.982)	-0.511 (-0.644)	-0.507 (-0.643)	-1.365* (-1.840)	0.789 (0.855)	-0.465 (-0.606)
No of obs	481	453	454	481	453	454	481
R ²	0.159	0.161	0.121	0.159	0.209	0.076	0.125
Adjusted R ²	0.111	0.110	0.0676	0.111	0.161	0.0197	0.0748

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C.5 / Regression results: Social integration and German writing abilities (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Inactive	0.291** (2.164)	0.297** (2.185)	0.314** (2.231)	0.344** (2.444)	0.205 (1.555)	0.315* (1.937)	0.259* (1.886)
Employed	0.450*** (4.307)	0.473*** (4.379)	0.427*** (3.824)	0.391*** (3.589)	0.462*** (4.408)	-0.027 (-0.206)	0.399*** (3.742)
Age	-0.005 (-0.137)	-0.003 (-0.071)	-0.011 (-0.287)	0.014 (0.368)	0.037 (1.076)	-0.023 (-0.530)	-0.008 (-0.216)
Age ²	-0.000 (-0.022)	-0.000 (-0.081)	0.000 (0.106)	-0.000 (-0.441)	-0.000 (-0.980)	0.000 (0.262)	0.000 (0.056)
Married	0.083 (0.699)	0.075 (0.620)	0.119 (0.946)	0.004 (0.033)	-0.081 (-0.684)	0.088 (0.605)	0.095 (0.791)
Lives with family	-0.018 (-0.177)	-0.054 (-0.515)	-0.053 (-0.489)	-0.052 (-0.482)	-0.105 (-1.031)	-0.025 (-0.201)	-0.011 (-0.101)
Months of residence	0.003 (0.252)	0.007 (0.554)	0.004 (0.329)	0.003 (0.203)	0.010 (0.836)	-0.013 (-0.831)	0.003 (0.222)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.296)	-0.000 (-0.567)	-0.000 (-0.380)	0.000 (0.264)	-0.000 (-0.619)	0.000 (1.265)	-0.000 (-0.337)
Matura	-0.059 (-0.556)	-0.037 (-0.335)	-0.039 (-0.340)	0.010 (0.090)	0.028 (0.266)	0.055 (0.423)	-0.070 (-0.641)
Christian	0.294 (1.501)	0.298 (1.503)	0.337 (1.639)	0.217 (1.061)	0.062 (0.320)	0.497** (2.091)	0.288 (1.440)
Muslim	-0.172 (-1.348)	-0.162 (-1.222)	-0.142 (-1.037)	-0.052 (-0.394)	-0.115 (-0.892)	0.331** (2.086)	-0.168 (-1.290)
Internal locus of control	0.037 (0.714)	0.030 (0.554)	0.027 (0.483)	-0.045 (-0.844)	-0.007 (-0.131)	-0.088 (-1.371)	0.048 (0.909)
External locus of control	-0.016 (-0.376)	-0.020 (-0.463)	-0.023 (-0.509)	0.012 (0.265)	-0.002 (-0.048)	-0.006 (-0.121)	-0.019 (-0.440)
Granted asylum	-0.007 (-0.054)	0.058 (0.401)	0.106 (0.718)	-0.246* (-1.718)	-0.139 (-0.997)	-0.262 (-1.528)	0.030 (0.211)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.054 (-0.318)	-0.000 (-0.000)	0.043 (0.238)	-0.321* (-1.792)	-0.155 (-0.907)	-0.374* (-1.772)	-0.006 (-0.032)
COB: AFG	0.063 (0.359)	-0.016 (-0.088)	0.007 (0.036)	-0.093 (-0.507)	-0.152 (-0.881)	0.132 (0.617)	0.069 (0.388)
COB: IRN	-0.355 (-1.255)	-0.384 (-1.353)	-0.396 (-1.347)	-0.153 (-0.516)	-0.161 (-0.585)	0.216 (0.635)	-0.371 (-1.285)
COB: SYR	0.028 (0.219)	-0.006 (-0.049)	0.038 (0.283)	0.010 (0.074)	-0.141 (-1.117)	0.317** (2.033)	0.040 (0.306)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.652* (-1.862)	-0.258 (-0.659)	-0.205 (-0.507)	-0.468 (-1.280)	-0.289 (-0.762)	-0.094 (-0.202)	-0.602* (-1.683)
Prov: Vienna	-0.046 (-0.278)	0.013 (0.075)	0.065 (0.361)	-0.089 (-0.523)	-0.073 (-0.437)	0.247 (1.195)	-0.012 (-0.071)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.209 (1.003)	0.325 (1.497)	0.223 (0.996)	0.500** (2.297)	0.570*** (2.704)	0.356 (1.376)	0.141 (0.660)
Prov: Salzburg	0.244 (1.168)	0.318 (1.465)	0.283 (1.257)	0.209 (0.959)	0.337 (1.601)	0.005 (0.020)	0.223 (1.047)
Prov: Styria	0.059 (0.309)	0.131 (0.654)	0.148 (0.714)	0.001 (0.006)	0.123 (0.634)	0.084 (0.350)	0.086 (0.440)
Wants to stay in AT	0.275** (2.409)	0.293** (2.475)	0.250** (2.039)	0.322*** (2.701)	0.308*** (2.692)	0.116 (0.817)	0.232** (1.994)
Write German: average	0.122 (0.838)	0.118 (0.785)	0.028 (0.180)	0.197 (1.297)	0.368** (2.511)	-0.152 (-0.839)	0.085 (0.571)
Write German: advanced/MT	0.250 (1.635)	0.238 (1.492)	0.131 (0.792)	0.398** (2.488)	0.554*** (3.578)	-0.070 (-0.364)	0.180 (1.151)
Constant	-0.468 (-0.618)	-0.670 (-0.868)	-0.423 (-0.530)	-0.566 (-0.717)	-1.404* (-1.877)	0.601 (0.650)	-0.375 (-0.485)
No of obs	481	453	454	481	453	454	481
R ²	0.142	0.144	0.109	0.153	0.198	0.075	0.111
Adjusted R ²	0.0926	0.0919	0.0546	0.104	0.149	0.0183	0.0602

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C.6 / Regression results: Social integration and discrimination (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Inactive	0.258*	0.262*	0.283**	0.318**	0.175	0.324**	0.228*
	(1.927)	(1.934)	(2.007)	(2.279)	(1.339)	(1.973)	(1.657)
Employed	0.390***	0.408***	0.372***	0.338***	0.390***	-0.012	0.346***
	(3.753)	(3.776)	(3.309)	(3.122)	(3.735)	(-0.091)	(3.242)
Age	-0.006	-0.005	-0.012	0.009	0.034	-0.032	-0.009
	(-0.184)	(-0.135)	(-0.337)	(0.242)	(0.993)	(-0.745)	(-0.256)
Age ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.124)	(0.068)	(0.214)	(-0.176)	(-0.737)	(0.438)	(0.164)
Married	0.109	0.101	0.144	0.013	-0.070	0.076	0.121
	(0.932)	(0.845)	(1.147)	(0.105)	(-0.603)	(0.521)	(1.014)
Lives with family	-0.018	-0.050	-0.048	-0.031	-0.093	0.013	-0.012
	(-0.174)	(-0.484)	(-0.442)	(-0.292)	(-0.934)	(0.101)	(-0.117)
Months of residence	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.011	-0.011	0.002
	(0.156)	(0.482)	(0.259)	(0.234)	(0.875)	(-0.691)	(0.126)
Months of residence ²	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(-0.342)	(-0.618)	(-0.395)	(0.020)	(-0.886)	(1.182)	(-0.335)
Matura	-0.064	-0.040	-0.044	0.040	0.050	0.098	-0.079
	(-0.605)	(-0.364)	(-0.391)	(0.360)	(0.472)	(0.743)	(-0.725)
Christian	0.277	0.270	0.315	0.190	0.022	0.499**	0.275
	(1.436)	(1.381)	(1.543)	(0.943)	(0.115)	(2.106)	(1.389)
Muslim	-0.180	-0.185	-0.163	-0.058	-0.136	0.316**	-0.179
	(-1.434)	(-1.415)	(-1.194)	(-0.441)	(-1.078)	(1.994)	(-1.383)
Internal locus of control	0.036	0.027	0.025	-0.042	-0.009	-0.076	0.047
	(0.700)	(0.508)	(0.444)	(-0.791)	(-0.170)	(-1.180)	(0.883)
External locus of control	-0.015	-0.014	-0.015	0.000	-0.009	-0.016	-0.016
	(-0.364)	(-0.313)	(-0.327)	(0.004)	(-0.220)	(-0.300)	(-0.380)
Granted asylum	0.028	0.083	0.126	-0.215	-0.112	-0.282*	0.060
	(0.208)	(0.587)	(0.854)	(-1.520)	(-0.816)	(-1.652)	(0.429)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.016	0.025	0.068	-0.321*	-0.164	-0.411*	0.034
	(-0.093)	(0.143)	(0.376)	(-1.819)	(-0.976)	(-1.950)	(0.193)
COB: AFG	0.075	-0.007	0.013	-0.034	-0.114	0.181	0.070
	(0.429)	(-0.041)	(0.068)	(-0.190)	(-0.665)	(0.842)	(0.391)
COB: IRN	-0.211	-0.256	-0.297	0.019	0.016	0.193	-0.257
	(-0.740)	(-0.892)	(-0.991)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.556)	(-0.877)
COB: SYR	0.021	-0.016	0.031	0.009	-0.151	0.358**	0.034
	(0.168)	(-0.127)	(0.228)	(0.067)	(-1.207)	(2.277)	(0.256)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.654*	-0.287	-0.235	-0.441	-0.264	0.011	-0.606*
	(-1.899)	(-0.743)	(-0.585)	(-1.228)	(-0.711)	(0.023)	(-1.714)
Prov: Vienna	-0.070	-0.022	0.033	-0.100	-0.106	0.266	-0.034
	(-0.434)	(-0.129)	(0.185)	(-0.596)	(-0.649)	(1.291)	(-0.204)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.180	0.275	0.185	0.459**	0.490**	0.372	0.120
	(0.871)	(1.282)	(0.829)	(2.137)	(2.363)	(1.437)	(0.568)
Prov: Salzburg	0.218	0.285	0.263	0.158	0.255	0.022	0.209
	(1.055)	(1.328)	(1.173)	(0.734)	(1.230)	(0.085)	(0.987)
Prov: Styria	0.049	0.101	0.120	-0.014	0.079	0.066	0.078
	(0.264)	(0.512)	(0.582)	(-0.074)	(0.417)	(0.275)	(0.406)
Wants to stay in AT	0.307***	0.331***	0.283**	0.372***	0.354***	0.139	0.256**
	(2.701)	(2.811)	(2.304)	(3.143)	(3.123)	(0.974)	(2.201)
Speak German: average	0.233	0.172	0.100	0.242	0.318*	-0.200	0.179
	(1.323)	(0.948)	(0.527)	(1.320)	(1.822)	(-0.911)	(0.994)
Speak German: advanced/MT	0.595***	0.541***	0.404*	0.610***	0.762***	-0.347	0.482**
	(3.029)	(2.664)	(1.907)	(2.976)	(3.888)	(-1.409)	(2.389)
Discrimination: often/very often	-0.051	-0.041	-0.075	0.354**	0.277**	0.402**	-0.107
	(-0.364)	(-0.281)	(-0.497)	(2.434)	(1.986)	(2.288)	(-0.745)
Discrimination: sometimes	-0.062	-0.106	-0.107	-0.052	-0.051	0.001	-0.062
	(-0.538)	(-0.879)	(-0.855)	(-0.433)	(-0.438)	(0.009)	(-0.521)
Discrimination: rarely	0.097	0.066	0.048	0.083	0.071	0.081	0.096
	(0.831)	(0.550)	(0.389)	(0.683)	(0.610)	(0.557)	(0.803)
Constant	-0.624	-0.726	-0.479	-0.721	-1.439*	0.662	-0.488
	(-0.821)	(-0.943)	(-0.597)	(-0.910)	(-1.937)	(0.709)	(-0.626)
No of obs	481	453	454	481	453	454	481
R ²	0.173	0.176	0.131	0.188	0.237	0.090	0.136
Adjusted R ²	0.120	0.120	0.0716	0.136	0.185	0.0278	0.0800

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C. 7 / Regression results: Relationship between social networks with Austrians and co-ethnic social networks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	NETW-AT	NETW-AT	NETW-AT	NETW-AT
Inactive	0.216*	0.119	0.225*	0.128
	(1.693)	(0.929)	(1.767)	(1.005)
Employed	0.555***	0.395***	0.559***	0.401***
	(5.548)	(3.895)	(5.588)	(3.948)
NETW-COB	0.171***	0.175***	0.011	0.007
	(4.416)	(4.665)	(0.101)	(0.068)
Age	0.002	0.046	0.004	0.047
	(0.045)	(1.386)	(0.128)	(1.413)
Age ²	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-0.020)	(-1.036)	(-0.079)	(-1.053)
Married	-0.078	-0.081	-0.088	-0.096
	(-0.680)	(-0.720)	(-0.766)	(-0.838)
Lives with family	-0.053	-0.112	-0.055	-0.113
	(-0.535)	(-1.149)	(-0.561)	(-1.158)
Months of residence	0.014	0.013	0.010	0.010
	(1.139)	(1.058)	(0.826)	(0.817)
Months of residence ²	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-1.071)	(-1.194)	(-0.771)	(-0.949)
Matura	0.101	0.009	0.105	0.015
	(0.990)	(0.091)	(1.032)	(0.145)
Christian	0.095	-0.054	0.156	0.011
	(0.518)	(-0.290)	(0.850)	(0.059)
Muslim	-0.102	-0.177	-0.093	-0.157
	(-0.836)	(-1.432)	(-0.758)	(-1.268)
Internal locus of control	-0.018	-0.006	-0.012	0.001
	(-0.376)	(-0.126)	(-0.249)	(0.025)
External locus of control	-0.055	-0.008	-0.056	-0.010
	(-1.369)	(-0.185)	(-1.387)	(-0.239)
Granted asylum	-0.170	-0.058	-0.205	-0.083
	(-1.254)	(-0.428)	(-1.502)	(-0.612)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.152	-0.077	-0.196	-0.112
	(-0.899)	(-0.466)	(-1.154)	(-0.677)
COB: AFG	-0.220	-0.173	-0.164	-0.124
	(-1.283)	(-1.046)	(-0.942)	(-0.742)
COB: IRN	-0.277	-0.056	-0.218	-0.016
	(-1.000)	(-0.209)	(-0.767)	(-0.058)
COB: SYR	-0.246**	-0.240**	-0.214*	-0.208*
	(-2.004)	(-1.968)	(-1.722)	(-1.687)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.091	-0.315	-0.057	-0.259
	(-0.251)	(-0.866)	(-0.159)	(-0.711)
Prov: Vienna	-0.179	-0.165	-0.154	-0.139
	(-1.092)	(-1.030)	(-0.940)	(-0.864)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.401*	0.419**	0.403*	0.425**
	(1.947)	(2.063)	(1.964)	(2.095)
Prov: Salzburg	0.250	0.240	0.282	0.273
	(1.220)	(1.188)	(1.375)	(1.352)
Prov: Styria	0.151	0.073	0.146	0.070
	(0.808)	(0.392)	(0.781)	(0.378)
Wants to stay in AT		0.302***		0.307***
		(2.743)		(2.796)
Speak German: average		0.359**		0.352**
		(2.103)		(2.048)
Speak German: advanced/MT		0.863***		0.843***
		(4.528)		(4.389)
AFG*NETW-COB			-0.033	0.036
			(-0.212)	(0.242)
IRN*NETW-COB			0.025	0.101
			(0.066)	(0.279)
SYR*NETW-COB			0.218*	0.218*
			(1.839)	(1.924)
Constant	0.049	-1.543**	0.008	-1.581**
	(0.068)	(-2.151)	(0.012)	(-2.202)
No of obs	502	454	502	454
R ²	0.195	0.263	0.206	0.272
Adjusted R ²	0.154	0.216	0.161	0.221

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

13. Annex D

Table D.1 / Endogenous social integration - first stage regression results (basic model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Kessler index (K10)	-0.021*** (-4.325)	-0.021*** (-4.248)	-0.017*** (-3.397)	-0.027*** (-5.387)	-0.026*** (-5.234)	-0.009 (-1.636)	-0.017*** (-3.441)
Age	-0.034 (-0.980)	-0.033 (-0.953)	-0.031 (-0.862)	-0.043 (-1.215)	-0.025 (-0.720)	-0.030 (-0.758)	-0.027 (-0.762)
Age ²	0.000 (0.611)	0.000 (0.582)	0.000 (0.512)	0.000 (0.944)	0.000 (0.504)	0.000 (0.566)	0.000 (0.422)
Married	0.119 (1.063)	0.117 (1.007)	0.141 (1.189)	0.024 (0.210)	0.006 (0.052)	0.039 (0.296)	0.127 (1.120)
Lives with family	-0.035 (-0.357)	-0.064 (-0.632)	-0.062 (-0.600)	-0.089 (-0.872)	-0.122 (-1.208)	-0.112 (-0.984)	-0.022 (-0.222)
Months of residence	0.010 (0.860)	0.013 (1.084)	0.011 (0.915)	0.002 (0.199)	0.009 (0.734)	-0.009 (-0.691)	0.010 (0.844)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.663)	-0.000 (-0.903)	-0.000 (-0.807)	0.000 (0.346)	-0.000 (-0.355)	0.000 (0.905)	-0.000 (-0.740)
Matura	-0.010 (-0.103)	0.016 (0.148)	-0.009 (-0.082)	0.119 (1.126)	0.164 (1.573)	0.023 (0.196)	-0.040 (-0.384)
Christian	0.249 (1.372)	0.251 (1.360)	0.276 (1.461)	0.180 (0.960)	0.092 (0.501)	0.366* (1.768)	0.243 (1.325)
Muslim	-0.222* (-1.866)	-0.230* (-1.863)	-0.198 (-1.574)	-0.098 (-0.799)	-0.181 (-1.476)	0.374*** (2.701)	-0.210* (-1.748)
Internal locus of control	-0.006 (-0.132)	-0.016 (-0.323)	-0.016 (-0.302)	-0.046 (-0.910)	-0.038 (-0.753)	-0.062 (-1.097)	0.002 (0.047)
External locus of control	-0.013 (-0.314)	-0.032 (-0.727)	-0.038 (-0.845)	0.040 (0.926)	-0.000 (-0.004)	0.018 (0.376)	-0.023 (-0.546)
Granted asylum	-0.112 (-0.849)	-0.063 (-0.451)	0.009 (0.066)	-0.361*** (-2.647)	-0.263* (-1.911)	-0.214 (-1.382)	-0.057 (-0.429)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.053 (-0.318)	-0.010 (-0.057)	0.051 (0.290)	-0.389** (-2.246)	-0.200 (-1.153)	-0.320 (-1.645)	0.010 (0.059)
COB: AFG	-0.009 (-0.052)	-0.092 (-0.519)	-0.035 (-0.192)	-0.159 (-0.885)	-0.289 (-1.640)	0.184 (0.922)	0.012 (0.067)
COB: IRN	-0.289 (-1.044)	-0.318 (-1.142)	-0.325 (-1.142)	0.016 (0.056)	-0.066 (-0.240)	0.391 (1.248)	-0.316 (-1.131)
COB: SYR	-0.010 (-0.079)	-0.057 (-0.442)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.090 (-0.693)	-0.222* (-1.742)	0.248* (1.721)	0.016 (0.130)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.772** (-2.276)	-0.457 (-1.219)	-0.412 (-1.074)	-0.502 (-1.427)	-0.373 (-1.000)	-0.088 (-0.209)	-0.723** (-2.110)
Prov: Vienna	-0.202 (-1.283)	-0.173 (-1.040)	-0.105 (-0.621)	-0.206 (-1.264)	-0.243 (-1.476)	0.257 (1.379)	-0.153 (-0.963)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.166 (0.834)	0.228 (1.098)	0.145 (0.686)	0.424** (2.060)	0.426** (2.062)	0.247 (1.061)	0.113 (0.561)
Prov: Salzburg	0.116 (0.571)	0.161 (0.759)	0.149 (0.685)	0.100 (0.475)	0.162 (0.767)	0.028 (0.119)	0.110 (0.534)
Prov: Styria	-0.035 (-0.193)	0.008 (0.041)	0.022 (0.112)	-0.031 (-0.161)	0.072 (0.377)	0.102 (0.470)	-0.007 (-0.036)
Constant	1.330* (1.824)	1.321* (1.783)	1.094 (1.443)	1.886** (2.494)	1.537** (2.087)	0.731 (0.878)	1.044 (1.417)
No of obs	548	516	517	548	516	517	548
R ²	0.109	0.111	0.081	0.130	0.149	0.056	0.084
Adjusted R ²	0.0717	0.0718	0.0400	0.0934	0.111	0.0140	0.0458

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D.2 / Endogenous social integration - first stage regression results (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Kessler index (K10)	-0.019*** (-3.936)	-0.020*** (-3.902)	-0.017*** (-3.224)	-0.022*** (-4.379)	-0.021*** (-4.217)	-0.010 (-1.582)	-0.016*** (-3.220)
Age	-0.014 (-0.414)	-0.011 (-0.310)	-0.016 (-0.430)	-0.012 (-0.322)	0.018 (0.517)	-0.040 (-0.922)	-0.013 (-0.366)
Age ²	0.000 (0.244)	0.000 (0.141)	0.000 (0.224)	0.000 (0.282)	-0.000 (-0.392)	0.000 (0.640)	0.000 (0.184)
Married	0.121 (1.066)	0.117 (1.008)	0.139 (1.144)	0.062 (0.522)	0.016 (0.143)	0.038 (0.269)	0.122 (1.050)
Lives with family	-0.041 (-0.420)	-0.077 (-0.762)	-0.065 (-0.614)	-0.108 (-1.039)	-0.160 (-1.604)	-0.049 (-0.397)	-0.022 (-0.220)
Months of residence	0.004 (0.310)	0.007 (0.570)	0.005 (0.400)	0.001 (0.074)	0.006 (0.517)	-0.011 (-0.734)	0.003 (0.284)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.318)	-0.000 (-0.559)	-0.000 (-0.411)	0.000 (0.273)	-0.000 (-0.423)	0.000 (1.084)	-0.000 (-0.344)
Matura	-0.030 (-0.288)	-0.010 (-0.093)	-0.013 (-0.121)	0.041 (0.381)	0.060 (0.582)	0.065 (0.501)	-0.043 (-0.405)
Christian	0.311* (1.685)	0.294 (1.567)	0.340* (1.746)	0.181 (0.929)	0.017 (0.091)	0.423* (1.853)	0.311 (1.643)
Muslim	-0.166 (-1.364)	-0.192 (-1.523)	-0.154 (-1.171)	-0.072 (-0.560)	-0.204* (-1.651)	0.364** (2.372)	-0.157 (-1.256)
Internal locus of control	0.024 (0.484)	0.011 (0.206)	0.010 (0.187)	-0.052 (-0.991)	-0.026 (-0.515)	-0.084 (-1.323)	0.036 (0.696)
External locus of control	0.025 (0.588)	0.024 (0.540)	0.015 (0.327)	0.060 (1.334)	0.041 (0.937)	0.023 (0.425)	0.015 (0.348)
Granted asylum	0.008 (0.064)	0.065 (0.469)	0.119 (0.835)	-0.230* (-1.659)	-0.137 (-1.014)	-0.242 (-1.450)	0.044 (0.325)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.047 (-0.282)	0.000 (0.000)	0.045 (0.252)	-0.284 (-1.618)	-0.128 (-0.761)	-0.341 (-1.644)	-0.007 (-0.038)
COB: AFG	0.034 (0.201)	-0.048 (-0.277)	-0.005 (-0.028)	-0.144 (-0.805)	-0.226 (-1.331)	0.149 (0.706)	0.049 (0.283)
COB: IRN	-0.153 (-0.563)	-0.199 (-0.727)	-0.245 (-0.859)	0.131 (0.456)	0.123 (0.457)	0.286 (0.860)	-0.204 (-0.731)
COB: SYR	-0.015 (-0.116)	-0.056 (-0.439)	-0.007 (-0.051)	-0.057 (-0.428)	-0.201 (-1.596)	0.285* (1.824)	0.002 (0.019)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.858** (-2.511)	-0.551 (-1.445)	-0.476 (-1.200)	-0.645* (-1.796)	-0.550 (-1.472)	-0.138 (-0.296)	-0.787** (-2.247)
Prov: Vienna	-0.161 (-1.033)	-0.118 (-0.717)	-0.061 (-0.356)	-0.170 (-1.036)	-0.183 (-1.135)	0.253 (1.260)	-0.119 (-0.745)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.175 (0.885)	0.267 (1.292)	0.179 (0.837)	0.393* (1.888)	0.458** (2.264)	0.254 (1.016)	0.127 (0.624)
Prov: Salzburg	0.113 (0.556)	0.177 (0.840)	0.160 (0.731)	0.065 (0.304)	0.170 (0.824)	-0.026 (-0.101)	0.111 (0.532)
Prov: Styria	-0.020 (-0.108)	0.030 (0.154)	0.051 (0.255)	-0.067 (-0.345)	0.030 (0.156)	0.050 (0.214)	-0.013 (0.070)
Wants to stay in AT	0.251** (2.247)	0.265** (2.294)	0.224* (1.866)	0.292** (2.489)	0.279** (2.459)	0.083 (0.590)	0.210* (1.835)
Speak German: average	0.264 (1.532)	0.201 (1.137)	0.119 (0.645)	0.268 (1.480)	0.381** (2.192)	-0.191 (-0.885)	0.209 (1.183)
Speak German: advanced/MT	0.658*** (3.446)	0.620*** (3.151)	0.462** (2.255)	0.722*** (3.594)	0.924*** (4.789)	-0.287 (-1.200)	0.532*** (2.717)
Constant	0.124 (0.164)	0.071 (0.093)	0.157 (0.198)	0.483 (0.610)	-0.267 (-0.357)	1.172 (1.262)	0.080 (0.104)
No of obs	496	468	469	496	468	469	496
R ²	0.167	0.171	0.122	0.178	0.230	0.061	0.127
Adjusted R ²	0.123	0.124	0.0728	0.134	0.186	0.00817	0.0801

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D.3 / Second stage regression results of the effect of social integration on labour market integration (basic model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
SI-TOT	0.089 (0.949)	0.266* (1.774)												
SI-AT			0.102 (1.011)	0.237 (1.604)										
SI-COB					0.125 (0.666)	0.286 (0.975)								
NETW-TOT							0.068 (1.081)	0.206** (2.064)						
NETW-AT									0.084 (1.120)	0.186* (1.736)				
NETW-COB											0.226 (0.206)	0.553 (0.130)		
SC-TOT													0.111 (0.658)	0.335 (1.259)
Age	-0.036*** (-2.796)	0.029 (1.421)	-0.035** (-2.366)	0.027 (1.285)	-0.035** (-2.260)	0.029 (1.184)	-0.036*** (-2.917)	0.030 (1.593)	-0.037*** (-2.686)	0.026 (1.377)	-0.033 (-0.668)	0.038 (0.355)	-0.036*** (-2.602)	0.030 (1.190)
Age ²	0.001*** (2.871)	-0.000* (-1.659)	0.001** (2.470)	-0.000 (-1.547)	0.001** (2.407)	-0.000 (-1.383)	0.000*** (2.971)	-0.001* (-1.900)	0.001*** (2.743)	-0.000* (-1.714)	0.000 (0.630)	-0.001 (-0.381)	0.001*** (2.595)	-0.000 (-1.416)
Married	-0.120*** (-2.738)	-0.009 (-0.162)	-0.127*** (-2.589)	-0.004 (-0.064)	-0.133** (-2.516)	-0.013 (-0.182)	-0.114*** (-2.664)	0.021 (0.432)	-0.118** (-2.491)	0.024 (0.462)	-0.127 (-0.874)	0.009 (0.021)	-0.124*** (-2.596)	-0.020 (-0.265)
Lives with family	0.042 (1.213)	0.009 (0.166)	0.046 (1.229)	0.011 (0.225)	0.047 (1.144)	0.010 (0.163)	0.046 (1.334)	0.013 (0.284)	0.051 (1.400)	0.013 (0.282)	0.068 (0.619)	0.054 (0.156)	0.042 (1.067)	0.007 (0.111)
Months of residence	-0.001 (-0.102)	0.010 (1.627)	-0.001 (-0.217)	0.009 (1.362)	-0.001 (-0.198)	0.008 (1.105)	0.001 (0.091)	0.012** (2.250)	-0.001 (-0.122)	0.010* (1.858)	0.002 (0.119)	0.016 (0.347)	-0.001 (-0.123)	0.010 (1.208)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.253)	-0.000 (-0.469)	-0.000 (-0.164)	-0.000 (-0.175)	-0.000 (-0.130)	-0.000 (-0.079)	-0.000 (-0.471)	-0.000 (-1.007)	-0.000 (-0.283)	-0.000 (-0.579)	-0.000 (-0.218)	-0.000 (-0.144)	-0.000 (-0.191)	-0.000 (-0.263)
Matura	0.050 (1.361)	0.105** (1.980)	0.050 (1.163)	0.087 (1.571)	0.053 (1.133)	0.096 (1.432)	0.043 (1.137)	0.076 (1.395)	0.038 (0.868)	0.057 (1.005)	0.049 (0.430)	0.076 (0.208)	0.053 (1.383)	0.115* (1.826)
Christian	-0.003 (-0.062)	-0.046 (-0.456)	-0.014 (-0.233)	-0.059 (-0.624)	-0.020 (-0.324)	-0.080 (-0.696)	0.006 (0.097)	-0.015 (-0.164)	-0.001 (-0.012)	-0.021 (-0.243)	-0.039 (-0.244)	-0.187 (-0.763)	-0.007 (-0.132)	-0.062 (-0.564)
Muslim	0.055 (1.357)	-0.063 (-0.833)	0.057 (1.338)	-0.096 (-1.218)	0.058 (1.284)	-0.096 (-1.136)	0.045 (1.167)	-0.104 (-1.578)	0.050 (1.201)	-0.115* (-1.805)	-0.011 (-0.080)	-0.349* (-1.883)	0.058 (1.327)	-0.052 (-0.574)
Internal locus of control	0.008 (0.374)	-0.001 (-0.044)	0.010 (0.427)	-0.009 (-0.326)	0.009 (0.400)	-0.009 (-0.301)	0.010 (0.467)	0.005 (0.191)	0.012 (0.548)	-0.006 (-0.239)	0.024 (0.343)	0.019 (0.127)	0.007 (0.311)	-0.004 (-0.118)
External locus of control	-0.001 (-0.032)	0.006 (0.244)	0.002 (0.124)	0.008 (0.340)	0.004 (0.151)	0.010 (0.307)	-0.004 (-0.247)	-0.005 (-0.231)	-0.001 (-0.056)	0.002 (0.111)	-0.005 (-0.120)	-0.010 (-0.069)	0.001 (0.036)	0.010 (0.309)

ctd.

Table D.3 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Granted asylum	0.032 (0.697)	-0.020 (-0.283)	0.024 (0.446)	-0.025 (-0.350)	0.019 (0.334)	-0.034 (-0.420)	0.040 (0.914)	0.018 (0.259)	0.036 (0.701)	0.012 (0.189)	0.063 (0.728)	0.093 (0.561)	0.028 (0.561)	-0.032 (-0.393)
Granted subsidiary protection	0.006 (0.106)	0.139 (1.570)	0.003 (0.043)	0.115 (1.255)	-0.001 (-0.017)	0.108 (1.051)	0.018 (0.332)	0.200** (2.300)	0.012 (0.193)	0.155* (1.865)	0.062 (0.522)	0.302 (1.369)	0.001 (0.019)	0.120 (1.174)
COB: AFG	0.164* (1.928)	-0.022 (-0.249)	0.190** (2.139)	-0.009 (-0.103)	0.186** (1.963)	-0.018 (-0.187)	0.172** (2.091)	0.003 (0.037)	0.203** (2.241)	0.015 (0.169)	0.150 (0.936)	-0.136 (-0.723)	0.162* (1.791)	-0.029 (-0.281)
COB: IRN	0.198 (1.521)	-0.001 (-0.005)	0.204 (1.477)	-0.010 (-0.077)	0.220 (1.410)	-0.002 (-0.013)	0.149 (1.292)	-0.057 (-0.487)	0.152 (1.175)	-0.051 (-0.425)	0.046 (0.243)	-0.256 (-1.006)	0.213 (1.471)	0.019 (0.133)
COB: SYR	0.016 (0.373)	0.041 (0.601)	0.025 (0.553)	0.048 (0.684)	0.020 (0.416)	0.034 (0.451)	0.020 (0.482)	0.060 (0.941)	0.033 (0.771)	0.077 (1.085)	-0.031 (-0.246)	-0.100 (-0.579)	0.013 (0.288)	0.034 (0.421)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.086 (-1.628)	-0.020 (-0.080)	-0.093 (-1.557)	-0.247 (-1.076)	-0.095 (-1.569)	-0.234 (-0.933)	-0.087* (-1.660)	-0.146 (-0.803)	-0.092 (-1.577)	-0.268 (-1.488)	-0.116 (-1.092)	-0.277 (-0.902)	-0.086 (-1.470)	0.029 (0.103)
Prov: Vienna	0.094 (1.569)	-0.227** (-2.286)	0.099 (1.443)	-0.255*** (-2.577)	0.095 (1.398)	-0.267** (-2.505)	0.090 (1.510)	-0.239*** (-2.814)	0.104 (1.520)	-0.246*** (-2.666)	0.043 (0.387)	-0.429** (-2.478)	0.093 (1.525)	-0.230** (-2.047)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.014 (0.206)	-0.004 (-0.030)	0.007 (0.098)	-0.062 (-0.517)	0.007 (0.092)	-0.060 (-0.445)	0.010 (0.139)	-0.043 (-0.351)	0.002 (0.023)	-0.075 (-0.606)	-0.007 (-0.066)	-0.145 (-0.763)	0.015 (0.219)	0.003 (0.025)
Prov: Salzburg	0.001 (0.018)	-0.111 (-1.000)	-0.006 (-0.089)	-0.139 (-1.248)	-0.006 (-0.090)	-0.146 (-1.197)	0.007 (0.113)	-0.095 (-0.932)	-0.003 (-0.042)	-0.123 (-1.215)	0.006 (0.054)	-0.094 (-0.523)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.118 (-0.948)
Prov: Styria	0.025 (0.389)	-0.153 (-1.454)	0.028 (0.377)	-0.199* (-1.937)	0.027 (0.360)	-0.203* (-1.719)	0.028 (0.425)	-0.149 (-1.505)	0.027 (0.364)	-0.198** (-2.068)	0.026 (0.202)	-0.235 (-1.204)	0.023 (0.348)	-0.160 (-1.366)
Exogeneity test	-1.404* (-1.739)	-1.393** (-2.245)	-1.420* (-1.757)	-1.237** (-1.963)	-1.773* (-1.805)	-1.673** (-2.197)	-0.898 (-1.406)	-0.941* (-1.919)	-1.091 (-1.619)	-0.730 (-1.383)	-3.553* (-1.909)	-3.958*** (-2.770)	-1.844* (-1.846)	-1.936** (-2.528)
No of obs	548	548	516	516	517	517	548	548	516	516	517	517	548	548
ll	-449.1	-449.1	-427.1	-427.1	-431.4	-431.4	-449.3	-449.3	-423.1	-423.1	-436.6	-436.6	-451.5	-451.5

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D.4 / Second stage regression results of the effect of social integration on labour market integration (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
SI-TOT	0.114 (0.736)	0.236 (0.566)												
SI-AT			0.129 (0.939)	0.194 (0.976)										
SI-COB					0.150 (0.935)	0.220 (0.979)								
NETW-TOT							0.097 (1.037)	0.202 (1.637)						
NETW-AT									0.126 (1.118)	0.174 (1.232)				
NETW-COB											0.248 (0.210)	0.392 (0.188)		
SC-TOT													0.136 (0.566)	0.284 (0.958)
Age	-0.033** (-2.139)	0.021 (0.789)	-0.034** (-2.216)	0.020 (0.894)	-0.033** (-2.029)	0.022 (0.924)	-0.034** (-2.458)	0.020 (0.936)	-0.037** (-2.489)	0.015 (0.694)	-0.026 (-0.307)	0.035 (0.282)	-0.033* (-1.860)	0.021 (0.835)
Age ²	0.000** (2.252)	-0.000 (-1.044)	0.000** (2.287)	-0.000 (-1.123)	0.000** (2.157)	-0.000 (-1.111)	0.000** (2.550)	-0.000 (-1.245)	0.001** (2.509)	-0.000 (-1.043)	0.000 (0.423)	-0.001 (-0.342)	0.000** (-1.966)	-0.000 (-1.043)
Married	-0.093* (-1.868)	-0.014 (-0.215)	-0.100** (-1.997)	-0.005 (-0.079)	-0.105** (-2.023)	-0.010 (-0.145)	-0.087* (-1.889)	0.005 (0.099)	-0.088* (-1.808)	0.015 (0.288)	-0.097 (-0.662)	0.009 (0.032)	-0.096 (-1.629)	-0.019 (-0.272)
Lives with family	0.011 (0.289)	0.024 (0.424)	0.015 (0.358)	0.025 (0.434)	0.014 (0.323)	0.020 (0.319)	0.018 (0.492)	0.034 (0.701)	0.028 (0.644)	0.034 (0.638)	0.018 (0.110)	0.025 (0.105)	0.010 (0.233)	0.020 (0.336)
Months of residence	0.003 (0.446)	0.008 (0.841)	0.002 (0.339)	0.006 (0.892)	0.003 (0.356)	0.006 (0.848)	0.004 (0.582)	0.009 (1.355)	0.003 (0.358)	0.007 (0.995)	0.006 (0.257)	0.011 (0.307)	0.003 (0.412)	0.008 (1.035)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.685)	-0.000 (-0.086)	-0.000 (-0.551)	0.000 (0.165)	-0.000 (-0.562)	0.000 (0.177)	-0.000 (-0.885)	-0.000 (-0.321)	-0.000 (-0.600)	0.000 (0.105)	-0.000 (-0.293)	-0.000 (-0.126)	-0.000 (-0.632)	-0.000 (-0.076)
Matura	0.049 (1.125)	0.103* (1.656)	0.050 (1.059)	0.078 (1.379)	0.052 (1.032)	0.082 (1.311)	0.045 (1.029)	0.089 (1.569)	0.040 (0.824)	0.069 (1.180)	0.037 (0.156)	0.050 (0.108)	0.052 (1.060)	0.107 (1.605)
Christian	-0.049 (-0.890)	0.037 (0.336)	-0.059 (-1.060)	0.024 (0.212)	-0.066 (-1.177)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.039 (-0.668)	0.083 (0.854)	-0.041 (-0.704)	0.089 (0.945)	-0.121 (-0.663)	-0.072 (-0.283)	-0.052 (-0.827)	0.017 (0.142)
Muslim	0.044 (0.954)	-0.029 (-0.398)	0.047 (0.977)	-0.068 (-0.913)	0.045 (0.921)	-0.074 (-0.903)	0.035 (0.817)	-0.051 (-0.769)	0.045 (0.956)	-0.062 (-0.907)	-0.050 (-0.326)	-0.243 (-1.313)	0.046 (0.881)	-0.024 (-0.294)
Internal locus of control	0.008 (0.303)	-0.005 (-0.195)	0.009 (0.352)	-0.010 (-0.389)	0.008 (0.310)	-0.011 (-0.371)	0.014 (0.607)	0.011 (0.383)	0.014 (0.549)	-0.003 (-0.109)	0.032 (0.446)	0.023 (0.140)	0.006 (0.178)	-0.010 (-0.302)
External locus of control	-0.009 (-0.458)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.009 (-0.475)	0.004 (0.161)	-0.009 (-0.419)	0.004 (0.160)	-0.011 (-0.667)	-0.006 (-0.261)	-0.011 (-0.557)	0.001 (0.060)	-0.013 (-0.201)	-0.001 (-0.009)	-0.009 (-0.360)	0.002 (0.076)

ctd.

Table D.4 / continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed	Inactive	Employed
Granted asylum	0.011 (0.205)	-0.015 (-0.199)	-0.003 (-0.045)	-0.013 (-0.193)	-0.010 (-0.131)	-0.018 (-0.209)	0.031 (0.622)	0.029 (0.449)	0.021 (0.374)	0.024 (0.399)	0.064 (0.615)	0.105 (0.695)	0.006 (0.090)	-0.026 (-0.319)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.013 (-0.197)	0.157 (1.573)	-0.022 (-0.304)	0.146* (1.650)	-0.026 (-0.305)	0.147 (1.408)	0.005 (0.076)	0.197** (2.234)	-0.009 (-0.143)	0.168** (1.969)	0.055 (0.415)	0.286 (1.386)	-0.017 (-0.237)	0.147 (1.359)
COB: AFG	0.138 (1.411)	-0.010 (-0.112)	0.168* (1.757)	0.002 (0.023)	0.163 (1.571)	-0.004 (-0.046)	0.159* (1.698)	0.021 (0.250)	0.192** (2.069)	0.027 (0.304)	0.133 (0.902)	-0.075 (-0.451)	0.135 (1.257)	-0.016 (-0.167)
COB: IRN	0.163 (1.174)	0.031 (0.247)	0.169 (1.187)	0.028 (0.213)	0.189 (1.232)	0.035 (0.259)	0.112 (0.868)	-0.010 (-0.079)	0.097 (0.782)	-0.010 (-0.076)	0.046 (0.230)	-0.096 (-0.410)	0.179 (1.175)	0.044 (0.321)
COB: SYR	-0.019 (-0.360)	0.060 (0.839)	-0.010 (-0.178)	0.068 (0.983)	-0.015 (-0.260)	0.058 (0.806)	-0.015 (-0.314)	0.069 (1.077)	0.006 (0.117)	0.093 (1.261)	-0.094 (-0.682)	-0.047 (-0.263)	-0.021 (-0.366)	0.056 (0.710)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.088 (-1.429)	0.005 (0.020)	-0.095 (-1.572)	-0.242 (-0.975)	-0.098 (-1.547)	-0.246 (-0.929)	-0.090* (-1.678)	-0.085 (-0.428)	-0.094 (-1.551)	-0.227 (-1.064)	-0.127 (-1.189)	-0.277 (-0.949)	-0.090 (-1.216)	0.035 (0.123)
Prov: Vienna	0.084 (1.291)	-0.229** (-2.331)	0.090 (1.290)	-0.262*** (-2.773)	0.084 (1.216)	-0.273*** (-2.725)	0.080 (1.289)	-0.233*** (-2.741)	0.099 (1.391)	-0.253*** (-2.818)	0.021 (0.165)	-0.381** (-2.174)	0.082 (1.100)	-0.233** (-2.266)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.019 (0.261)	-0.007 (-0.063)	0.008 (0.099)	-0.066 (-0.517)	0.009 (0.116)	-0.064 (-0.482)	0.010 (0.132)	-0.045 (-0.351)	-0.006 (-0.083)	-0.088 (-0.636)	-0.015 (-0.126)	-0.120 (-0.657)	0.020 (0.265)	-0.002 (-0.014)
Prov: Salzburg	-0.010 (-0.160)	-0.118 (-1.107)	-0.019 (-0.265)	-0.141 (-1.295)	-0.019 (-0.254)	-0.142 (-1.228)	-0.004 (-0.056)	-0.102 (-1.008)	-0.018 (-0.248)	-0.136 (-1.328)	-0.003 (-0.028)	-0.074 (-0.449)	-0.012 (-0.173)	-0.124 (-1.072)
Prov: Styria	0.043 (0.606)	-0.182* (-1.847)	0.050 (0.603)	-0.227** (-2.179)	0.047 (0.586)	-0.233** (-2.049)	0.048 (0.664)	-0.169* (-1.691)	0.048 (0.571)	-0.218** (-2.242)	0.054 (0.403)	-0.233 (-1.253)	0.039 (0.507)	-0.191* (-1.814)
Wants to stay in AT	-0.066 (-1.002)	-0.011 (-0.079)	-0.077 (-1.130)	-0.002 (-0.026)	-0.076 (-1.129)	-0.002 (-0.018)	-0.066 (-1.200)	-0.009 (-0.128)	-0.078 (-1.247)	0.005 (0.064)	-0.065 (-0.225)	0.018 (0.042)	-0.066 (-0.839)	-0.011 (-0.109)
Speak German: average	-0.223* (-1.840)	0.176 (1.585)	-0.223* (-1.882)	0.189* (1.830)	-0.205* (-1.710)	0.197* (1.955)	-0.213** (-2.119)	0.179* (1.657)	-0.262** (-2.153)	0.173 (1.580)	-0.059 (-0.455)	0.232* (1.854)	-0.219* (-1.685)	0.178 (1.626)
Speak German: advanced/MT	-0.225 (-1.458)	0.190 (1.280)	-0.232 (-1.554)	0.229 (1.634)	-0.210 (-1.402)	0.247* (1.706)	-0.214 (-1.643)	0.191 (1.373)	-0.284* (-1.747)	0.193 (1.243)	0.007 (0.043)	0.406** (2.204)	-0.220 (-1.309)	0.193 (1.295)
Exogeneity test	-1.642* (-1.775)	-1.410* (-1.933)	-1.662* (-1.807)	-1.187 (-1.609)	-1.920* (-1.805)	-1.470* (-1.731)	-1.249 (-1.557)	-1.181* (-1.870)	-1.654* (-1.875)	-1.002 (-1.420)	-3.406* (-1.837)	-3.196** (-2.181)	-2.030* (-1.851)	-1.835** (-2.126)
No of obs	496	496	468	468	469	469	496	496	468	468	469	469	496	496
ll	-397.2	-397.2	-377.1	-377.1	-379.5	-379.5	-398.2	-398.2	-376.7	-376.7	-381.8	-381.8	-401.7	-401.7

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D. 5 / Endogenous labour market integration - first stage regression results (basic model)

	SI-TOT		SI-AT		SI-COB		NETW-TOT		NETW-AT		NETW-COB		SC-TOT	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed
Ever had a job before	-0.054	0.014	-0.066*	-0.012	-0.064*	-0.003	-0.054	0.014	-0.066*	-0.012	-0.064*	-0.003	-0.054	0.014
	(-1.550)	(0.257)	(-1.761)	(-0.209)	(-1.712)	(-0.049)	(-1.550)	(0.257)	(-1.761)	(-0.209)	(-1.712)	(-0.049)	(-1.550)	(0.257)
Worked during flight	-0.078*	-0.029	-0.080*	-0.007	-0.079*	-0.006	-0.078*	-0.029	-0.080*	-0.007	-0.079*	-0.006	-0.078*	-0.029
	(-1.924)	(-0.630)	(-1.850)	(-0.154)	(-1.842)	(-0.133)	(-1.924)	(-0.630)	(-1.850)	(-0.154)	(-1.842)	(-0.133)	(-1.924)	(-0.630)
Age	-0.030***	0.027	-0.029**	0.028	-0.029**	0.027	-0.030***	0.027	-0.029**	0.028	-0.029**	0.027	-0.030***	0.027
	(-2.641)	(1.474)	(-2.442)	(1.479)	(-2.449)	(1.445)	(-2.641)	(1.474)	(-2.442)	(1.479)	(-2.449)	(1.445)	(-2.641)	(1.474)
Age ²	0.000***	-0.001**	0.000**	-0.001**	0.000***	-0.001*	0.000***	-0.001**	0.000**	-0.001**	0.000***	-0.001*	0.000***	-0.001**
	(2.762)	(-1.971)	(2.574)	(-1.961)	(2.584)	(-1.928)	(2.762)	(-1.971)	(2.574)	(-1.961)	(2.584)	(-1.928)	(2.762)	(-1.971)
Married	-0.107**	-0.000	-0.113**	0.005	-0.113**	0.007	-0.107**	-0.000	-0.113**	0.005	-0.113**	0.007	-0.107**	-0.000
	(-2.530)	(-0.007)	(-2.541)	(0.094)	(-2.541)	(0.138)	(-2.530)	(-0.007)	(-2.541)	(0.094)	(-2.541)	(0.138)	(-2.530)	(-0.007)
Lives with family	0.051	0.003	0.053	0.000	0.051	-0.004	0.051	0.003	0.053	0.000	0.051	-0.004	0.051	0.003
	(1.573)	(0.062)	(1.544)	(0.010)	(1.496)	(-0.085)	(1.573)	(0.062)	(1.544)	(0.010)	(1.496)	(-0.085)	(1.573)	(0.062)
Months of residence	-0.000	0.015**	-0.001	0.014**	-0.001	0.013**	-0.000	0.015**	-0.001	0.014**	-0.001	0.013**	-0.000	0.015**
	(-0.075)	(2.470)	(-0.107)	(2.144)	(-0.124)	(2.097)	(-0.075)	(2.470)	(-0.107)	(2.144)	(-0.124)	(2.097)	(-0.075)	(2.470)
Months of residence ²	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-0.358)	(-1.123)	(-0.330)	(-0.839)	(-0.320)	(-0.802)	(-0.358)	(-1.123)	(-0.330)	(-0.839)	(-0.320)	(-0.802)	(-0.358)	(-1.123)
Matura	0.051	0.091*	0.054	0.075	0.055	0.079	0.051	0.091*	0.054	0.075	0.055	0.079	0.051	0.091*
	(1.384)	(1.872)	(1.404)	(1.518)	(1.442)	(1.596)	(1.384)	(1.872)	(1.404)	(1.518)	(1.442)	(1.596)	(1.384)	(1.872)
Christian	0.005	0.052	-0.006	0.039	-0.006	0.039	0.005	0.052	-0.006	0.039	-0.006	0.039	0.005	0.052
	(0.089)	(0.581)	(-0.095)	(0.431)	(-0.089)	(0.433)	(0.089)	(0.581)	(-0.095)	(0.431)	(-0.089)	(0.433)	(0.089)	(0.581)
Muslim	0.028	-0.105*	0.025	-0.130**	0.025	-0.132**	0.028	-0.105*	0.025	-0.130**	0.025	-0.132**	0.028	-0.105*
	(0.719)	(-1.836)	(0.589)	(-2.167)	(0.587)	(-2.194)	(0.719)	(-1.836)	(0.589)	(-2.167)	(0.587)	(-2.194)	(0.719)	(-1.836)
Internal locus of control	0.006	-0.001	0.007	-0.009	0.006	-0.010	0.006	-0.001	0.007	-0.009	0.006	-0.010	0.006	-0.001
	(0.340)	(-0.060)	(0.364)	(-0.398)	(0.344)	(-0.458)	(0.340)	(-0.060)	(0.364)	(-0.398)	(0.344)	(-0.458)	(0.340)	(-0.060)
External locus of control	-0.005	-0.009	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005	-0.008	-0.005	-0.009	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005	-0.008	-0.005	-0.009
	(-0.371)	(-0.493)	(-0.318)	(-0.362)	(-0.329)	(-0.399)	(-0.371)	(-0.493)	(-0.318)	(-0.362)	(-0.329)	(-0.399)	(-0.371)	(-0.493)
Granted asylum	0.011	-0.024	0.005	-0.014	0.009	-0.003	0.011	-0.024	0.005	-0.014	0.009	-0.003	0.011	-0.024
	(0.237)	(-0.402)	(0.091)	(-0.212)	(0.174)	(-0.049)	(0.237)	(-0.402)	(0.091)	(-0.212)	(0.174)	(-0.049)	(0.237)	(-0.402)
Granted subsidiary protection	0.005	0.144*	0.005	0.132	0.010	0.143*	0.005	0.144*	0.005	0.132	0.010	0.143*	0.005	0.144*
	(0.090)	(1.833)	(0.090)	(1.603)	(0.160)	(1.753)	(0.090)	(1.833)	(0.090)	(1.603)	(0.160)	(1.753)	(0.090)	(1.833)
COB: AFG	0.187***	-0.007	0.203***	-0.020	0.204***	-0.018	0.187***	-0.007	0.203***	-0.020	0.204***	-0.018	0.187***	-0.007
	(2.611)	(-0.096)	(2.731)	(-0.251)	(2.742)	(-0.225)	(2.611)	(-0.096)	(2.731)	(-0.251)	(2.742)	(-0.225)	(2.611)	(-0.096)
COB: IRN	0.167	-0.097	0.167	-0.109	0.167	-0.109	0.167	-0.097	0.167	-0.109	0.167	-0.109	0.167	-0.097
	(1.464)	(-0.854)	(1.440)	(-0.961)	(1.439)	(-0.960)	(1.464)	(-0.854)	(1.440)	(-0.961)	(1.439)	(-0.960)	(1.464)	(-0.854)

ctd.

Table D.5 / continued

	SI-TOT		SI-AT		SI-COB		NETW-TOT		NETW-AT		NETW-COB		SC-TOT	
	(1) Inactive	(2) Employ-ed	(3) Inactive	(4) Employ-ed	(5) Inactive	(6) Employ-ed	(7) Inactive	(8) Employ-ed	(9) Inactive	(10) Employ-ed	(11) Inactive	(12) Employ-ed	(13) Inactive	(14) Employ-ed
COB: SYR	0.022 (0.588)	0.044 (0.770)	0.026 (0.673)	0.034 (0.576)	0.026 (0.663)	0.034 (0.579)	0.022 (0.588)	0.044 (0.770)	0.026 (0.673)	0.034 (0.576)	0.026 (0.663)	0.034 (0.579)	0.022 (0.588)	0.044 (0.770)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.083* (-1.880)	-0.295** (-1.971)	-0.088* (-1.883)	-0.376** (-2.413)	-0.088* (-1.881)	-0.378** (-2.421)	-0.083* (-1.880)	-0.295** (-1.971)	-0.088* (-1.883)	-0.376** (-2.413)	-0.088* (-1.881)	-0.378** (-2.421)	-0.083* (-1.880)	-0.295** (-1.971)
Prov: Vienna	0.088* (1.805)	-0.317*** (-4.171)	0.093* (1.811)	-0.339*** (-4.244)	0.094* (1.813)	-0.339*** (-4.251)	0.088* (1.805)	-0.317*** (-4.171)	0.093* (1.811)	-0.339*** (-4.244)	0.094* (1.813)	-0.339*** (-4.251)	0.088* (1.805)	-0.317*** (-4.171)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.053 (0.769)	0.041 (0.413)	0.057 (0.776)	-0.015 (-0.142)	0.051 (0.715)	-0.027 (-0.262)	0.053 (0.769)	0.041 (0.413)	0.057 (0.776)	-0.015 (-0.142)	0.051 (0.715)	-0.027 (-0.262)	0.053 (0.769)	0.041 (0.413)
Prov: Salzburg	0.019 (0.331)	-0.063 (-0.641)	0.017 (0.283)	-0.089 (-0.873)	0.017 (0.284)	-0.090 (-0.879)	0.019 (0.331)	-0.063 (-0.641)	0.017 (0.283)	-0.089 (-0.873)	0.017 (0.284)	-0.090 (-0.879)	0.019 (0.331)	-0.063 (-0.641)
Prov: Styria	0.036 (0.635)	-0.159* (-1.775)	0.041 (0.687)	-0.196** (-2.106)	0.042 (0.688)	-0.197** (-2.109)	0.036 (0.635)	-0.159* (-1.775)	0.041 (0.687)	-0.196** (-2.106)	0.042 (0.688)	-0.197** (-2.109)	0.036 (0.635)	-0.159* (-1.775)
Observations	534	534	502	502	503	503	534	534	502	502	503	503	534	534
ll	-443.5	-443.5	-421.3	-421.3	-423.2	-423.2	-443.5	-443.5	-421.3	-421.3	-423.2	-423.2	-443.5	-443.5

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D.6 / Endogenous labour market integration - first stage regression results (extended model)

	SI-TOT		SI-AT		SI-COB		NETW-TOT		NETW-AT		NETW-COB		SC-TOT	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed	Inactive	Employ-ed
Ever had a job before	-0.065*	0.026	-0.078**	-0.005	-0.076*	0.004	-0.065*	0.026	-0.078**	-0.005	-0.076*	0.004	-0.065*	0.026
	(-1.783)	(0.466)	(-2.000)	(-0.087)	(-1.957)	(0.073)	(-1.783)	(0.466)	(-2.000)	(-0.087)	(-1.957)	(0.073)	(-1.783)	(0.466)
Worked during flight	-0.107**	-0.043	-0.109**	-0.021	-0.109**	-0.020	-0.107**	-0.043	-0.109**	-0.021	-0.109**	-0.020	-0.107**	-0.043
	(-2.311)	(-0.888)	(-2.239)	(-0.417)	(-2.233)	(-0.393)	(-2.311)	(-0.888)	(-2.239)	(-0.417)	(-2.233)	(-0.393)	(-2.311)	(-0.888)
Age	-0.023*	0.021	-0.023*	0.022	-0.022*	0.022	-0.023*	0.021	-0.023*	0.022	-0.022*	0.022	-0.023*	0.021
	(-1.940)	(1.088)	(-1.812)	(1.167)	(-1.806)	(1.149)	(-1.940)	(1.088)	(-1.812)	(1.167)	(-1.806)	(1.149)	(-1.940)	(1.088)
Age ²	0.000**	-0.000	0.000**	-0.000	0.000**	-0.000	0.000**	-0.000	0.000**	-0.000	0.000**	-0.000	0.000**	-0.000
	(2.094)	(-1.517)	(1.972)	(-1.569)	(1.971)	(-1.545)	(2.094)	(-1.517)	(1.972)	(-1.569)	(1.971)	(-1.545)	(2.094)	(-1.517)
Married	-0.069	-0.010	-0.074	-0.001	-0.074	-0.000	-0.069	-0.010	-0.074	-0.001	-0.074	-0.000	-0.069	-0.010
	(-1.574)	(-0.181)	(-1.623)	(-0.027)	(-1.624)	(-0.003)	(-1.574)	(-0.181)	(-1.623)	(-0.027)	(-1.624)	(-0.003)	(-1.574)	(-0.181)
Lives with family	0.020	0.015	0.019	0.010	0.017	0.006	0.020	0.015	0.019	0.010	0.017	0.006	0.020	0.015
	(0.587)	(0.320)	(0.538)	(0.222)	(0.489)	(0.124)	(0.587)	(0.320)	(0.538)	(0.222)	(0.489)	(0.124)	(0.587)	(0.320)
Months of residence	0.003	0.011*	0.003	0.009	0.003	0.009	0.003	0.011*	0.003	0.009	0.003	0.009	0.003	0.011*
	(0.662)	(1.678)	(0.673)	(1.332)	(0.661)	(1.269)	(0.662)	(1.678)	(0.673)	(1.332)	(0.661)	(1.269)	(0.662)	(1.678)
Months of residence ²	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-0.961)	(-0.495)	(-0.961)	(-0.189)	(-0.955)	(-0.142)	(-0.961)	(-0.495)	(-0.961)	(-0.189)	(-0.955)	(-0.142)	(-0.961)	(-0.495)
Matura	0.049	0.089*	0.055	0.067	0.056	0.070	0.049	0.089*	0.055	0.067	0.056	0.070	0.049	0.089*
	(1.282)	(1.789)	(1.369)	(1.321)	(1.394)	(1.387)	(1.282)	(1.789)	(1.369)	(1.321)	(1.394)	(1.387)	(1.282)	(1.789)
Christian	-0.050	0.141	-0.062	0.116	-0.062	0.117	-0.050	0.141	-0.062	0.116	-0.062	0.117	-0.050	0.141
	(-0.851)	(1.500)	(-1.012)	(1.205)	(-1.016)	(1.218)	(-0.851)	(1.500)	(-1.012)	(1.205)	(-1.016)	(1.218)	(-0.851)	(1.500)
Muslim	0.006	-0.046	0.001	-0.081	0.000	-0.083	0.006	-0.046	0.001	-0.081	0.000	-0.083	0.006	-0.046
	(0.144)	(-0.766)	(0.012)	(-1.290)	(0.008)	(-1.307)	(0.144)	(-0.766)	(0.012)	(-1.290)	(0.008)	(-1.307)	(0.144)	(-0.766)
Internal locus of control	0.011	0.001	0.011	-0.005	0.010	-0.007	0.011	0.001	0.011	-0.005	0.010	-0.007	0.011	0.001
	(0.552)	(0.032)	(0.524)	(-0.219)	(0.503)	(-0.269)	(0.552)	(0.032)	(0.524)	(-0.219)	(0.503)	(-0.269)	(0.552)	(0.032)
External locus of control	-0.009	-0.006	-0.010	0.000	-0.010	-0.000	-0.009	-0.006	-0.010	0.000	-0.010	-0.000	-0.009	-0.006
	(-0.619)	(-0.313)	(-0.638)	(0.015)	(-0.651)	(-0.022)	(-0.619)	(-0.313)	(-0.638)	(0.015)	(-0.651)	(-0.022)	(-0.619)	(-0.313)
Granted asylum	-0.004	0.017	-0.010	0.028	-0.006	0.039	-0.004	0.017	-0.010	0.028	-0.006	0.039	-0.004	0.017
	(-0.072)	(0.281)	(-0.185)	(0.447)	(-0.115)	(0.635)	(-0.072)	(0.281)	(-0.185)	(0.447)	(-0.115)	(0.635)	(-0.072)	(0.281)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.013	0.161**	-0.015	0.159*	-0.011	0.170**	-0.013	0.161**	-0.015	0.159*	-0.011	0.170**	-0.013	0.161**
	(-0.231)	(2.023)	(-0.236)	(1.934)	(-0.180)	(2.101)	(-0.231)	(2.023)	(-0.236)	(1.934)	(-0.180)	(2.101)	(-0.231)	(2.023)
COB: AFG	0.178**	0.005	0.191**	-0.008	0.193**	-0.006	0.178**	0.005	0.191**	-0.008	0.193**	-0.006	0.178**	0.005
	(2.348)	(0.068)	(2.461)	(-0.100)	(2.475)	(-0.074)	(2.348)	(0.068)	(2.461)	(-0.100)	(2.475)	(-0.074)	(2.348)	(0.068)
COB: IRN	0.169	-0.035	0.163	-0.045	0.164	-0.043	0.169	-0.035	0.163	-0.045	0.164	-0.043	0.169	-0.035
	(1.325)	(-0.278)	(1.266)	(-0.360)	(1.271)	(-0.347)	(1.325)	(-0.278)	(1.266)	(-0.360)	(1.271)	(-0.347)	(1.325)	(-0.278)

ctd.

Table D.6 / continued

	SI-TOT		SI-AT		SI-COB		NETW-TOT		NETW-AT		NETW-COB		SC-TOT	
	(1) Inactive	(2) Employ-ed	(3) Inactive	(4) Employ-ed	(5) Inactive	(6) Employ-ed	(7) Inactive	(8) Employ-ed	(9) Inactive	(10) Employ-ed	(11) Inactive	(12) Employ-ed	(13) Inactive	(14) Employ-ed
COB: SYR	-0.010	0.066	-0.006	0.060	-0.007	0.059	-0.010	0.066	-0.006	0.060	-0.007	0.059	-0.010	0.066
	(-0.228)	(1.115)	(-0.142)	(0.991)	(-0.156)	(0.974)	(-0.228)	(1.115)	(-0.142)	(0.991)	(-0.156)	(0.974)	(-0.228)	(1.115)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.087*	-0.280*	-0.090*	-0.376**	-0.090*	-0.378**	-0.087*	-0.280*	-0.090*	-0.376**	-0.090*	-0.378**	-0.087*	-0.280*
	(-1.912)	(-1.866)	(-1.910)	(-2.451)	(-1.908)	(-2.465)	(-1.912)	(-1.866)	(-1.910)	(-2.451)	(-1.908)	(-2.465)	(-1.912)	(-1.866)
Prov: Vienna	0.072	-0.297***	0.081	-0.318***	0.081	-0.319***	0.072	-0.297***	0.081	-0.318***	0.081	-0.319***	0.072	-0.297***
	(1.450)	(-3.856)	(1.547)	(-3.935)	(1.552)	(-3.940)	(1.450)	(-3.856)	(1.547)	(-3.935)	(1.552)	(-3.940)	(1.450)	(-3.856)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.063	0.036	0.066	-0.013	0.061	-0.027	0.063	0.036	0.066	-0.013	0.061	-0.027	0.063	0.036
	(0.870)	(0.359)	(0.867)	(-0.125)	(0.811)	(-0.253)	(0.870)	(0.359)	(0.867)	(-0.125)	(0.811)	(-0.253)	(0.870)	(0.359)
Prov: Salzburg	0.012	-0.078	0.010	-0.095	0.010	-0.096	0.012	-0.078	0.010	-0.095	0.010	-0.096	0.012	-0.078
	(0.193)	(-0.768)	(0.158)	(-0.905)	(0.161)	(-0.912)	(0.193)	(-0.768)	(0.158)	(-0.905)	(0.161)	(-0.912)	(0.193)	(-0.768)
Prov: Styria	0.053	-0.186**	0.061	-0.222**	0.061	-0.222**	0.053	-0.186**	0.061	-0.222**	0.061	-0.222**	0.053	-0.186**
	(0.860)	(-2.035)	(0.949)	(-2.341)	(0.952)	(-2.340)	(0.860)	(-2.035)	(0.949)	(-2.341)	(0.952)	(-2.340)	(0.860)	(-2.035)
Wants to stay in AT	-0.026	0.060	-0.030	0.064	-0.030	0.062	-0.026	0.060	-0.030	0.064	-0.030	0.062	-0.026	0.060
	(-0.678)	(1.163)	(-0.742)	(1.194)	(-0.763)	(1.154)	(-0.678)	(1.163)	(-0.742)	(1.194)	(-0.763)	(1.154)	(-0.678)	(1.163)
Speak German: average	-0.122	0.195**	-0.139	0.190**	-0.137	0.191**	-0.122	0.195**	-0.139	0.190**	-0.137	0.191**	-0.122	0.195**
	(-1.520)	(2.476)	(-1.589)	(2.362)	(-1.572)	(2.393)	(-1.520)	(2.476)	(-1.589)	(2.362)	(-1.572)	(2.393)	(-1.520)	(2.476)
Speak German: advanced/MT	-0.064	0.292***	-0.077	0.298***	-0.074	0.303***	-0.064	0.292***	-0.077	0.298***	-0.074	0.303***	-0.064	0.292***
	(-0.728)	(3.347)	(-0.807)	(3.331)	(-0.775)	(3.413)	(-0.728)	(3.347)	(-0.807)	(3.331)	(-0.775)	(3.413)	(-0.728)	(3.347)
Observations	482	482	454	454	455	455	482	482	454	454	455	455	482	482
ll	-386.7	-386.7	-366.3	-366.3	-367.8	-367.8	-386.7	-386.7	-366.3	-366.3	-367.8	-367.8	-386.7	-386.7

Note: Average marginal effects are reported. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D.7 / Second stage regression results of the effect of labour market integration on social integration (basic model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Inactive	-0.464 (-0.733)	-0.428 (-0.700)	-0.519 (-0.811)	0.075 (0.116)	0.140 (0.235)	0.500 (0.728)	-0.507 (-0.790)
Employed	0.262 (0.472)	0.364 (0.582)	0.244 (0.364)	0.849 (1.494)	1.012* (1.662)	0.402 (0.558)	0.127 (0.226)
Age	-0.044 (-1.086)	-0.044 (-1.072)	-0.048 (-1.123)	-0.033 (-0.782)	-0.014 (-0.341)	-0.017 (-0.371)	-0.040 (-0.984)
Age ²	0.000 (0.867)	0.000 (0.864)	0.001 (0.899)	0.000 (0.743)	0.000 (0.407)	0.000 (0.242)	0.000 (0.761)
Married	0.009 (0.062)	0.004 (0.026)	0.036 (0.249)	-0.050 (-0.354)	-0.081 (-0.592)	0.115 (0.739)	0.025 (0.182)
Lives with family	0.032 (0.300)	0.005 (0.042)	-0.000 (-0.001)	-0.010 (-0.088)	-0.052 (-0.483)	-0.093 (-0.762)	0.033 (0.302)
Months of residence	0.012 (0.890)	0.015 (1.060)	0.014 (0.913)	-0.000 (-0.019)	0.007 (0.531)	-0.013 (-0.789)	0.013 (0.934)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-1.110)	-0.000 (-1.352)	-0.000 (-1.201)	0.000 (0.058)	-0.000 (-0.802)	0.000 (1.039)	-0.000 (-1.169)
Matura	0.002 (0.014)	0.018 (0.143)	0.009 (0.066)	0.056 (0.425)	0.079 (0.636)	-0.011 (-0.074)	-0.016 (-0.125)
Christian	0.293 (1.528)	0.296 (1.537)	0.311 (1.560)	0.235 (1.199)	0.154 (0.821)	0.409* (1.913)	0.279 (1.439)
Muslim	-0.177 (-1.297)	-0.157 (-1.038)	-0.156 (-0.988)	0.029 (0.210)	0.021 (0.144)	0.392** (2.303)	-0.187 (-1.353)
Internal locus of control	-0.001 (-0.018)	-0.005 (-0.096)	-0.005 (-0.097)	-0.044 (-0.876)	-0.024 (-0.472)	-0.060 (-1.059)	0.008 (0.163)
External locus of control	-0.069* (-1.665)	-0.086** (-1.991)	-0.084* (-1.888)	-0.023 (-0.548)	-0.054 (-1.280)	-0.008 (-0.157)	-0.070* (-1.661)
Granted asylum	-0.080 (-0.583)	-0.033 (-0.228)	0.026 (0.176)	-0.306** (-2.183)	-0.203 (-1.456)	-0.248 (-1.579)	-0.036 (-0.258)
Granted subsidiary protection	-0.020 (-0.106)	0.013 (0.069)	0.080 (0.396)	-0.462** (-2.443)	-0.270 (-1.449)	-0.423* (-1.949)	0.057 (0.305)
COB: AFG	0.177 (0.864)	0.099 (0.472)	0.151 (0.690)	-0.020 (-0.093)	-0.161 (-0.786)	0.147 (0.624)	0.183 (0.879)
COB: IRN	-0.256 (-0.812)	-0.283 (-0.888)	-0.266 (-0.809)	-0.045 (-0.138)	-0.137 (-0.441)	0.304 (0.859)	-0.278 (-0.870)
COB: SYR	0.015 (0.115)	-0.029 (-0.224)	0.030 (0.222)	-0.072 (-0.542)	-0.212* (-1.665)	0.266* (1.823)	0.042 (0.323)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.698* (-1.786)	-0.320 (-0.699)	-0.332 (-0.693)	-0.205 (-0.510)	-0.205 (0.153)	0.068 (0.290)	-0.697* (-1.759)
Prov: Vienna	-0.108 (-0.468)	-0.051 (-0.191)	-0.004 (-0.016)	0.019 (0.081)	0.028 (0.108)	0.377 (1.253)	-0.091 (-0.388)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.192 (0.913)	0.258 (1.193)	0.172 (0.772)	0.476** (2.210)	0.469** (2.224)	0.352 (1.470)	0.130 (0.611)
Prov: Salzburg	0.195 (0.928)	0.248 (1.105)	0.221 (0.951)	0.224 (1.040)	0.308 (1.412)	0.107 (0.429)	0.173 (0.810)
Prov: Styria	0.017 (0.080)	0.083 (0.362)	0.079 (0.328)	0.126 (0.597)	0.269 (1.199)	0.222 (0.859)	0.022 (0.105)
Constant	0.937 (1.116)	0.822 (0.956)	0.868 (0.973)	0.703 (0.817)	0.103 (0.123)	0.098 (0.102)	0.858 (1.008)
Observations	534	502	503	534	502	503	534
R ²	0.057	0.063	0.019	0.085	0.114	0.036	0.030
Adjusted R ²	0.0148	0.0176	-0.0285	0.0442	0.0711	-0.0106	-0.0140
<i>Endogeneity test</i>	1.714	1.755	2.042	1.026	0.818	0.445	1.722
p-value	0.425	0.416	0.360	0.599	0.664	0.800	0.423
<i>Underidentification test</i>	17.82	13.53	12.68	17.82	13.53	12.68	17.82
p-value	2.43e-05	0.000235	0.000370	2.43e-05	0.000235	0.000370	2.43e-05
<i>Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic</i>	8.804	6.618	6.192	8.804	6.618	6.192	8.804
Stock-Yogo weak ID critical values (n=2, k=2)							
10% maximal IV size	7.03						
15% maximal IV size	4.58						
20% maximal IV size	3.95						
25% maximal IV size	3.63						

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D.8 / Second stage regression results of the effect of labour market integration on social integration (extended model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Inactive	-0.691 (-1.291)	-0.495 (-0.997)	-0.640 (-1.193)	0.175 (0.330)	0.276 (0.577)	0.140 (0.240)	-0.774 (-1.399)
Employed	-0.123 (-0.221)	-0.111 (-0.188)	-0.369 (-0.561)	0.547 (0.988)	0.988* (1.748)	-0.185 (-0.257)	-0.252 (-0.438)
Age	-0.018 (-0.472)	-0.010 (-0.259)	-0.020 (-0.502)	0.010 (0.265)	0.038 (1.036)	-0.032 (-0.734)	-0.022 (-0.551)
Age ²	0.000 (0.391)	0.000 (0.181)	0.000 (0.341)	-0.000 (-0.166)	-0.000 (-0.668)	0.000 (0.370)	0.000 (0.432)
Married	0.007 (0.058)	0.013 (0.102)	0.042 (0.306)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.060 (-0.484)	0.074 (0.492)	0.014 (0.108)
Lives with family	0.014 (0.133)	-0.028 (-0.267)	-0.022 (-0.195)	-0.051 (-0.486)	-0.114 (-1.115)	-0.009 (-0.069)	0.025 (0.231)
Months of residence	0.011 (0.788)	0.014 (0.974)	0.013 (0.878)	0.002 (0.122)	0.006 (0.436)	-0.008 (-0.517)	0.012 (0.811)
Months of residence ²	-0.000 (-0.955)	-0.000 (-1.060)	-0.000 (-0.868)	-0.000 (-0.018)	-0.000 (-0.846)	0.000 (1.140)	-0.000 (-0.970)
Matura	0.013 (0.107)	0.014 (0.119)	0.039 (0.299)	-0.002 (-0.020)	-0.025 (-0.218)	0.101 (0.703)	0.013 (0.101)
Christian	0.330 (1.539)	0.314 (1.489)	0.379* (1.673)	0.173 (0.814)	-0.035 (-0.172)	0.526** (2.132)	0.337 (1.519)
Muslim	-0.180 (-1.352)	-0.203 (-1.439)	-0.202 (-1.329)	-0.026 (-0.195)	-0.069 (-0.506)	0.313* (1.890)	-0.183 (-1.333)
Internal locus of control	0.042 (0.789)	0.028 (0.521)	0.027 (0.479)	-0.055 (-1.055)	-0.020 (-0.395)	-0.088 (-1.408)	0.055 (1.015)
External locus of control	-0.033 (-0.762)	-0.031 (-0.699)	-0.035 (-0.740)	0.003 (0.078)	-0.007 (-0.170)	-0.010 (-0.204)	-0.036 (-0.802)
Granted asylum	0.029 (0.211)	0.090 (0.624)	0.144 (0.936)	-0.214 (-1.542)	-0.121 (-0.872)	-0.275 (-1.639)	0.060 (0.419)
Granted subsidiary protection	0.028 (0.144)	0.078 (0.396)	0.158 (0.738)	-0.337* (-1.771)	-0.233 (-1.237)	-0.357 (-1.528)	0.085 (0.429)
COB: AFG	0.232 (1.183)	0.128 (0.650)	0.182 (0.865)	-0.061 (-0.315)	-0.169 (-0.893)	0.167 (0.726)	0.246 (1.210)
COB: IRN	-0.085 (-0.273)	-0.180 (-0.587)	-0.204 (-0.622)	0.004 (0.012)	0.005 (0.016)	0.162 (0.453)	-0.119 (-0.371)
COB: SYR	-0.007 (-0.054)	-0.038 (-0.283)	0.020 (0.138)	-0.036 (-0.268)	-0.212 (-1.638)	0.346** (2.204)	0.011 (0.082)
Prov: East- & Southeast Austria	-0.899** (-2.293)	-0.589 (-1.300)	-0.631 (-1.286)	-0.432 (-1.109)	-0.092 (-0.212)	-0.137 (-0.257)	-0.875** (-2.161)
Prov: Vienna	-0.188 (-0.813)	-0.162 (-0.639)	-0.168 (-0.607)	-0.053 (-0.232)	0.066 (0.271)	0.200 (0.662)	-0.173 (-0.723)
Prov: Upper Austria	0.218 (1.011)	0.285 (1.304)	0.190 (0.819)	0.445** (2.081)	0.485** (2.313)	0.377 (1.490)	0.164 (0.737)
Prov: Salzburg	0.145 (0.669)	0.198 (0.879)	0.154 (0.635)	0.161 (0.748)	0.306 (1.414)	0.001 (0.006)	0.128 (0.572)
Prov: Styria	-0.036 (-0.165)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.022 (-0.088)	0.028 (0.129)	0.213 (0.943)	0.052 (0.186)	-0.023 (-0.103)
Wants to stay in AT	0.285** (2.321)	0.307** (2.437)	0.269** (2.000)	0.319*** (2.617)	0.283** (2.338)	0.118 (0.802)	0.243* (1.915)
Speak German: average	0.204 (1.036)	0.157 (0.787)	0.092 (0.427)	0.196 (1.006)	0.265 (1.379)	-0.195 (-0.833)	0.156 (0.770)
Speak German: advanced/MT	0.695*** (2.941)	0.661*** (2.679)	0.564** (2.096)	0.592** (2.523)	0.671*** (2.830)	-0.274 (-0.934)	0.595** (2.437)
Constant	-0.228 (-0.275)	-0.409 (-0.498)	-0.080 (-0.091)	-0.549 (-0.666)	-1.452* (-1.843)	0.882 (0.923)	-0.095 (-0.110)
No of obs	482	454	455	482	454	455	482
R ²	0.059	0.091	-0.006	0.160	0.163	0.071	0.003
Adjusted R ²	0.00562	0.0358	-0.0667	0.112	0.112	0.0145	-0.0541
Endogeneity test	4.254	3.189	4.402	0.272	1.237	0.150	4.650
p-value	0.119	0.203	0.111	0.873	0.539	0.928	0.0978
Underidentification test	16.33	14.11	12.98	16.33	14.11	12.98	16.33
p-value	5.32e-05	0.000173	0.000315	5.32e-05	0.000173	0.000315	5.32e-05
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	7.979	6.847	6.282	7.979	6.847	6.282	7.979
Stock-Yogo weak ID critical values (n=2, k=2)							
10% maximal IV size	7.03						
15% maximal IV size	4.58						
20% maximal IV size	3.95						
25% maximal IV size	3.63						

Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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